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ABSTRACT 
A MEETING OF MINDS: 
COALITIONS, at:PRESENTATIONS AND AMERICAN 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 
BRAZILIAN AMAZON 
by 
Lise Fernanda Sedrez 
American environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have created and 
spread in the last decade a particular representation of the Amazon rainforest among the 
public and policy-makers. This new representation contrasts with earlier American 
representations of the Amazon in that it has been more responsive to local (Amazon) concerns 
and agendas. This greater responsiveness is a direct result of strategic conditions with Brazilian 
NGOs by most US NGOs. US NGOs may avoid charges of 'environmental imperialism" and 
obtain larger legitimacy in their action in the Amazon by Opting for the coalition strategy. 
However, this option also stesses the differences between two environmental traditions, 
North and South, at the same time that it [minis out common areas of understanding. The 
primary sources used in this study are the documents and reports, published (paper pamphlets) 
and on-line (conferences), produced by the NGOs themselves and interviews with US NCO 
officers. The thesis analyses the Mahogany Campaign (1991-1997) as an example of a broad 
coalition between North and South NGOs. 
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CHAPTER. ONE 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Only since the mid-80s have American environmental non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) such as Sierra Club or Environmental Defense Fund developed interest in and 
concern for the Amazon region. A preliminary review in the 1982 and 1983 issues of the Sierra 
Club magazine did not reveal any reference to the Amazon rainforest. Rainforest Alliance and 
Rainforest Action Network, organizations in the US exclusively dedicated to the preservation 
of the tropical rainforest, were founded in 1986 and 1987, respectively. Yet ten years later, in 
1992, research showed that more than 70% of the US NGOs with international action 
dedicated some part of their agenda to issues concerning the Amazon (Mohd & Laarman, 
1994). From mid-1980s on, American NGOs' view of Amazon has helped to shape national 
and international policies regarding to the South American rainforest. 
US NGOs' growing influence in international environmental policy has been 
denounced by some local governmental officers as a new form of imperialism — an 
unjustifiable interference in internal activities of a sovereign country. International concern on 
the deforestation of the Amazon has been charged as an attempt for the "internationalization 
of the Amazon": "[this international concern] built on a long-standing sensitivity with respect 
to the Amazon and existing accusations about international interest in the region" (Kolk, 1996, 
p. 5). The charge of environmental imperialism is also supported, although on a different basis, 
by some environmental activists. They allege that American NGOs are transporting their own 
values of wilderness to the Third World, which has its own parameters for a relationship with 
the nature (Guha, 1989; Luke, 1997). Such imposition, by disregarding local concerns, is not 
only imperialist but can be harmful to Third World societies and environments. 
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One example of this sort of environmental imperialism, according to R. Guha, is the 
creation of the Project Tiger in India. A network of- parks aimed for the conservation of the 
tiger, the Project Tiger "transplanted the American system of national parks into Indian soil" 
and it was encouraged and acclaimed by the international environmental community. 
However, it was made possible only "by the physical displacement of existing villages and their 
inhabitants." For those traditional villages, the installation of national parks for the sake of the 
wilderness can be as oppressive and distressing as a huge dam. Regarding the Amazon, the 
impact of the action of the American NGOs in the region is unquestionable: Melone (1993), 
Conklin and Graham (1995) and Kolk agree that part of the achievements of Amazon local 
movements such as indigenous people's and rubber tappers', was due to their alliances with 
American and other Northern environmental NGOs. 
American NGO policies for the Amazon are generated from their mental 
representation of the region. These policies re Elect the values and/or biases held by such 
representation, and they will affect the Amazon accordingly. The problem, therefore, is to 
understand how the Amazon appears in the American environmental mentalité and how this 
representation was formed. To evaluate the charges of environmental imperialism, we need to 
recognize whether the idea of Amazon propagated by American NGOs is no more than the 
expansion of their own values of wilderness. Or if is it rather a collective  representation, for it 
has assimilated concerns and elements characteristics of the local NGOs' agendas? To do so, 
we should analyze the context in which the relationship between US NGOs and local NGOs 
takes place. Is this relationship a sheer co-optation of the legitimacy that local NGOs can 
The concept mentalité was created by French historiography, In a free translation, it means a mental outlook as 
expressed in discourse and artifacts, a way of thought that derives from a specific sociocultural, economic 
structure. It is used here in a broader sense, to include the collection of representations and mental references 
belonging to a particular culture. 
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offer? Or is it a true collaboration between different agents, with clear bent as for both 
partners? 
1.1 Methodology  
This research derives from two different theoretical traditions: histoire des mentalités  and 
environmental history. Although each of them has been developed mainly in different sides of 
the Atlantic Ocean (France and the United States), they have shared their respective major 
subjects very often. Environmental history belongs to American historiography. It asks how 
societies understand their own environments, which kind of interaction humans—in each 
society—build with the natural world surrounding them.(Opie, 1998, p. 5). 
On the other hand, Fernand Braudel (1949), one of the founders of the histoire des 
mentalités, produced one of the more significant works on environmental history - The 
Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age Of Philip  II. More recently, Emmanuel Le Roy 
Ladurie (1967/1988), an acclaimed contemporary historian of mentalités. , wrote Times of Feast, 
Times of Famine: A History of Climate Since the Year 1000. Although neither Braudel nor La Roy 
Laduric defined themselves as environmental historians, the presence of environmental. issues 
is an essential characteristic of their work. 
We borrow from histoire des mentalités two key concepts for this study: representation  
and mentalité. I took both concepts from French cultural historiography, especially in the 
works of Jacques Le Goff and Fernand Braudel. "By representation," says Le Goff, "I mean 
any mental image of a perceived external reality. Representation is related to the process of 
abstraction. The representation of a cathedral is our idea of it.." Mentalité, on the other hand, is 
more comprehensive than representation. The term is rather vague, and it has been used both 
to designate discourse and artifact--single mental constructions--and to define intellectual 
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universes, the collection of images and representations that constitute the horizon of 
references of a particular culture (Le Goff, 1988). To Fernand Braudel, mentalité is as much a 
fact of a civilization as its economic structure or geographical environment. "In every period", 
states Braudel (1987/1993, p. 22), "a certain view of the world, a collective mentality [mentalité], 
dominates the whole mass of society." 
In order to build an oceanic bridge among these two historical traditions, we use 
complementary methodological techniques. Each of these adds a different approach to the 
problem (see following sub-items). A timeline will offer a chronological sequence to the 
research. Comparative history will situate our objects in their context and underline the 
differences and new aspects. Discourse analysis identifies mental representations in the sources 
and how such representations fit in the environmental mentalité. Structured interviews will offer us 
an inside-view on how the actors see the image that themselves created. Finally, the case study 
underlies a particular interaction of American and Amazon agendas. 
1.1.1 Timeline  
Timelines are useful tools by historians; they put events in a chronological sequence without 
necessary linking them in cause-effect connections. Time is a central concept in history and 
timelines may be active, complex and multifaceted. They are the major frames that the 
historian built for the documents. 
This thesis' timeline focus on three major benchmarks. The first is the earlier US 
representations of the Amazon, until the middle of this century (Chapter 2, Earlier Images of 
the Amazon in the United States). The second benchmark is the incorporation of global 
concerns, including the Amazon rainforest, in the US NGOs Agendas, in the 1980s (Chapter 
3, Thinking Globally, Acting Globally). Finally, the third benchmark (Chapter 4, Coalition: A  
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Network Made of Conflict, Diversity and .Alliances) studies the analyses and evaluation of the 
experience of coalition between US and Brazilian NGOs, in the 1990s. 
1.1.2 Comparative History 
A comparative history approach should underline the differences and similarities between the 
two partners in this relationship (local and US environmental NGOs). A first basis for 
comparative analysis is how these partners consider the existence of forest people. The 
traditional concept of wilderness in US implies a representation of nature where humanity is 
not permanent presence. Most of environmental groups in Brazil, on the other hand, 
developed out of social and Indian rights movements, with strong support for forest people 
demands. For the same reason, control of natural resources has been an important element in 
the Brazilian NGOs agenda, while considerations for Nature per se are more common in the 
US conservationist movement. Finally, different historical contexts set the basis of support and 
legitimacy for local and for US environmental NGOs and support and legitimacy are key issues 
in this relationship. 
Two other questions should provide us with a better understanding of the different 
representations of Amazon: 
• The role of science in each different representation. Science can be the method to generate 
new information, or to conquer the forest through technology, or to guarantee 
sustainability. 
• The values that are present in each representation and how they justify the different 
proposals for the Amazon. Some actors stress the importance of the Amazon forest for 
itself, while others underline the Amazon region as the provider of natural resources, or 
the source of life for forest people. These different conceptions of the value of the 
Amazon are not necessarily exclusive, but they are not automatically compatible either. 
1.1.3 Discourse Analysis  
Discourses are cultural artifacts, products of the mentalité. Hence discourse analysis is a possible 
and privileged way of access to the mentalité and its representations. Although we will focus on 
the American environmental mentalité  and its representation of Amazon, we will work at the 
borders of this mental universe, and how it answers to external influences. Hence the 
American environmental historian Richard White's concept of "middle ground" is particularly 
useful. "Middle ground," says White (1991, p. 255), "is the construction of mutually 
comprehensible world characterized by new systems of meaning and exchange". White 
developed the middle ground concept to describe Indian-white relations in North America's 
Great Lakes region in the 17th to 19th centuries. Through processes of confrontation, 
negotiation, and creative innovation, Indians and non-Indians (fur traders, soldiers, clerics, 
colonial officials) developed systems of communication and exchange through which both 
sides perceived their goals could be achieved. "White argues that these middle grounds were 
pragmatic, mutually constructed accommodations that do not fit a simple rubric of 
domination, subordination, and acculturation" (Conklin & Graham, 1995, p. 594). Therefore 
we should identify the boundaries of a middle ground in the representation of Amazon by 
American NGOs. 
This middle ground can be identified through discourse analysis. This middle ground is 
a communication intersection, a "discursive community" out of the different backgrounds of 
the cultures that touch each other. The challenge is to find out how and if meanings were 
negotiated inside this discursive community, how the process of constructing a negotiated meaning  
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took place—a new representation of ideas and issues that makes a new sense out of competing 
or opposed ways of seeing (Flower, 1996). "Civilizations," says Braude]. (1987/1993, p. 29), 
"are continually borrowing from their neighbors, even if they 'reinterpret' and assimilate what 
they have adopted." In other words, according to our hypothesis, we should be interested in 
how and if the Amazon NGOs' concerns were translated, reinterpreted and assimilated into the 
American NGOs' agendas. 
Of course, the representation of Amazon is not present only in discourse, but also in 
artifacts. In a free application of these historiographic concepts to the sphere of environmental 
NGOs, the discourses and artifacts through which NGOs intend to shape the American. 
environmental mentalité arc their promotional literature (e.g., articles in magazines and media) 
and projects (e.g., campaigns). When Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth decide to promote 
a boycott on tropical mahogany, this concrete action carries a particular representation of the 
Amazon, as well as the more explicit institutional pamphlets and fact-sheets. Web Pages and 
on-line conferences are also an important source. Rainforest Action Network claims that its 
web page has 23,000 hits per week, and it is an important part of their strategy (R. Borges, 
online interview, October 24, 1997). Internet has also been an important communication tool 
between Brazilian and US NGOs. Its decentralized, low price characteristics have turned the 
Internet in a favored public forum for NGOs, and an important source for environmental 
historians (Sedrez, 1997). 
This study focuses mainly on five of the most significant US NGOs concerned with 
the Amazon Rainforest: the Sierra Club, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Rainforest 
Action Network, the Friends of the Earth and the Greenpeace. The Sierra Club is one of the 
oldest and more traditional American NGOs. The Environmental Defense Fund was created 
in the 1960s' in the second wave of the environmental movement (Gottlieb, 1992); it is an  
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important NGO lobby, with an extensive lobby activity for the rainforest and Amazon in 
particular. The Rainforest Action Network was founded in the third wave of the 
environmental movement (1980s) when US NGOs started to focus on international 
environmental problems. It is probably the first American NGO that has worked exclusively 
with rainforests issues. Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have their headquarters in 
Amsterdam. Both were founded by Americans in Vancouver (1972) and San Francisco (1969), 
respectively. Although they are more international NGOs than American NGOs, they have a 
singular influence on the American environmental mentalité. 
1.1.4 Oral history/Structured Interviews  
Dealing with recent history--as, in the case of the last part of our study, the 1990's--we have 
the option of interviewing the actors that took part in the history, according to the oral history 
technique. 
Structured interviews, by confronting different interviewers with the same issues, 
provide a comparative tool for the answers and, therefore, a comparison between the different 
produced discourses (McDowell, 1991). 
A total of six NGO officers were interviewed: Stephen Schwartzman (current officer 
of the Environmental Defense Fund's International Program); David Malakoff (former officer 
of Friends of the Earth-US); Geoff Webb (former officer of Friends of the Earth-US); Jose 
Augusto Padua (former officer of Latin America Greenpeace); Jose Roberto Borges (current 
officer of Rainforest Action Network's Program Brazil); and Roberto Smeraldi (current officer 
of Friends of the Earth's Program Amazon). The first three officers are Americans, and the 
last three, Brazilians. 
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Appendix I shows the questions used for the structured interviews. The questions 
were all send by e-mail on September 15, 1998. They were composed of three parts: a brief 
identification of the officer, general information on the organization and a longer 
questionnaire on their action and thoughts about the Brazilian Amazon. The interviews ended 
with an overall assessment of the organization's action in the Amazon. 
Except for Schwartzman and Borges, whose interviews were conducted by phone, all 
the other officers answered the questions by e-mail. The list of interviewees and dates when 
the interviews were conducted are in Other References. 
1.1.5 Case study 
The thesis concludes with the presentation of a case study, the "Mahogany Campaign." 
"Campaign" is defined as a number of articulated actions that have a common goal. The 
American political scientist Eikland (1994) identifies several tactics and actions that may be 
carried out in a NGO "campaign," including direct action, consumer campaign, legal litigation, 
direct lobby, participation in official meetings and others. Illegal or non-sustainable mahogany 
logging is seen as the major cause for deforestation in the Amazon, for as a result it makes the 
forest vulnerable to other Factors. By fighting against non-sustainable mahogany lowing in the 
Amazon, in a campaign articulated with local (Brazilian) NGOs, American NGOs adopted an 
agenda and concerns generated by those local NGOs. Moreover, the international pressure 
empowered the Brazilian NGOs in their negotiations with the local government. Far from 
environmental imperialism and narrower concepts of wilderness, the Mahogany Campaign 
demonstrates the possible responsiveness in the American NGOs' vision of the Amazon to 
local influences. 
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1.2 	The Amazon Rainforest: Characteristics  
Environmental problems are at once site specific and politically specific. They are site specific 
because they do not occur in the abstract, but within a geographical context, with concrete and 
particular characteristic—be it the ozone layer depletion or the deforestation of the Amazon. 
They are politically specific because they also occur within a political and historic context, such 
as the North-South conflict or the imperialistic experience. Therefore, tropical deforestation 
raises particularly difficult issues because of the fact that the forests are located within 
particular countries 	in the Amazon case, the majority of the forest is located in Brazil 	and 
that their preservation or destruction lies within - the sovereign jurisdiction of the Brazilian state 
(Hurrell, 1992, p. 401). 
The political context of the Amazon deforestation 	and the movement to combat 
it—is partially developed in the Chapter 4 Coalition: A Network Made of Conflict, Diversity 
and Alliances. However, this section deals with some of the geographic characteristics of the 
Amazon forest that should be taken into account. 
Although the Amazon is not limited to Brazil, the Brazilian Amazon is by far the 
largest remaining rain forest area in the world, comprising a relatively high percentage of largely 
intact forest (360,030,000 hectares of closed forest area in 1980 against the 123,235,000 of 
Indonesia, -the second largest). Although estimates of the rate of total deforestation range from 
8% to 20%, even the unlikely highest figure is much lower than in other countries (Kolk, 1996, 
p. 66). The Brazilian Amazon covers some 58 per cent of Brazil's total land area and accounts 
for around 33 per cent of the world's surviving tropical forests, larger than the combined 
forested areas of Colombia, Indonesia, Peru and Zaire (Hurrell, 1992, p. 400). Comparatively, 
the Brazilian Amazon corresponds to half of the European continent. (See Figure 1-1 — The 
Amazon and Europe: Comparative Map.) 
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Figure 1.1— The Amazon and Europe: Comparative Map (Corrêa, 1997) 
Rainforests have unparalleled biodiversity, containing innumerable herbs, plants and 
animals, and are a reservoir for genetic material, new crops and medicine. For instance, in the 
Amazon Basin, more than 1500 species of fish have been described, and scientists estimate 
that this is no more than half of all the Amazon fish species. This is fifteen times the number 
of species found in Europe. The Amazon rainforest's biodiversity accumulates a large list of 
"the biggest in the world": the biggest beetle (20 cm); the biwest moth (30 cm), the biggest 
river shrimp (48 cm), the biggest river fish (3 m), the biggest eagle (97 cm), the biggest river 
turtle (1.5 m), the smallest monkey (about 12 cm), the biggest spider (28 cm), the biggest 
flower (2 m) and so on. From its spring to the mouth, the Amazon River has about 6,868 km, 
about the distance between New York and Berlin (Correa, 1997). 
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Rainforests also perform important regulatory functions for soils, water and climate, 
protecting vulnerable tropical soils against erosion, stabilizing the local and regional water 
supply system. Finally, rainforests leads to all kinds of products, ranging from wood to latex, 
fruits and honey, and provide a living for the local, often indigenous, population. Only the 
Negro River watershed has more potable water than in all Europe. About 20% of all the fresh 
water of the planet passes through the Amazon River estuary. Studies at the University of 
Maryland calculate that the benefits of the Amazon rainforest for the planet about 
$1,100,000,000,000 (more than the Brazil's national domestic income) (Corrêa, 1997). 
Tropical forests also have a global impact in terms of their role in the global carbon 
cycle and the effect of deforestation on the global climate. Next to fossil fuel consumption, 
deforestation by burning is the second most important anthropogenic source of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide. Of the 8 billion tons of carbon dioxide accumulation per year in the global 
atmosphere, one estimate suggests that around 2.4 billion tons come from forest burning, or 
around 30 per cent of the total. Tropical deforestation also releases two other, potent 
greenhouse gases (methane and nitrous oxide). Although estimates vary, tropical deforestation 
by burning probably contributes around 10-15 per cent of total greenhouse gas emissions 
(Hurrell, 1992, p. 401). 
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Figure 1-2 — Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon (Correa, 1997). (Red areas are deforestated.) 
In less than 30 years, an area larger than France was deforested (see Figure 1-2 — 
Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon). This means about 600,000 SqKm and most of it 
occurred in the 1980s. The deforestation slightly decreased in the beginning of the 1990s, but it 
has increased again in the revitalization of the Brazilian economy. National parks and 
environmental reservations have been created in the Amazon region since 1970, a total of 124 
public protected areas. They cover about 45,000 SqKm, or less than 10% of the Brazilian 
Amazon (see Figure 1-3 — National Parks and Protected Areas). 
Figure 1-3 — National Parks and Protected Areas (Correia, 1997). (Dark green 
areas are natural parks and protected areas.) 
In addition Indian reservations count for about 1,000,000 SqKm (although most arc 
still to be officially defined), or about 20% of the Brazilian Amazon (see Figure 1-4 — Indian 
Reservations in the Amazon). The Indian population in the Amazon is about 170,000, from 
210 different ethnic groups. At least 50 tribes have never been contacted by non-Indian 
society. 
Figure 1-4 — Indian Reservations in the Amazon (Correa, 1997). (Red areas are 
Indian reservations.) 
Were the Brazilian Amazon region an independent state, it would be the sixth largest 
country in the world, with one of the lowest population densities on the planet. See below 
some of the statistics comparing Amazon and the rest of Brazil. 
Table 1.1— Comparison between Amazon and the Rest of Brazil Correa, 199 
Brazil without the Amazon 
Amazon 
Area (SqKrn) 3,400,000 5,100,000 
Population 138,000,000 19,000,000 
Density 40 hab./SqKm 4 hab./SqKm 
Income per capita $4,957 $2,059 
Participation in the Gross National 
Product 95% 5% 
Child mortality 40 dead per 1000 39 dead per 1000 
Illiteracy 19% 25% 
Life expectation 67 years 63 years 
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Figure 1-5 — Brazil and the Amazon Region (Correa, 1997). (The green area is the Brazilian Legal 
Amazon; the red area is the Brazil without the Amazon region.) 
1.3 Structure 
Chapter 2, Earlier Images of the Amazon in the United States, introduces the reader to 
selected representations of the Amazon in the America mentalité (see section 1.1. Methodology 
and footnote 1). These representations result from the reports of naturalists, adventures, 
travelers and businessmen. Chapter 2 explores also the experience of the former US president 
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Roosevelt in the charting of an unknown river in Amazon and the Ford Company's frustrated 
attempt of producing rubber in large scale in the Amazon. 
Chapter 3, Thinking Globally, Acting Globally, describes how US NGOs initiated their 
activities on the Amazon rainforest and points out some strategic motions that showed 
necessary in their approach to the issue. It also briefly analyses the action of NGOs in 
international environmental politics and how they built their legitimacy—how they became 
acceptable and significant actors in international environmental politics. Among different 
NGOs' strategies, the coalition strategy turned to be the optimal one for US NGOs in 
Amazon. 
Chapter 4, Coalition: A Network Made of Conflict, Diversity and Alliances, discusses 
the concrete and ideological framework in which the coalition between North American and 
Brazilian NGOs took place and the areas of conflict and successful cooperation that resulted 
of such coalition. The representation of the Amazon Indians as "ecologically noble savage" 
and its efficiency for the environmental movement is analyzed. 
Finally, Chapter 5, Case Study: The Mahogany Campaign, presents the "Mahogany 
Campaign" a case study, with focus on the action of Greenpeace in the campaign. Green.peace 
was the main articulator of a coalition among Brazilian NGOs, and the establishment of links 
between these coalition and US and Northern NGOs. The chapter also analyze the campaign 
strategies regarding consumer markets and international environmental forums such as the 
CITES―Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora.  
CHAPTER TWO 
2 EARLIER IMAGES OF THE AMAZON IN THE UNITED STATES  
The presence of the Amazon region in the American mentalite has been shaped by naturalists, 
travelers, wilderness lovers, and capitalists. This chapter explores earlier and different 
representations of Amazon that had major impact in the American mentalité. These 
representations do not exclude or complement each other: they rather compose, even in their 
contradictions, a complex image. Some elements of these representations—such as the 
universality of the scientific Amazon—are still present in the American mentalité  (see Chapter 3 
Thinking Globally, Acting Globally); others have been replaced. 
We have avoided representations from the literature and singled personal and historical 
experiences. However, in these cases, the experience, or the accuracy of its report, is less 
important than the representation it created. 
2.1 The Naturalists  
The first tales of the Amazon arrived in the United States in the form of reports by the 
naturalists in the 18th century. Before that, every information regarding the Amazon was 
jealously filtered by the Spanish and Portuguese rulers. For Americans who took the time to 
Forget their own problems with the British Crown and looked south, the Amazon region 
seemed a mysterious forest in the maps, with incredible legends2 and little more information. 
2 The name Amazon is due to a colorful report by the expedition of Orellana (the second-in-command of the 
Spanish conquistador Pizarro), in 1540, approximately. Orellana affirmed that his expedition was attacked by 
Fierce warrior women, like the mythological Greek Amazons, while they descended the river. 
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The First true scientific exploration in the Amazon was launched in 1736 by the French 
Academic des Sciences, intended to resolve some of Newton's theories regarding the size and 
shape of the earth. The party included Charles Marie de la Condamine and ten other "natural 
philosophers." La Condamine's journey differed from earlier ones in that it was sponsored by 
a scientific institution and in principle "concerned the accumulation of pure knowledge" 
(Hecht & Cockburn, 1990, p. 8). In the same 18th century, the Amazon valley would also be 
visited by the naturalists Alexander von Humboldt and Aime Bonpland (1799). 
It was in the next century that such enterprises really expanded. in the 19'h century, a 
feverish interest in Brazil, or in Brazil's tropical nature, brought to Amazon several scientific 
expeditions. A. Reis (1960, p. 95), a Brazilian historian, calls this century "the revolutionary 
century" for the knowledge of Brazil and the Amazon. In Humboldt's Footsteps, came Karl 
von Martius and Johann von Spix from Bavaria, Hercule Florence, Jean Louis and Elizabeth 
Agassiz from France, Langsdorff, Gaetano Osculati, Richard Spruce from. England, and then 
Henry- Walter Bates, Wallace, Spix and many others. Joseph Ewan, historian from the Missouri 
Botanical Garden, lists over 600 naturalists of all nationalities who visited and published on the 
South American continent. Among those, North Americans were a minority until the 20' 
century. Ewan identifies, as significant 19  American naturalists in the Amazon, only James 
Orton (1830-1877), William Henry Edwards (1822-1909) and Frank Michler Chapman (1864-
1945) (Ewan, 1989,p. 2; 1992, p. 185). 
Why were there so few Americans naturalists in the Amazon forest? Perhaps because 
before the end of the 19century, the wilderness in America was as juicy, mysterious and 
unexplored in the civilized mind as any other place. Americans were busy exploring, 
discovering, praising and collecting their own wilderness. Roderick Nash, an American 
environmental historian, noted that, by 1850, British noblemen adventurously vacationed in 
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the wilderness upper Missouri River; forty years later, die wilderness frontier in America was 
declared over by the historian Frederick Jackson Turner. By the beginning of the 20
th 
 century 
rich Americans such as the former president Theodore explored the Amazon rainforest (see 
2.3 The Wilderness Lover). Between the British noblemen in 1850 and Roosevelt in 1910, "the 
United States changed from an exporter to an importer of wild nature" (Nash, 1982, p. 343). 
If not naturalists, Americans were present in Navy-sponsored surveys in the Brazilian 
forest. In 1849, Lieutenant Lewis Herndon and Midshipmen Lardner Gibbon were requested 
by the US Navy to explore the entire watershed of the Amazon, with regard to navigability and 
also to the terrain's possibilities in "the field, the forest, the river or of the mine". They were 
also required to bring back any specimens or seeds thought to do well on American shores. 
Herndon's report was published in 1854, arousing great excitement for the description of the 
riches of the Amazon and the beauty of its women. Samuel Clemens (the American writer 
Mark Twain) was one of the several young men who, after reading Herndon's report, rode 
South to New Orleans, hoping to find a ship that would take them to Para, in the mouth of 
the Amazon. Fortunately for American literature, Twain could not End any ship going to 
Brazil then, and decided for becoming a river pilot (Hecht & Cockburn, 1990, p. 76). 
Most naturalists were also true heirs of Rousseau. Together with the descriptions of 
plants and seeds, the naturalists' report were plenty of Amazon tribes that "frolic in their 
innocent beauty, have the leisure to appreciate life, and are attuned to the deeper verities of 
human existence. Tropical exuberance honors moral perfection," but does not assure 
civilization (Hecht & Cockburn, 1990, p. 11).  
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2.2 	The Traveler 
The Rev. James C. Fletcher and his co-writer Rev. D. P. Kidder wrote in 1 857 the first book 
about Brazil that received a wide reception by the American public. 1n fact, the author wrote in 
the 6th edition in 1866, that "the favorable reception which five editions of this work have had 
in the Unites States, England, and Brazil, indicates a growing interest in the largest and most 
stable country of South America" (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, p. vi). The book, called Brazil and 
the Brazilians, challenges any easy classification. It includes some useful information on the 
Portuguese idiom, currency, prices and Brazilian etiquette. It is at one history narrative, 
religious consideration, travel tale and tourist guide. 
Fletcher's book has a special interest because of his attempts to make Brazil interesting 
to his American readers. Brazil's geographic and natural characteristics were his major 
enticement. After all, there were so many similarities between the temperate and young United 
States, and the tropical and young Empire of Brazil (see Figure 2-1 — The Empire of Brazil in 
1854).3 Both were, for instance, continentally large and unexplored. "Brazil has neither been 
explored nor surveyed, and its full extent cannot be accurately ascertained; but, according to 
the best calculations made in 1845 for the Diccionario Geographico Brasileiro, The Empire 
contains within its borders 3,004,460 square miles. The United States, buy the latest 
computations of the Topographical Bureau at Washington, has an area of 3,002,013 square 
miles." For the farm-driven Americans, Fletcher has an extra bait: "It is not," he continues, 
"[Brazil's] extent which should attract our attention so much as the fact that no portion of the 
globe is so available for cultivation and for the sustaining of man" (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, 
432). By the time of his 6th edition, Fletcher had visited Brazil six times. Although most of the  
'Brazil became independent From Portugal in 1822. 
22 
time he stayed in the capital of the Empire, Rio de Janeiro, he also went to the temperate 
South, to the North along the coast and the explored part of the Amazon and Central Brazil. It 
was not a small feat, considering the precarious transport of the middle 19'h century. 
Figure 2-1— The Empire of Brazil in 1854 (Fletcher and Kidder, 1866 
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In his descriptions, Fletcher paid special attention to Forest products, by then an 
important item of the trade relations between Brazil and US, together with coffee. It was 
however, the tropical Atlantic rainforest the major source of such products, because its easy 
access from and to the sea. For instance, the rosewood-tree, today an endangered species from 
the Atlantic Rainforest, was "cut down, deprived of its branches, and conveyed to market 
generally by floating it to some seaport-town, whence it is shipped to North America and 
Europe.... The United States annually purchase of Brazil eighty thousand dollars' worth of 
rosewood" (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, p. 437). In his chapter on the Amazon region, however, 
Fletcher focused not on the actual limited trade or relationship with the US, but on the 
potential for future trade or relationship. Therefore, Fletcher overcame the prejudice of a 
common belief that tropical climate were unhealthy for Europeans descendants. By doing so, 
he also foresaw a Future for the Amazon, a vision of the future that would be shared by may 
American and Brazilian after him. "Some people," says Fletcher, "who have given much 
attention to this subject [tropical climate] argue front the nature of the case that the provinces 
of Pará and Amazonas can never become flourishing rendezvous For Northerners. But, as 
Brazil differs from all other tropical countries, it may be that the 'howling wilderness'4 of the 
Amazon will yet smile with Industry and civilization. This was my conviction when in the 
valley in 1862" (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, p. 580). 
4The Amazon region, in the mercantilist logic of naming the regions after what they produced, was know as 
"Regiao das Drogas do Sertao" (Region of the Drugs of the Wilderness). Fletcher translated sertão for 
"wilderness," but this translation should be taken carefully, specially because the change in the meanings of 
both words, sertão in Brazil, and wilderness in America, in the last century. An original meaning for sertão is 
"desert place," the opposite for civilization, and it is probably the Portuguese word with closest meaning to 
wilderness. It could be applied to the Amazon region or to the Northeast dry countryside. However, by the turn 
of the century, sertão has been more associated to the specific ecosystems of caatinga and cerrado. S Sertanejo is the 
man of the sertão. The man-desert wilderness is not the best translation for sertão anymore, but the more accurate 
"back-lands," used by Warren Dean and Hecht and Cockburn (Dean 1987, 58; Hetch and Cockburn 1990, 61). 
The term implies the populated, uncivilized region. 
24 
The Amazon valley, its potential and the wonderful of its creature, greatly impressed 
Fletcher. Nature in the Amazon is always the realm of the wonderful, be it annoying, such as 
vampire bats, or magnificent, such as the Victoria Regia (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, pp. 506--
539). Notwithstanding the wonderful characteristics, however, for Fletcher this nature as well 
as its original inhabitants were doomed to disappear to be replaced by Amazon's real destiny: 
civilization. This process could already be seen while settler advanced in the territory and 
entered in conflict with the former habitants of the land. In the civilized territory of Goyas, 
named after a nearly extinguished tribe, Fletcher noted that "various other tribes still exist 
within its borders, several of, which cherish a deadly hatred to the people who have invaded 
their domains and disturbed them in their native haunts. Settlements are often laid waste by 
the hostile incursions of these Indians.... I do not know that it holds true in Brazil, as in North 
American, that the bee precedes a few miles the onward march of civilization—advances as 
the Indian and the wild beast prepare to take their departure and thus is the pioneer of a 
better state of things." The United States, as well as other nations, could play a part in the 
developing of the future potential of the Amazon. "It would be an interesting expedition, and 
great good would be accomplished, if the Government of Brazil would consent to send out, 
with England, France, and the United States, a joint scientific commission, to explore 
thoroughly the whole district of central Brazil, from Bolivia to Bahia, with particular reference 
to the navigability of the waters, that here interlace, of those vast rivers which irrigate such a 
wide extent of territory" (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, p. 454-60). 
Although Fletcher was careful enough to underline the need for approval from the 
Brazilian Government, he was in troubled waters. The control o f natural resources was a 
prerogative to which that the 'Brazilian Government was extremely sensitive. In the 1850's, the 
letters of the American Lieutenant Maury, who advocated the opening of the Amazon for  
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international navigation, had dangerously affected the relations between Brazil and US. As 
Fletcher witnessed, Americans Felt the repercussion in Brazil of the so-called Maury's letters 
thorough all Brazilian territory. For instance, "outrages committed upon citizens of the United 
States in the distant portions of the Empire in 1858 very tardily met with redress from the 
interior magistrates, whose feelings toward 'Norte Americanos' were embittered by the 
conclusion arrived at after reading the letters of Tenente Maury" (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, p. 
580). 
The letters of the Lieutenant Matthew Fontaine Maury (brother-in-law of Lieutenant 
Herndon, mentioned in 2.1 The Naturalists) deserve a special parenthesis, for its impact on the 
American public opinion as well as on the Brazilian officers. Maury was a Navy officer, head 
of the National Observatory in Washington. His letters were motivated by the reports from 
two different American government sponsored expeditions: Lieutenant norms J. Page, USN, 
in 1853 on the Paraná, Paraguay and the 1851-52 expedition, Lieutenants (USN) Herndon and 
Gibbon descended the Amazon—one by its Peruvian and the other by its Bolivian tributaries. 
According to A. Reis (1960, p. 65), Maury depicted Amazon as a generous Eden of natural 
resources, waiting by "strong races" to carry on its scientific and economic conquest. Such 
paradise could not be closed to the Humanity by a "Chinese policy." Reis, Fletcher and Kidder 
(1866) and Hecht and Cockburn (1990, p. 75) agreed on the impact that Maury's letters had on 
the American image of Amazon: all that great potential for wealthy in the Amazon valley and 
the lack of the right people to develop it.5 After letters to newspapers and conferences to 
businessmen in several cities, Maury put all his ideas, advice and suggestions in a book named 
The Amazon River and the Atlantic Slopes of South America, edited in 1853, published also in a  
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Brazilian edition in the same year. The Brazilian government was understandable cautious and 
suspicious of such American enthusiasm For the Amazon. The reaction was not different from 
when the Portugal or Spain ruled the Amazon states: their resources should be protected from 
the international greed. This nationalist defensive argument would be an integral part of any 
policy for the Amazon in the future. 
The nationalist and somehow xenophobic argument can be found in Teixeira de 
Macedo, then Brazilian Minister in Washington, when he warned his superior in Brazil on the 
American intentions toward the Amazon: "The Anglo-American is totally convinced that he 
should regenerate the whole world, give new form of government to all human society, and 
rule by his influence all parts of the world, of which he hold today the center, because his 
position, that dominates the two big oceans, the Gulf of Mexico and the Antilles Sea.... In his 
work, Lieutenant Maury claims and proves that communications between Para and New York 
are easier and shorter than between Para and Rio de Janeiro, and consequently it is easier to 
rule the regions served by the Amazonas river from Washington than from the Capital of the 
Empire of Brazil" (Reis, 1960, p. 80, free translation). 
It is easy to infer how such ideas affected the diplomatic relationship between Brazil 
and USA. The Maury's letters, however, exemplify correctly how Amazon fitted in the US 
Manifest Destiny doctrine: the American's manifest destiny was to bring development to all 
the regions that, on their turn, had the manifest destiny of being developed. The n 
development of the Amazon was a waste that Americans have the right and duty to try to 
reverse. As we can see in Fletcher's conclusions about Brazil, although more polite (and 
diplomatic!) than Lt. Maury, he and the other US Navy officers shared the same opinion: the  
5Another of the plans of Lt. Maury to the Amazon was to sell southern slaves to the Brazilian planters there. 
"The slaves of the South," wrote Maury, "are worth 15 hundred million. Their value is increasing at the rate of 
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capabilities of the Amazon Valley were immense, and the navigation should be open to other 
nations. Explicitly, Fletcher wrote that "the Amazon should, with proper restrictions, be 
opened to the commerce of the world. The grandest valley of our globe would, under such 
conditions, reap, in the course of the next ten years, incalculable benefits" (Fletcher & Kidder, 
1866,p. 591). 
2.3 	The Wilderness Lover 
In 1913, the conservation champion of the Progressive era, the former American president 
Theodore Roosevelt, had his own experience in the Amazon Forest. Invited by the Brazilian 
Government, and under scientific patronage of the American Museum of Natural History, he 
and his party joined an expedition to chart the course of an unknown river, a tributary of the 
Amazon River basin. The two-month expedition, named Roosevelt-Rondon Scientific 
Expedition, resulted in a magnificent collection of some 2.500 birds, 500 mammals and several 
score of reptiles. Many of these were previously unknown to science, and most were new to 
the museum's collection. Results also included a never well recovered wound for Roosevelt, a 
frustrated hunting experience, and an exciting report by Roosevelt on his Through the Brazilian 
Wilderness, published in 1914. 
Roosevelt's party included himself, George K. Cherrie, Leo E. Miller and Anthony 
Fiala (three expert naturalist from the American Museum of natural History), and Roosevelt' 
son Kermit Roosevelt Their travel to the Brazilian wilderness would be initially a pure 
adventure to collect new specimens for the Museum, and to provide some hunting 
opportunities to a depressed T. Roosevelt, after the failure of his 1912 presidential bid. Instead,  
30 or 40 million a year. It is the industrial capital of the South. Did ever a people consent to sink so much 
industrial capital by emancipation or any other voluntary act?' (Hecht & Cockburn, 1990, p. 74). 
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it was turned in an exploratory expedition when the Brazilian. Government requested Colonel 
Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon to escort the former president. Rondon defined a new goal 
for the expedition: to chart the course of 629-mile-long river unknown to cartographers, from 
the River Parana, in Mato Grosso, to the River Amazonas. The river was called Rio da Dúvida 
(River of Doubt, see Figure 2-2 — Theodore Roosevelt River, According to Roosevelt Logs. ), 
as all rivers are before their charting, and it was renamed Roosevelt River after the expedition.6 
Roosevelt described Rondon as "an officer and a gentleman, also a particularly hardy and 
competent explorer, a good field naturalist and scientific man, a student and a philosopher." 
Rondon was also probably the man who best knew the extended ',Brazilian territory by that 
time. For 20 years, before he met Roosevelt, he had explored the Brazilian interior, recorded 
its natural history, built telegraph lines and peacefully pacified primitive tribes (Williams, 1986, 
p. 36). 
The expedition was not like any exciting hunting vacation or an well-organized safari. 
Roosevelt faced "piranhas, jaguars, crocodile and a catalog of nasty insect life. He had emerged 
From the jungle wracked by fever, weakened by severe malnutrition, hollow-eyed from 
exhaustion and with a tube draining pus from an abscessed leg. Consummate naturalist and 
compulsive adventurer, T.R. had loved every minute of it" (Williams, 1986, p. 36).  
A small tributary of this river was named after Kermit Roosevelt. 
7 Rondon was also one of the true heroes of the Brazilian History—and there is not a single shade of irony on the 
use of the word "hero." His mother was from the tribes Terena e Bororo; his father had mixed origins, 
Portuguese and Guará. An ardent disciple of the French philosopher August Comte, Rondon was hest known 
for his activities as protector of the Brazilian Indian peoples. He actually succeeded into reverse the Brazilian 
Government's informal support to the fights against the Indians. instead, Rondon motioned the government to 
establish the Indian Protective Service, naming the colonel its director. His one ironclad order to his 
subordinates—"Die if you must, but never kill."—became the official motto of the service, and its men lived 
and literally died by it. He received the Livingstone Award in 1914, by the New York Geography Society. In 
1913 the International Council of the Races, meeting in London, considered Rondon's accomplishment an 
example to be followed for the honor of the universal civilization (Ribeiro, 1958/1998). 
Figure 2-2 — Theodore Roosevelt River, According to 
Roosevelt Logs. (Roosevelt, 1955). 
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Roosevelt may have loved it, but the expedition was different from his expectations. 
For several reasons, hunting was not an easy activity during the trip. First, nobody knew how 
long was the river, and how long it would take to them to reach any civilized area to get new 
provisions. Therefore, time was a critical issue, and could not be wasted in leisure hunting. 
Second, the expedition was carried on during the rainy season. On the one hand, it provided a 
better speed down the river; on the other hand, animals did not need to stay close to the river. 
After almost on month in the river, Roosevelt noted: "So far the game, Fish, and fruit had been 
too scarce to be an element of weight in our food-supply. In an exploring trip like ours, 
through a difficult and utterly unknown country, especially if densely forested, there is little 
time to halt, and game cannot be counted on. It is only in lands like our own West thirty years 
ago, like South Africa in the middle of the last century, like East Africa today that game can be 
made the chief food-supply" (Roosevelt, 1914/1955, p. 370). The Roosevelt's comparisons 
showed Amazon as a different wilderness from others. There is no big game, little hunting. 
The real foes are the insects, the small and far from noble carregadoras ants and borrachudos 
mosquitoes. " The mammals were a great contrast to what 1 had seen in Africa. Africa is the 
country for great game. There is nothing like that in South America. The animals in South 
America of interest to the naturalist more than to the person who is traveling through the 
country and takes the ordinary layman's point of view" (Roosevelt, 1914/1955, p. 325). Third, 
the obstacles during the trip not at all uncommon for similar expeditions—stripped 
Roosevelt little by little of most of his material assurances from civilization. His clothes 
(including underwear) were mostly eaten by ants; his books--"the last two volumes of 
Gibbon, they plays of Sophocles, Moore's Utopia, Marcus Aurelius, and Epjctetus" (Roosevelt, 
1914/1955,p. 304)—were abandoned in the forest when the party had to redistribute the 
cargo among the remaining canoes .  
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However, it was exactly this direct and non-mediated experience with wilderness that 
Roosevelt sought. 'Theodore Roosevelt was part of the American romantic tradition that 
praises the US wilderness almost in a Funerary eulogy. The frontier was gone, and it was 
mourned by its admirers, at the same time that civilization and progress were considered the 
biggest achievements of humanity.' In the vision of James Fenimore Cooper, the wilderness 
writer of Prairie and another member of this tradition, "the elimination of wilderness was 
tragic, but it was a necessary tragedy; civilization was the greater good" (Nash, 1982, p. 77). 
Roosevelt went further. For him, the most valuable of the goods was not civilization, or 
wilderness, but the virile qualities, the strength of character that the continuous contact with 
the wilderness —and its conquest offered to the American people. The greatness of the 
American civilization was a direct result of the greatness of this frontiersmen's virtù. "Under 
the hard conditions of life in the wilderness,' Roosevelt wrote, those who migrated to the New 
World 'lost all remembrance of Europe' and became new men 'in dress, in costumes, and in 
mode of life.' He too realized that by the 1890's 'the frontier had come to an end; it had 
vanished.' This alarmed Roosevelt chiefly because o its anticipated effect on national virility 
and greatness" (Nash, 1982, p. 149). This virtù is lost when the civilization concludes its task, 
and its children mourn the loss. The American historian Roderick Nash quotes the 19th century 
historian Francis Parkman' claims that "Iclivilization had a destroying as well as a creating 
power. Among its casualties were the Indian, the buffalo, and the frontiersman, 'a class of 
men... so remarkable both in their virtues and their faults that few will see their extinction 
without regret" (Nash, 1982, p. 99). Roosevelt shared this mourning and feared the effect of  
8 Frederick Jackson Turner proposed the "frontier thesis," a landmark in the American historiography, in 1893. 
The frontier thesis explained the American history as a series of -westward waves that formed the American 
national character. When a report in the 1890 census stated that the western land of opportunity had been filled 
up, and the frontier had come to an end, Turner feared for the future of the United States and its national 
character (Opie, 1998, p. 156), 
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the loss of the frontiersman in the American character. The continuous contact with 
wilderness was an important way to keep alive in the complex American civilization "the 
Fundamental frontier virtues" (Nash, 1982, p. 150). 
Despite the difference in the game and glory, Roosevelt saw the same virtues in his 
comrades of expedition. He praised "the way the work was done, at the good-will, the 
endurance, and the bull-like strength of the camaradas, and at the intelligence and the unwearied 
efforts of their commanders." How pitiful was the "ignorance of those who do not realize the 
energy and the power that are so often possessed by, and that may be so readily developed in, 
the men of the tropics." His pity (and disdain) was also extended to those who experienced the 
false wilderness and therefore did not develop the virile characteristics that only the wild could 
offer. "Another subject of perpetual wonder is the attitude of certain men who stay at home, 
and still more the attitude of certain men who travel under easy conditions, and who belittle 
the achievements of the real explorers of, the real adventurers in, the great wilderness.... [T]he 
work of the genuine explorer and wilderness wanderer is fraught with fatigue, hardship and 
danger" (Roosevelt, 1914/1955, p. 344). Like Fletcher, Roosevelt foresaw a glorious 
civilization in the South Amazon: "Here the soil was fertile; it will be a fine site for a coffee 
plantation when this region is open to settlement."9 In fact, to do otherwise would be a waste, 
a sin against the land hungry humanity. "Such a rich and fertile land cannot be permitted to 
remain idle, to lie as a tenantless wilderness, while there are such teeming swarms of human 
beings in the overcrowded, overpeopled countries of the Old World." Technology and 
progress would turn what were then obstacles in clear benefits for a healthy and wealthy  
9 Most of the soil in Amazon is poor and dependent from the ecosystems. Deforestation and agriculture have 
eroded almost completely the topsoil of some areas. However, other areas in Mato Grosso, close to Roosevelt' 
itinerary, are rich. I ignore whether this observation is referred to one of these fertile areas, or if it was an 
optimistic mistake by Roosevelt. 
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society. "The very rapids and waterfalls which now make the navigation of the river so difficult 
and dangerous would drive electric trolleys up and down its whole length and far out on either 
side, and run mills and factories, and lighten the labor on farms. With the incoming of 
settlement and with the steady growth of knowledge how to fight and control tropical diseases, 
fear of danger to health would vanish" (Roosevelt, 1914/1955, p. 372). 
Roosevelt, however, did not envy those who would live on the tamed land, and it is 
not their experience that he coveted. "A land like this is a hard land for the first explorers, and 
perhaps for their immediate followers, but not for the people who come after them." It is not 
the conquered land as much as the conquest of the land that he praised. The virtù belongs to 
the "first explorers" (Roosevelt, 1914/1955, p. 372). 
2.4 The Capitalist 
Henry Ford never went in person to Amazon. His presence was, however, almost as real as the 
Roosevelt river, in the abandoned skeleton of the cities of Fordlândia and Belterra (see Figure 
2-3 — Rubber Tree Occurrence Range). From 1927 to 1945, the Ford company carried on a 
social an economic experience by the margins of the rivers Amazonas and Tapajós, 
unsuccessfully trying to turn the forest into an organized and efficiency center of production 
of rubber. 
Rubber gathering is an old activity to the Amazon people arid a traditional item in the 
Brazil-US commercial relations. In 1866 Fletcher described the process of production of the 
rubber by Indians. "The use of the cam:ham:or gum-elastic," Fletcher wrote, "was learned from 
the Omaguas,―a tribe of Brazilian Indians. These savages used in the form of bottles and 
syringes: (hence the name syringe-tree)." Seringueira is the Portuguese name for the rubber tree,  
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or Hevea brasiliensis. By 1800 Belem was exporting rubber shoes to New England, with this 
trade reaching 450.00 by 1839 (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, p. 553)10 . 
Figure 2-3 - Rubber Tree Occurrence Range (Dean, 1982). 
The Ford adventure began when rubber world prices skyrocketed by 1922, when the 
world glut of rubber was seriously afflicting even the Southeast Asian plantations. The US 
Department of Agriculture carried out research in the Amazon countries, trying to find 
alternatives to the Asian rubber. Equally, Henry Ford looked for his own solution that would 
give him autonomy for his tire factories and a social laboratory in the middle of Amazon.  
10 Rubber was also the Brazilian nationalists' symbol for the world greedy eyes on the Amazon. Brazil had in the 
19th century the monopoly of rubber until a British adventurer secretly (and illegally) took seedling of Hevea to 
the Kew Botanical Garden, in London. These seedlings were the origin of the British rubber tree plantations in 
Malaysia and the end of the Brazilian monopoly of rubber (Dean, 1987, p. 47).  
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In 1927, Ford bought from the Government of Para two and a half million acres, 
stretched for seventy-five miles along the east bank of the Tapajós, south of Santarem. 
Different from Roosevelt, Ford did not revel in the process of conquest of the wilderness. His 
idea of virtù was on the ordered, union-free and almost aseptic production facility he created in 
Brazil. The technological city of Fordlândia was not born in the Amazon: it was transported 
directly from Dearborn to the Tapajós. It is a modernity cluster in the wilderness. "In 
December 1928, a company-owned freighter deposited at Fordlândia the components of an 
entire plantation nucleus, from diesel engines to nails and bolts. The American staff and their 
Brazilian workers immediately set to work to construct a small city, soon to be the third largest 
in the Amazon, complete with Hospital, schools, cinema, water supply, electricity, docks, 
machine shops and warehouses. Visitors never failed to marvel at this superb infrastructure, 
unmatchable for a thousand miles in any direction. The neatly aligned wooden bungalows, 
bunkhouses, general stores, and mess halls elicited praise From junketing Brazilian officials and 
went far to extract Ford from his early political difficulties" (Dean, 1987, p. 73). 
It was to be an enterprise in the Ford mold. Ford's industries were characterized by 
tight linkages with suppliers and rigorous control over labor. Fordlândia was to be a southern 
extension of the Rouge Plant in Detroit, with its integrated system of production. "In this 
perspective, the requirements of success were organization, capital and work disciplines of the 
advanced industrial world" (Hecht & Cockburn, 1990, p. 95). 
Ford's idea was to start everything from scratch, out of nothing, out of the a-historical 
forest. And his failure is due in a great degree to the fact that the forest was none of these. 
Instead, the forest was located in a political context, and Ford had to deal with jealous and 
petty local disputes. The political context also included the work force in the Amazon, with its 
own history and culture. They did not fit in Ford's ordered scheme. Ford tried to give to the  
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worker an orderly and modern environment: health and dental care, wages twofold higher than 
in any other place in the Amazon, new and clean houses, schools and even soccer fields. The 
workers, however, were used to a more personal (even if exploiting) relationship with the 
patrão (patron), who was at once bossman, godfather and protector. Capitalist work relations 
were a bigger burden to them than all the debt servitude that was so common in the Amazon. 
Riot and grudges against management became common, some caused by professional 
provocateurs, others by sheer cultural gap. 11Facing these problems, management in 
Fordlândia wondered whether would be possible to import people, as the city itself was 
imported. The forest was not the problem, they thought, but the forest people, or the lack of 
forest people available to work in capitalist terms. Immigration was a wise option: "the 
Government of Pará and the federal government [were ready] to import Asian labor if  
should happen that enough workers could not be found in the Amazon and the Brazilian 
Northeast." LaRue, one of the first advocates of the large-scale plantation of rubber in the 
Amazon, wrote to the Firestone company in 1924: "I know you will be permitted to import 
Chinese. A million Chinese in the rubber sections of Brazil would be a godsend to that 
country. And after Brazil saw what wonderful development came form the Chinese labor, that 
nation wouldn't ask expatriation of the coolies" (Dean, 1987, p. 83). 
Not only the workers did not fit Ford's blueprint, but the forest had also its own 
environmental requirements. in its natural ecosystem, the Hevea (rubber tree) has a biota that 
lives out of the tree. That means that, when planted in dose sequence, in a line of production 
typical of industrial exploitation, the rubber tree is highly vulnerable to a number of blights and 
diseases. These diseases do not exist in Asia, where the Hevea is an exotic species, and this is  
11The American historian Galey describes a riot caused by the cafeteria system, where the workers were required 
to help themselves. "I am worker, not a waiter," reportedly complained one of the workers, and what followed 
destroyed the whole cafeteria (Galey, 1979, p. 277). 
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the major cause of success of the Malaysian plantations. Ford also planned to process the 
lumber from the cleared forest as a second source of funds for Fordlândia, with no better 
results than in the rubber plantation. To the dismay of the Ford's managers, tropical hardwood 
did not occur in clusters of the same specie, making commercially impossible a systematic 
exploitation of the resource (Galey, 1989, p. 273). 
The ecological problems succeeded to each other as in a curse. At Fordlândia, the 
feared caterpillars that attacked the plantations were temporary dominated by their natural 
enemy, the sauva ant. The ants, then, turned their attention to the trees. White root disease and 
canker attacked the tree roots. "Jungle underbrush also hindered tree growth and maintenance, 
so cover crops were planted to retard the undergrowth. These cover crops soon dried up in 
the Amazonian dry season and created a fire hazard. In the rainy season the cover crops 
absorbed water and plant foods that might ordinarily have promoted the growth of the rubber 
trees. By 1933 Ford officials realized the Detroit engineering approach to rubber planting was 
hopeless" (Galey, 1979, p. 274). These problems had not been foreseen by Ford' staff, who 
lacked of expert knowledge on the region. A factory is a factory anywhere; why would not a 
rubber tree plantation be the same everywhere? Even better, in the natural area of occurrence 
of the rubber tree? The high technology of the city contrasted with the total ignorance of the 
staff on the basics of the business. "For the first five years of its existence, Fordlândia had not 
one resident on its staff, or even available as a consultant, with scientific training in tropical 
agriculture or practical experience in rubber planting" (Dean, 1987, p. 75). 
A radical solution was tried in 1934, when the plant pathologist James Weir was in 
charge of the plantation: the complete transference of the experiment. "Modernity works," he 
seemed to say, "we are just in the wrong spot." In 4 May 1934, "a 281,500 hectare tract of the 
Fordlândia concession was traded for another of equal size at Belterra. The sawmill and the  
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machine shop began to replicate the warehouses, dock, housing, schools, hospital and the like 
of Fordlandia" (Dean, 1987, p. 77). New seedlings were imported from Asia, in the 
expectation that they would resist better to the blight, and then cloned. A new area was 
cleared, and the problems were the same. "After thirteen years, an investment of almost $10.5 
million, and the planting of 3.650.000 rubber tress, there was still almost nothing ready to tar 
(Dean, 1987, p. 84). By the 1940s, the Ford company had lost all its interest for Fordlândia, 
alter a brief revival caused by the demand of rubber because the World War 11. in 1945, 
Belterra was sold to the Brazilian government for $500,000, less than 5% of the total 
investment. In eighteen years, the plantations had failed to produce any rubber for large-scale 
commercial use (Daley, 1979, p. 283). 
2.5 Conclusion  
The Amazon experiences of the naturalists, as well as Fletcher, Maury, Roosevelt and Ford, 
coexist with many others that helped to Form the earlier representations of the Amazon in the 
American mentalité. Not less important is the idea of "Green Hell" that is associated to the 
tropical rainforest in general, be it Asian, African or American. The Green Hell, the dark and 
betraying jungle, was better explored in the literature, for instance by Joseph Conrad's Heart of 
Darkness, or the Latin-American writers of the first half of the 20th century, who wrote the 
"jungle novels" ("la novela de la selva") (Marcone, 1997, par. 3). However, these experiences 
point out to some elements, sometimes contradictorily, that would characterize the 
relationship of the North Americans with the Amazon. These elements are, For instance, the 
"perception of divine nature as virgin, unmodified by human action, and thus meet for 
virtuous contemplation," the role of science in the future of the Amazon, and/or the role of 
the Amazon in the future of the science, "inspired by a view of the Amazon as an enormous,  
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unsullied laboratory for the scientific contemplation and classification of nature," the plan 
and/or role of countries other than Brazil in the Future of the Amazon; the nationalistic 
reaction to these plans; the control of the resource of the Amazon. Each of these 
representations has also implied a project For the Amazon. 
At the same time, these representations have in common the fact that they projected 
upon the Amazon their own ideas on what the region is or should be. These impositions 
"have exacted a heavy price: a refusal to permit the Amazon to tell its own story" (Hecht & 
Cockburn, 1990, p. 15). The American mantalité has thus representations of the Amazon that 
greatly disregarded the plans or conceptions that the Amazonians may have about themselves. 
In the next chapter, we hope to show a change in this mentalité or, at least, a potential for 
change.  
CHAPTER THREE 
3 	THINKING GLOBALLY, ACTING GLOBALLY 
Since the first naturalists' reports on the Amazon region reached the United States, Americans 
have seen it successively as the jungle, the wilderness, the land of underutilized resources, the 
future center of a civilization. Yet on October 15, 1997, a New York Times editorial complained 
that "[t]he issue that most Americans identify with Brazil—the destruction of the Amazon 
rainforest did not occupy a prominent role in the talks between President Clinton and 
Brazil's President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso." This is far distant from the earlier images 
seen in the previous chapter. The destruction of the Amazon rainforest is the main association 
with Brazil, not its scientific or bizarre curiosities, nor the wasted resources. Moreover, the 
New York Times goes on by saying that "Brazil, like the United States and Asia's forested 
nations, must abandon the view that the rain forest is only a commodity to be exploited for 
private gain" ("A Rain Forest Imperiled," 1997). If not only a commodity, what does the New 
York Times suggest that the forest is now? 
This shift from dangerous "jungle" to fragile or threatened "rainforest" in the 
American mentalité  is due in large part to the influence of environmental non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs)12. Though relatively new in the world environmental political arena, 
NGOs have been major actors in the definition of US policies for tropical rainforests (Mohd 
cue Laarman, 1994). In this chapter I analyze how US NGOs initiated their activities on the  
The impact of this shift can he noted in the Following comic message that has circulated in the Internet : 
"Rainforest?! When the hell did it become the rainforest? When I was a little kid it was called the jungle, a place 
where it's dark and scary and snakes are crawling everywhere and there's large spiders that bite you and, if you 
don't find an antidote for its poison in five minutes, your heart will explode. Now it's the rainforest, a happy 
place of butterflies with smiling little elves running around." (Cantu ,1998, par. 2). More in the academic realm, 




Amazon rainforest and to point out some strategic actions in their approach to the issue. Most 
of the data on the activities of the US NGOs was obtained in structured interviews (sec 4.1 
Oral history/Structured Interviews). 
3.1 	Non Governmental Organizations: A New Actor in the Block 
Most authors agree that it is difficult to define a non-governmental organization (Kolk, 1996, 
p. 52; Mohd & Laarman, 1994, p. 320; Anello, 1991, p. 5). The term defines the organizations 
negatively by expressing what it is not (governmental), instead of defining what it is. The wide 
range of tasks carried on by an NGO also prevents us from a definition by activities. Currently, 
NGOs sponsor research, lobby in the congress, implement field and educational projects, 
organize conferences and are active in many other areas. 
For several decades, the NGO concept has been used in the framework of the United 
Nations to refer to the list of identified organizations with certain rights within the Economic 
and Social Council (Kolk, 1996, p. 52). This is, however, a rather arbitrary selection that does 
not include many relevant organizations. On the other hand, some authors include in their 
studies business organizations, such as the American Plywood Association or the 
Woodworkers Alliance for Rainforest Protection. Both organizations have a clear timber trade 
associations agenda but are, formally, non-governmental organizations (Mohd & Laarman, 
1994). Consensus appears to have been reached on the use of NGOs in the sense of non-
profit organization—which could still include the business organizations which operate under 
the guise of NGOs. In this thesis, environmental NGOs refer exclusively to non-profit 
organizations that align themselves within the environmental movement. 
Their unclear definition notwithstanding, non-governmental organizations are a 
notable force of the last quarter of this century. When compared with other organizations,  
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their growth has been unparalleled. For instance, whereas "between 1909 and 1988, 
intergovernmental organizations grew from thirty-seven to 309, non-governmental 
organizations grew from 179 to 4,518.... In fact, almost all environmental NGOs, networks, 
and coalitions were started in 1980s" (Princen & Finger, 1994, p. 1). Yet another indicator of 
growing NGO prominence is the organizational growth which many individual NGOs, 
especially some of the more prominent Northern groups,13 have experienced since the early 
1980s. Just to quote some examples relevant to this study, from 1985 to 1990, membership in 
Greenpeace increased from 1.4 million to 6.75 million and annual revenues went from $24 
million to some $100 million. Greenpeace had five foreign affiliates in 1979, while in 1992 it 
had offices in twenty-four countries worldwide. The Nature Conservancy, founded in 1951, 
began its international programs in 1974 but it was not until 1987 that a splinter group formed 
Conservation International; by 1991 it had twenty NGO partners in sixteen Latin American 
countries, and a budget of $10.9 million. The Sierra Club increased its membership from 
346,000 in 1983 to 560,000 in 1990 and has an annual budget of $35 million. The Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), founded in 1972 with 6,000 members, now has 170,000 
and an annual budget of $16 minion. Both the Sierra Club and the NRDC expanded their 
international programs in the 1980s and early 1990s (Princen & Finger, 1994, p. 3). 
UNCED—the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio 
de Janeiro, 1992—was a major landmark in the history of NGOs in international 
environmental forums. By then the relevance of the NGOs in international forums was already 
recognized, although its role was yet in dispute. Governments and intergovernmental 
13 According to well-accepted terminology, I use "Northern" to denote industrialized countries from North 
America and Western Europe plus Japan, Australia and New Zealand. 'Southern" refers to those less 
industrialized countries formerly known as the Third World and occupying much of Latin America, Africa and 
Asia.  
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organizations intended to have NGOs just as providers of data and expertise [science], as 
information disseminators, and as legitimating agents. On the other hand, many NGOs were 
not ready to be limited to this role and wanted to use UNCED to bring about fundamental 
change in world development. "As a result, an ongoing bargain occurred in UNCED whereby 
states conceded credit to some NGOs for promoting environmental and development values 
and, in return, gave them visibility, prominence, and sometimes even financial and logistical 
support. Consequently, in organizing themselves around UNCED, some NGOs acquired a 
certain autonomy from traditional politics and developed a new relationship with the emerging 
international environment and development establishment" (Finger, 1994a, p. 187). 
3.2  The Amazon Forest Enters the US NGOs' Agenda 
The environmental issue started to be internationalized in the mid-1980s, when it became the 
subject of international controversies. Although the environment had been considered at the 
international level before, as, for instance, in the United Nations Conference on Human 
Environment in Stockholm 1972, this largely involved deliberation in international forums, 
exchange of scientific information, and concrete action in the area of nature conservation 
(Kolk, 1996, p. 19). 
It was also during the 1980s that the Amazon gained international attention. Kolk 
(1996) considers that "the gradual shift of focus from local to global features of rainforest 
destruction and from separate elements to the ecosystem as a whole explain the rising 
significance of the Amazon." In other words, the disastrous consequences of widespread 
logging of the rainforest area in other regions of the world for export purposes, especially their 
rapid decimation, even increased the specificity of the Amazon as the largest and reasonable 
healthy rainforest in the planet. Regarding the Brazilian Amazon in particular, a sudden  
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upsurge of public interest in the region in 1988 was brought about by the publication of 
alarming deforestation figures; global media coverage of burning rainforests; the subsequent 
association of rainforest destruction with global warming and the assassination of the rubber 
tapper Chico Mendes, the president of the National Council of the Rubber Tappers and a 
longtime advocate for the preservation of the Amazon rainforest for extrativist use14 (Kolk, 
1996, p. 19). 
However, if 1988 is a the landmark for public interest in the Amazon rainforest, US 
NGOs had been active in the region since 1983, through a campaign against Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDBs). To initiate this process were Barbara Bramble, Bruce Rich and 
Brent Blackwelder, respectively the international program officers then recently appointed to 
the National Wildlife Federation (NWF), the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the 
Environmental Policy Institute (EPI, the predecessor of Friends of the Earth-US, FoE). These 
officers tried to find ways to deal with the international dimension of the environment 
understandable for a wider public. Until then, US NGOs had generally restricted their activities 
to domestic issues. 
Bramble, Rich and Blackwelder were all part of the Green Group or Group of Ten, a 
formal committee established in 1983, made up of the heads of twenty of the major NGOs in 
the US, for planning and co-ordination of major initiatives. "It was this committee that agreed 
to a joint media campaign on six major environmental issues (global warming, biological 
diversity, population, ocean pollution, Eastern Europe, and global economic bargaining) at the 
group of seven Economic Summit in Houston in 1990" (Bramble & Porter, 1992, p. 319). 
14 Extractive reserves are protected areas in which forests would be preserved for local people to extract non-
timber products, such as rubber, Brazil nuts, roots and other non-timber products. Occasionally and under the 
agreement of the community, timber may be extracted for local use. 
45 
A campaign against the MDBs which centered on the fate of the local population and 
their natural environment was launched, and it turned out to be an excellent approach to 
attract public attention to international issues. The NGOs involved selected the case studies on 
the basis of personal contacts with Southern NGOs or with US activist who knew about a 
particular project. In this way, ongoing and emerging protests in Brazil were linked to and 
strengthened by international actions (which, in their turn, were far more convincing and 
effective as a result of these connections). The campaign against the multilateral development 
banks, which US environmental NGOs initiated in 1983, brought about an international 
coalition of Northern and Southern organizations. In Brazil the protests against the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank built on the opposition to military 
dictatorship, uniting Indians, environmentalists and rural activists, particularly rubber tappers. 
Due to these successful actions in particular, international knowledge of and concern over the 
fate of the inhabitants of the rainforest increased (Kolk, 1996, p. 78). 
Stephen Schwartzman (phone interview, October 17, 1997), currently officer for the 
EDF International Program, considers that the campaign approach was original at that time. 
The US was then (and now) the larger single source of funds for the World. Bank. The strategy 
of the campaign was to require more environmental responsibility for US money that went to 
the World Bank. "We singled out case studies," says Schwartzman, "demanding a broader 
concept of sustainability. In that period Brazil had three big projects waiting for funds in the 
World Bank, with little participation of the local NGOs at all. We tried to underline the 
importance of the participation of the local NGOs, as local constituencies, and this was a big 
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success. Our partner then was the FASE, one of the oldest organizations working in Amazon, 
besides IBASE and Rede Brazil."15  
Besides the mainstream US environmental organizations, such as NWF, EDF, Sierra 
Club, FoE, NRDC,.the campaign formed coalition of forces also with human rights 
organizations in Washington, such as Survival. Survival international is an organization 
dedicated to indigenous people in all the world and it had already links with local organizations 
in Brazil. Other activists in the human tights field understood how this alliance of 
environmental and human rights organizations could be fruitful and adapted in part their 
agendas to encompass both environmental and social needs. In fact, in the NGOs' discourse, 
equity was one of the most important philosophical matrixes for sustainability (S. 
Schwartzman, phone interview, October 17, 1997; Acselrad & Sedrez, 1995). 
Imazon (the Man and Environment Institute of the Amazon), the National Council of 
Rubber Tappers, and the Institute for Amazon Studies would be major partners for EDF and 
NWF from 1985 on. The Brazilian organizations demanded that the Brazilian government 
support extractive reserves—areas in which forests would be preserved for local people to 
extract non-timber products, such as rubber and Brazil nuts—as an alternative to government-
aided development projects that threatened to destroy tropical forests. This proposal was 
quickly incorporated by the US organizations in their negotiations with the World Bank 
(Bramble & Porter, 1992, p. 332). 
According to Schwartzman (phone interview, October 17, 1997), "this alliance was a 
landmark for the environmental movement in the US. Traditional conservationist movements 
began to pay attention to the relationship between social and environmental problems, and to 
15IBASE-- Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analyses—and Rede Brazil are two important development 
Brazilian NGOs, with large tradition in the Brazilian social movement. 
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make deeper criticism to development models. For instance, in 1985 organizations such as the 
Sierra Club had no contact with grassroots movements. Nowadays this exchange is a common 
place." Schwartzman suggests a causal link between the international campaign against the 
MDBs, that took into account the social dimensions of environmental issues, with more 
receptiveness by the mainstream environmental organization to environmental. justice concepts 
within the US. Although I cannot confirm such causal link, there is no doubt that both 
tendencies (coalitions with Southern grassroots and coalitions with American grassroots) were 
parallels, with a slight precedence for the former. 
Some authors consider the MDB ("50 years is enough!") campaign a failure. According 
to K. Conca (1993, p. 313), a researcher on world politics, "the campaign succeeded in forcing 
the Bank to divert a small percentage of its lending into environmental-protection projects, 
and to rein in some of its most environmentally destructive lending activities. But the 
campaign failed in its larger effort to challenge the concept of project-based development 
lending and the ends toward which such lending is directed." 
Notwithstanding its specific achievements and failures, the campaign set a pattern for 
the relationship of the US NGOs regarding the Amazon rainforest. This pattern included not 
only concern for the fate of the forest and its biodiversity, but also concern for the forest 
people and proposals for alternative development; above all, this pattern included the 
establishment of coalitions with Southern organizations. 
Such a pattern was noticed in the reviewed literature. In 1992-93, Mohd and Laarman 
(1994, pp. 321-324) surveyed the tactics and targets of US NGOs regarding rainforest. 
According to the authors, environmental "NGOs indicated that they are concerned not only 
with the broad issue of protecting rainforest biodiversity, but also inter ilia with rights of 
indigenous people, roles of the international institutions in tropical deforestation, and linkages  
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between the tropical timber trade and deforestation.... Nearly one in every two citizen NGOs 
mentioned that the fight for the rights of indigenous peoples is a prime concern". Almost all 
showed preference for "outside tactics," as defined by the author, which include "entering into 
coalitions, working with media, protest and demonstrations, grassroots lobbying viewpoints." 
However, among all the organizations in the United States, only a small subset has 
been involved in global environmental problems, although that number has risen remarkably 
in the last few years. These organizations with a global agenda are usually of three general 
types: "first the large, general membership organizations, with broad environmental interests 
but focused primarily on domestic environmental issues; second, organizations whose primary 
orientation is toward international issues and which are part of a larger international network 
of affiliated organizations; third, 'think tank' organizations without large membership whose 
primary influence comes through research, publishing, and/or legal work" (Bramble & Porter, 
1992, p. 316). 
I selected five of the most significant US NGOs concerned with the Amazon 
rainforest among a list of 24 organization from Mohd and Laarman' study: Sierra Club, 
Environmental Defense Fund, Rainforest Action Network, Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace. The former two are not considered "activist" NGOs by Mohd and Laarman' 
study, while the latter three are. In the next few pages, I intend to offer a brief chronology of 
the involvement of each of them with the Amazon rainforest. In the Bramble and Porter's 
taxonomy, Sierra Club fits in the first category; Rainforest Action Network, Friends of the 
Earth and Greenpeace fit in the second; and Environmental Defense Fund could fit in the 
third, as a legal think tank.  
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The coalition strategy is analyzed in more detail in the next chapter. (A brief 
consideration on its fundamental role for assuring legitimacy of action for US NGOs in the 
South follows in the section 3.3 Legitimacy: from Local to Global). 
3.2.1 Sierra Club 
The US environmental icon John Muir founded the Sierra Club in 1892. It is in many senses 
the most traditional of the American environmental organizations. Its journal, Sierra, promotes 
ecotourism, conservation, hints for climbing and camping in the "wilderness" and updates on 
the US environmental policy. 
Though the Sierra Club deals mainly with domestic environmental issue, it first issued 
a policy guideline for tropical rainforest on January 12 1974, only two years after the UN 
Conference of Stockholm. The Sierra Club policy claimed that "more areas to [sic] tropical 
forest need to be set aside permanently as parks and reserves. The need for these reserves for 
recreational, scientific or educational use is clear and urgent." A final article demanded "that 
the culture and human rights of primitive [sic] native peoples living in the rainforests of the 
world must be recognized in any planning program." There is no suggestion, however, on how 
to harmonize both demands: parks and reserves on one side and cultural and human rights of 
indigenous people on the other (Sierra Club, 1994, par. 2-8). 
In 1980 the Sierra Club was part of the U.S environmental communities Tropical 
Forest Working Group. Due to this activity, it included an amendment to its Rainforest policy 
on November 15, 1980. in this amendment, the Sierra Club "recognizes that there is dramatic 
deterioration of the world's tropical rainforest resource from a multitude of causes and that, at 
the current rate of loss, projections indicate that by the year 2000 [sic] most of the accessible 
tropical forests of the world will disappear. The Sierra Club maintains that existing institutional 
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measures to control tropical deforestation are insufficient to secure vital reservoirs of genetic 
diversity or to prevent severe deterioration in watershed quality throughout the developing 
countries of the tropics." The focus was therefore on the ecological effects of the destruction 
of the rainforest. In the same amendment, the Sierra Club urged US and Canada to assume 
their responsibility in the quest for mitigation of the tropical deforestation, due "to their 
leadership in science and technology" (Sierra, 1994, par. 3). 
Despite this policy, Sierra Club didn't have a really active campaign on tropical 
rainforest until 1983, when it took part on the MDB campaign. The Sierra journal dedicated 
no more than one article per year to tropical rain forest, from 1978 to 1985. In 1988 Sierra 
announced the launching of its tropical rainforest campaign. The campaign meant basically the 
support of initiatives of other organizations with larger basis in Amazon, such as EDF and 
NRDC, especially in the MOB campaign. The Sierra Club website claims that, as part of this 
campaign, in 1989 "the Sierra Club presses World Bank to withdraw $500 million loan to 
Brazil, which kills plans to build 147 dams and flood large areas of Amazon" (Sierra, 1996, par. 
5). I couldn't find any reference to such plans. 
From 1985 to 1995 there is a slight increase of articles on rainforest in the Sierra 
journal (about two to three per year, and a total of four articles in 1992). There is no evidence 
that the camp* was still active in 1997. On the other hand, several pages in the Sierra Club 
website in 1998 are dedicated to "Human Rights and Environment," with special notes 
regarding the activist Chico Mendes, the National Council of Rubber Tapper and the Kayapós, 
one of the largest Amazonian tribe. 
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3.2.2 Environmental Defense Fund  
The Environmental Defense Fund was founded in 1967 by a "coalition of Long Island 
scientists from the Brookhaven National Laboratory, faculty from the State University of New 
York at Stony Brook, and local citizens concerned about groundwater pollution, dump sites, 
wildlife habitat protection, and uncontrolled development" (Opie, 1998, p. 423). 
EDF's involvement with Amazon started in 1993, with the campaign against 
Multilateral Development Banks, which is still the bulk of its International Program. The 
strategy of coalition has been part of the history of the EDF, so it was natural that it would try 
to create coalitions also in its international program. The selection of Stephen Schwartzman to 
coordinate the International Program in 1988 was part of this policy. Schwartzman had lived in 
Brazil for two years, working with Brazilian NGOs on Indian rights and human rights 
international networks. For his research for a Ph.D. in Anthropology by the University of 
Chicago, in 1983 he lived with the Panará Indians, in Mato Grosso, Brazil. His background 
warranted him easy access to Brazilian NGOs. 
EDF activities include the release of in depth studies on the Amazon and press 
releases on news from Amazon; lobbing in US and international forums, such as the World 
Bank; consultant services to local NGOs and managing the Chico Mendes Fund. The Fund 
was created soon after the murder of the Brazilian activist and its resources are transferred to 
the National Council of Rubber Tappers in Brazil, founded by Mendes. 
EDF was one of the first organizations to open the US NGOs for Brazilian activists. 
According to Schwartzman (phone interview, 1997, October 17), EDF "started the contact 
with Chico Mendes with US NGOs." 'The goal then was not only to enlarge the coalition of 
US NGOs, but also to enlarge the basis of support for environmental issues in Brazil. "In 
1987, when we brought him here, my major expectation was that the rubber tappers would be 
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a point of contact with the Unions and the worker movement, with the small farmers. We 
thought that it could be an opening for the worker unions to environmental issues." 
3.2.3 Rainforest Action Network 
Rainforest Action Network (RAN) was created during the "wave of awareness on the Amazon 
issues in the mid-80s" by Randall Hayes, the founder of RAN, was an ex-activist for Native 
American's rights. 'the trigger event was the documentary by Adrian Cowan, The Decade of 
Destruction, released in 1986, just after the Polonoreste Project, one of the most 
environmentally disastrous projects funded by the World Bank, was launched. 
RAN is probably the first US NGO working only with tropical rainforest (and today 
also with temperate forests). According to Roberto Borges (online interview, October 24, 
1997), the Brazilian officer responsible for the Program Brazil, coalition and decentralization 
were basic in the RAN's work. Since 1987, RAN has created 150 RAGs----Rain forest Action 
Groups, active in all US, with which RAN has a semiformal link. 
The Program Brazil has developed two major themes: the issue of the consumption of 
timber, and multinational responsibility, besides solidarity with Amazon people. lts activities 
include, for instance, helping Brazilian activists visiting the US. That means political support 
(lobbying, scheduling meetings, etc.) and institutional support (to create a public and political 
space in the international agenda for the Brazilian issues). In the case of CITES- Conference of 
International Trade of Endangered Species of Fauna and Elora, for instance, there has been a 
strong participation of the RAN in coordinating the movement in Brazil with that in the US. 
The Program Brazil also includes financial support, as in the Protect and Acre Program, 
created in 1991. This program funds community projects, provides juridical assistance, and 
helps demarcation of Indian territory and other projects for the protection of tropical forest.  
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They also review projects and help in fundraising for projects by Brazilian NGOs' to US 
foundations. Finally, the Program Brazil offers technical support, with mediation of field 
projects in Brazil and US organizations that have the expertise for natural resource 
management. For that, RAN created a specific database. RAN supports the transference of 
technology appropriate to the local institution's needs. The goal is to assist organizations in 
Brazil to form these partnerships directly and therefore, to decentralize the contacts (R. 
Borges, online interview, October 24, 1997). 
According to Borges (online interview, October 24, 1997), RAN works in close 
contact with its Brazilian partners. Although active in the MDB campaign by releasing 
information, RAN sees itself primarily as an mediator between Brazilian NGOs and US 
organizations. 
3.2.4 Friends of the Earth  
Friends of the Earth (FoE) began as a strictly United States organization, opening its first 
office in San Francisco in 1969, but soon expanded to Paris (1970) and London (1971). In the 
early 1970s, FoE began developing an international structure called Friends of the Earth 
International, which grew from twenty-five member groups worldwide in 1981 to fifty-one in 
1992 (and fifty-five in 1998), with relative autonomy. Although FoE is usually considered an 
"activist" group, it is less a direct action (street protest) group, than a lobbying organization 
which works to build public awareness through the news media and reports and exert pressure 
on Congress, the President, and government agencies. 
Differently from the preceding groups, Friends of the Earth had an international 
profile from the very beginning. Moreover, the existence of several FoE groups in several 
countries makes it a network by itself. There has been a FoE Brazil since 1985, although in the  
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very South, in the subtropical zone. According to David Malakoff (online interview, 
November 14, 1997), former editor of the FoE magazine No Man Apart and International 
Program staff, in the mid-1980s, Friends of the Earth groups in the United Kingdom (UK), 
Malaysia, and Brazil took an active interest in tropical forest issues. In the U.S., Friends of the 
Earth -- because of its international affiliates—was playing a small but active role in efforts to 
reform the World Bank, notably the MDB campaign, also called 50 years is enough!. In 1987 the 
FoE- UK began a major campaign targeting the tropical timber trade. As part of that campaign, 
they published a study documenting the trade in Europe. FoE-US was to prepare a similar 
study of the trade in the US, since this is the major market for tropical timber trade. Although 
a great deal of research was done, and several drafts were prepared, the study was never 
published. At about the same time, a number of groups with a major focus on tropical forest 
issues, including Greenpeace, the Rainforest Action Network, the Rainforest Alliance, Survival 
international, and Conservation international, became very active on rainforest issues. As a 
result, FoE-US's only claim to unique expertise on the issue came from its association with 
FoE groups in other tropical nations. It focused its efforts on helping these groups fund and 
promote their activities. "The most active group was FoE-Malaysia, working on Asian forests. 
FoE-Brazil was less active. Eventually, FoE-US's efforts in this area became focused on 
working together with these and other groups to influence international and national policy 
decisions, particularly regarding multinational lending institutions. This became even more the 
focus of FoE's work after it merged with the Environmental Policy Institute and the Oceanic 
Society in 1990. Jim Barnes and Brent Blackwelder of the Institute were major players in 
international issues." Still according to Malakoff, "Friends of the Earth's affiliates typically have 
strong relationships with local NGOs and local governments. In the US, we saw our role as  
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helping our affiliates strengthen these affiliations by helping our groups raise money and 
become known in the US" (D. Malakoff, online interview, November 14, 1997). 
Since 1988, when FoE took part in a successful campaign to prevent the building of a 
dam in the Xingu river, Center Brazil, FoE has established many contacts in the Amazon, and 
partnerships with other organizations, Indigenous people, etc. In 1989 FoE International 
established the amazon program, but with still a low participation directly in the area. In 1994, 
the GTA (Amazon Work Group), a network of 350 groups from the Amazon, joined FoE, 
establishing a larger basis in the region. 
In the last three years, Friends of the Earth has been more active in the Amazon, with 
Roberto Smeraldi as full time officer for Amazon issues. After the downsizing of the activities 
of Greenpeace Brazil, FoE has been the most active transnational NGOs in Brazilian territory, 
coordinating in-depth studies, reports and forming coalitions. R Smeraldi (online interview, 
1998 March 16) is Brazilian, and had worked for FoE Italy since 1986 before being transferred 
to Brazil. FoE Amazon currently is leading currently a campaign against predatory logging of 
mahogany. 
3.2.5 Greenpeace  
Greenpeace was formed by two expatriate American, Jim Bohlen and Irving Stone, in 
February 1970 out of a small British Columbia chapter of the Sierra Club, to protest against 
nuclear testing in the North Pacific (Opie, 1998, p. 428). Similar to the FoE process, 
Greenpeace started its career in the international arena. Its  goal was to attract media attention 
to environmental issue, in an effort of having the world "bearing witness" in a Quaker 
tradition to wrongs against Nature. Greenpeace became famous for its "flamboyant" actions, 
what are considered its major strength and major weakness. Greenpeace US is one of the four 
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most important chapter of Greenpeace International (the others are Germany, UK and 
Netherlands) and has strong influence on the decisions of the international board. 
In 1988, public opinion in the Northern countries—which forms the basis of support 
for the organization—shared a general concern on the state of the world's rainforest and the 
Amazon in particular. As the Amazon was perceived as a global environmental problem, 
Greenpeace International felt necessary to answer to this concern and to act in this area. 
According to José Augusto Pádua (online interview, Jan 17, 1988), "even today there are some 
officers that consider that the Amazon should be the priority issue for GP." Padua was the 
Forest Campaign Coordinator for the Greenpeace Latin America, between February 1990 and 
May 1996. 
Greenpeace International decided to create Greenpeace Latin America (GPAL) in 
1988 with the Amazon issue in mind. The hired staff (most Latin Americans) had some―  
justified―fear that this issue would monopolize the work of the L shadowing other 
important questions, especially in the Central America. As in the case of FoE, RAN and EDF, 
the choice for a Brazilian staff, or with people long familiarized with Brazil, was a strategic 
move—and not without conflict. The Latin American Forest campaign had a double forum 
for policy decisions: the GPAL—with more social and integrated vision of the region—and the 
International Forest Campaign in Amsterdam. GPAL was timid on tackling the Amazon issue, 
while the international campaign encouraged it, with generous financial support (J. A. Pádua, 
online interview, January 17, 1998). 
The relationship between. Greenpeace US and GPAL was never very close. From 1990 
to 1991 the coordination of the International Forest Campaign was in Washington, until it was 
transferred to Amsterdam in 1991. There was initially a campaigner and an assistant for the 
Forest Campaign in the US, and both quit when the international coordination went to  
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Europe. Only in 1993 was a new campaigner hired, based in San Francisco. The campaigner, 
Pamela Weller, was a former officer in Rainforest Action network and was hired to work 
mainly on the campaign against predatory logging of mahogany, that had started in Brazil in 
1992. The goal was to coordinate both campaigns, Brazil and US, since the US \vas the major 
mahogany consumer market in the world. The campaign was eliminated during the Financial 
cuts by the end of 1994, and only in 1997 Greenpeace US decided to reinitiate the process. 
However, despite the weaknesses of the Forest Campaign in the Greenpeace US, the 
American members have always showed support for the issue. Although not working directly 
on the Amazon, Greenpeace US provided financial support for the campaign in Latin 
America. 
In Brazil, the forest campaign had two campaigner (Latin America and Brazil), both 
Brazilians with wide experience in the Amazon. Although Greenpeace didn't work with 
indigenous groups directly, the first executive director was an anthropologist who had worked 
with Guarani Indians for several years and was well known among Indian rights organizations. 
Greenpeace Brazil established strong links with local groups, by creating a coalition against 
predatory logging in Amazon. For Padua (online interview, January 17, 1998), "this was 
probably the best moment of the campaign, which had a great start. In this moment GP 
played a fundamental role in Amazon, being a sort of 'bridge' to articulate different interests, 
to put together groups and to establish platforms." 
The Amazon Campaign chose the logging as its main target. According to Pádua 
(online interview, January 17, 1998), "that choice was strategic, because, thought we know that 
the major deforestation cause in Amazon is the cattle, we consider that logging was an 
emerging problem that open new frontiers for other deforestation causes (including cattle)." 
Moreover, the campaigners calculated that Greenpeace and similar international organizations  
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could be more efficient by confronting the international timber market that confronting the 
cattle issue (which reach almost exclusively domestic actors and market in Brazil). Mahogany 
was chosen as a symbol and concrete object to face the logging and timber issue. Mahogany 
would offer also an opportunity to challenge consumption patterns, especially in the Northern 
countries (the consumer markets) and link them to the deforestation of the Amazon (J. A. 
Pádua, online interview, January 17, 1998; see Chapter Five - Case Study: The Mahogany 
Campaign). 
3.3 	Legitimacy: from Local to Global  
With few exceptions, before the decade of the 1980s most US NGOs dealt mainly with 
domestic questions. Three factors counted for the broadening of activities to a global scale: 
First, a deeper understanding by the NGOs of the nature of environmental degradation and its 
links to international economic and political forces; second, the development of strong 
alliances among NGOs from many nations, North and South; third, the emergence of a new 
set of issues during the 1980s that had not been identified or understood during the first wave 
of environmental activism of the 1960's and 70s—the destruction of the ozone layer, 
greenhouse warming, and the loss of tropical forests. 
Matthias Finger, an international relations scholar with a deep interest in 
environmental NGOs, considers that "the globalization of ecology and the corresponding 
transformation and globalization of environmental activism corresponds to the phenomenon 
some call 'global civil society' or 'turbulence in the world politics.'" Parallel to this 
"turbulence" there is the "emergence of a multicentric world consisting of thousands of non-
state, no-sovereign global actors, [which] coexist in a nonhierarchical relationship with the 
state-centric system" (Finger, 1994, p. 48).  
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In other words, as we mentioned before, NGOs are the new actors in the 
environmental international forum. Such intrusion could not take place without some 
conflicts. The major conflict was the challenge of US NGOs legitimacy to act in Southern 
countries. This challenge can be understood in two fronts: first within the conflicts between 
North and South, and second, due to the NGOs' democratic deficit (see 3.3.2 The Democratic 
Deficit). 
3.3.1 The Nationalist Challenge  
The first front is easy to understand. The disputes between North and South found in the 
environmental forum a new space for battle. These disputes arc magnified due a major 
characteristic of the environmental issues: although they don't respect political borders, they 
are site specific, i.e., they occur in concrete places, within a concrete political framework. in the 
case of tropical rainforest, they occurs mainly in Southern, developing countries, with a huge—
and, as we have seen in the first chapter, sometimes justified mistrust on plans by Northern 
countries or constituencies on what to do with the Southern natural resources. 
In the Brazilian case, any discussion that could just suggest the internationalization in 
any way of the Amazon was enough to cause a huge uproar among the military. As Ann Kolk 
commented about the Brazilian nationalist reaction to the international environmental 
movement in Brazil, the global concern on the forests "provoked a staunch reaction of 
nationalist forces in the first months of 1989. Every proposal for the supposed 
internationalization of the Amazon in whatever form was fiercely renounced. In this period, 
the Brazilian media paid considerable attention to a large number of statements about and 
visits to the Amazon by a range of prominent foreign persons—politicians, artists, and royalty" 
(Kolk, 1996, p. 106).  
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National sovereignty includes the control of the natural resources in the nations' 
territory. Any attempt to interfere in this control will find jealous opposition by the nation-
states, especially if the southern countries consider that this interference can affect their 
legitimate right to development. This tension is starkly evident in Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration of the 1972 UN Conference of the Human. Environment, which 
reflects an attempt to insert a new norm of environmental responsibility into international 
relations. According to Principle 21, states have "the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment" (Liftin, 
1993, p. 110). 
Conca (1992b) contests the affirmation that a global environmental regime would 
affect the sovereignty of the nation-states. His arguments is that most policies decided in 
international forum call for the a larger participation and action of the nation-state, and 
increase, instead of dilute, the authority of the state in the management of natural resources. 
However, the nationalist challenge remains, and most international NGOs have to face 
it soon or later. 
3.3.2 The Democratic Deficit  
We have to understand the structure of the NGOs to understand this second challenge to their 
legitimacy. I have claimed that NGOs shaped the American mentalite regarding the Amazon 
and other environmental issues. But the relationship between NGOs-mentalité  is more complex 
than that. Different from Roosevelt, the naturalist, Ford and the others shapers of the cultural 
perception, NGOs depend on public opinion as much as they influence it.  
61 
	
They are not elected, as are governments; they do not generate significant income  for 
society, as do corporations; they do not have a clear mission outside the political arena, as  do 
churches and the academy. International relations scholars call this lack of a traditional 
legitimating support "democratic deficit." The only legitimacy NGOs have is what is given to 
them by public support. On one side, the democratic deficit—the absence of traditional links 
with the constituencies 	offers peculiar advantages to the NGOs. In international forums, for 
instance, "NGOs are not bound by national boundaries. They are accountable not to an 
electorate but only to their membership and, then, only insofar as membership and donations 
are maintained. They do not have to be nice to anyone. They can be, and often are, in the 
business of monitoring, exposing, criticizing, and condemning. They need not compromise on 
either ecological or ethical principles, or, at least, they need do so much less than governments 
for which the essence of maintaining good relations is, indeed, compromise" (Princen, 1994, p. 
142). 
On the other hand, they are continuously fighting for legitimacy to be in these 
international forums, and this legitimacy depends clearly in a volatile public opinion. The 
dependence is financial in the first place. All the organizations mentioned in the precedent 
item—Sierra Club, RAN, EDF, FoE and Greenpeace 	depend heavily on members' financial 
support to survive. Greenpeace, for its statutes, accepts money exclusively from private 
donors; therefore practically 100 percent of its budget comes from membership. RAN, and 
EDF fund their activities with 60 percent from membership and 40 percent from grants by US 
Foundations. Sierra Club has a more complex budget composition, but membership also plays 
an important role. 
This situation is very specific of the US NGOs. Actually, US non-governmental 
organizations are much more bound to public opinion than their European siblings are, for 
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instance. According to Kolk (1996, p. 58), usually "NGOs in the United States are supported 
by private contributions, membership fees and foundations, while European NGOs rely more 
on financial assistance from the government (or the European Community), in addition to 
private donation.... To survive, US NGOs need to canvass actively, wage fund-raising 
campaigns and place advertisements, which have to convince the public to continue to support 
the organization." Therefore, the role of US NGOs in the building of an environmental 
awareness—and consequently in the shaping of the American environmental mentalité—is not 
a side effect of their actions, but a necessary condition to their existence. 
This dependence is also, of course, political. When Greenpeace claims to have five 
million members, it is unquestionably a political asset, an vital component of its legitimacy. It is 
NGOs' political asset that determine their value as a partner for governments and international 
forums in the decision making process, depends on theirs bargain assets. These assets include, 
for instance, the public support NGOs can achieve and their now history of efficiency, i.e., 
what they can claim as victories for the causes they defend. 	instance, when the World 
Bank adopted environmental sustainability requirements in its guidelines, this was a major 
victory to the NGOs involved in the Multilateral Development Banks campaign. The 
organizations were then considered skilled negotiators, and their members felt being part of 
that victory. Correctly publicized, such victory drew more supporters. 
Both assets are interlinked: the more an NGO is efficient, the more it has credibility 
and public support. The more it has public support (political and financial), the more it has 
power to bargain for its cause. 
The Figure 3-1— NGOs Legitimating Sources —shows a simplifred scheme on the 
sources of NGOs' legitimacy. However, public support and success history are only secondary, 
though more tangible, sources of legitimacy. People don't support financially and politically 
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NGOs for nothing. People support NGOs because they believe in their diagnosis of the 
problem—in the science that NGOs presented—and they agree with their moral consideration 
towards the problem. Therefore science and values are the ultimate sources of legitimacy of 
environmental NGOs.  
Figure 3-1 - NGOs Legitimating Sources 
In the passage from local to global activities, all these legitimating factors should be put 
to test. What was enough within national border may not suffice in a global scale. As we have 
seen, NGOs tend to enlarge their public support in Southern countries by building coalitions. 
In fact, the ability to form wide coalitions will be another bargain asset for international 
NGOs, as we see in the Chapter 4, Coalition: A Network Made of Conflict, Diversity and 
Alliances. Science and values, however, need to be at least initially analyzed here. 
3.3.2.1 Science: in theory, science would be the best legitimating for NGOs' global action. 
In principle, it is universally accepted and as free from national borders as environmental 
issues can be. Biodiversity loss occurs When habitats arc destroyed, be it in the temperate  
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rainforest in Canada or in the tropical rainforests in Brazil. The more reliable date a NGO 
can show to support its claims, the more credibility it will acquire. 
Some of the groups, mostly the smaller and more radical NGOs, are accused of 
inattention to factual accuracy, or making exaggerated claims, and appealing to the public's 
emotions. Although there are occasional isolated examples of this sort, in many cases the best 
weapon the NGOs have, in a lobbying contest with industry, is die credibility of NGOs 
research and data. 
NGOs dedicated to research, the so-called "Think tanks", claim their legitimacy almost 
exclusively from science and from their ability of producing accurate and indisputable reports. 
In theory, they don't have financial interest; therefore, their reports should be unbiased. 
The role of science as legitimating factor in the western society has been widely studied 
(Giddens, 1990). In the political agenda, probably environmental issues are the most 
dependent on scientific information. Unfortunately, despite common believes, scientific 
information is not at all free from political value. just the opposite, different groups tend to 
claim the legitimating blanket to themselves, blaming the opponents for being a-scientific, the 
supreme anathema. This kind of dispute was seen in the polemic on Climate Change, in the 
1997 Conference in Kyoto, as well as in the preparatory meetings (Liftin, 1994, p. 154). 
In fact, the point is that what constitutes knowledge that is polemic, more than science 
itself. For instance, in the climate change question: science can provide data on the amount of 
greenhouse gases that arc originated by different sources. But knowledge requires more: it 
requires the "cognizance of die connections between the problem and the larger world." In 
our example, "many First World interests would prefer to focus attention on the destruction 
of forests in the Third World and ignore that the bulk of greenhouse gases is the result of 
activities in the industrialized countries" (Breyman, 1993, p. 140).  
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Small NGOs, grassroots, also claim their legitimacy based on another type of science, 
i.e., local knowledge. However, this wouldn't be able to gather them a bargain asset if not 
linked to the other important source of legitimacy: values (in this case, the value that the 
knowledge of the traditional communities should be respected and that it is worth by itself), 
which lead to the second point. 
3.3.2.2 Values: NGOs defend causes that contain values shared by most people. They seek 
to appear disinterested; at the same time, they have a mandate, from their members, to do 
their best to defend the values they advocate. These values can be wilderness, humanity, 
right to know, civil rights, or any other deemed right, fair and noble by the society that 
supports the NGOs. It is the value-based legitimacy the major factors that make people feel 
honored for supporting certain organizations. 
The kind of validation seek in this case is not so much "what is scientifically correct," 
but "what is morally good." Environmental movements, in their daredevil actions, or in their 
litigation against powerful corporations in defense of Nature, offer the kind of moral heroism 
that appeals to public opinion. They, as said Breyman, "despite their imperfections, inspire 
hope for an uncertain future.... Environmental thinkers have offered a new social paradigm to 
replace the outdated by still dominant ideology of endless growth, boundless faith in 
neopositivist science and technology, patriarchy, elitist decision-making, and unbridled 
materialism" (Breyman, 1993, p. 125). 
Many NGOs partially shape their agendas by responding to what the public considers 
morally (and environmentally) good. For instance, when in 1988 Greenpeace decided to create 
the Latin American campaign based on the concern of its constituencies regarding the 
Amazon (J. A. Pádua, online interview, January 17, 1998). Or when the Rainforest Action  
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Network was created as an answer to the denunciation of predatory project in the Amazon, 
funded by the World Bank (R. Borges, online interview, October 24, 1997). Likewise part of 
the Greenpeace Forest campaign budget went to the defense of temperate rainforest, when 
these succeeded into getting a more than warm reaction from the Canadian and American 
public in 1993 (J. A. Pádua, online interview, January 17, 1998). 
However, NGOs not only answer to values, they also shape values. Through their 
campaigns, media relations and projects, they bring to the public attention new problems and 
new values. NGOs depends not so much from the public opinion, as they depend on their 
skill in bring to the public opinion the issues they consider important. They depend on their 
skill to link particular situations to global or widely shared values. In this sense they are much 
more competent and dedicated mentalite-shapers than their predecessor. As Karen Liftin, a 
scholar from the University of Washington, argued, "environmental crises... are not just 
physical phenomena, they are informational phenomena." The very way in which a crisis is 
defined, or constructed, on the basis of knowledge and stories, comes to empower some actors 
over others (Liftin, 1993, p. 21). Therefore, when Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth built 
their Amazon Campaigns on the consumption of tropical timber by Northern countries, they 
bring to the political arena no only the destruction of the rainforest (an accepted value), but: 
also the Northern consumption patterns linking to it (a new or at least less considered value). 
Here resides the major challenge for US NGOs working in the global sphere. 1-low can 
NGOs assure that the values they advocate, the images they built, have global validation? Here 
is also where the charges of Eco-colonialism and the nationalistic challenge are more harmful. 
How can environmental values be morally good when they are imposed upon people who do 
not share them, but who should suffer from them? 
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Nancy Peluso, a professor on political ecology at University of Berkeley, provides a 
good example of NGOs' eco-colonialism regarding tropical rainforests. By lobbying for 
sustainable forestry, for example, and defining sustainable forestry in the terms traditionally 
used by Western foresters or ecologist (which generally neither acknowledge nor consider the 
role of people in creating so-called natural environments), they international conservation 
groups] emphasize the formal, scientific, planning aspects of forest management. Most 
recently, the Rainforest Alliance's certifrcation of Java teak as part of its "Smart Wood" 
program has provided the SIC ]State Forestry Corporation, a Indonesian parastatal forest 
enterprise] with international legitimization for its management programs." The certification 
did not consider the violence imposed upon local communities as part of its management 
program (Peluso, 1993, p. 65). 
3.4 Conclusion  
In 1992, Barbara Bramble, the National Wildlife Society international officer, wrote an article 
to evaluate the participation of the US NGOs in international politics. For Bramble, the 
experience of ten years of North South coalition shows a priority path to follow. "I f there is 
no North South accommodation," says Bramble, "there is no chance for building a sustainable 
future" (Bramble & Porter, 1992, p. 335). 
Coalition has been the major answer by US NGOs in dealing with the Amazon 
rainforest, as the NGOs' officer report in their quoted statements. Although not conflict-
proof, the coalition strategy addresses most of the legitimacy challenges mentioned above. 
When Greenpeace claims the existence of a coalition of 70 local NGOs that support its work, 
it is definitively showing a wider support basis. For example, when Greenpeace advocates the 
choice of mahogany as a symbol of its campaign (see Chapter 5 Case Study: The Mahogany  
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Campaign) Greenpeace is not a solitary and foreign player anymore: it is backed by the action 
and legitimacy of the 70 local organizations that have been frghting the predatory logging. 
Likewise, as noted above, when EDF joins with the National Council of Rubber Tappers and 
local communities to implant a extrativist reserve, it has more possibilities of a success history. 
And of course, when any among these hires local officers, or adopts Southern agendas in their 
own agenda (such as the extractive reserves, or the limited selling of mahogany by Kayapos 
Indians), they try to create a bridge between particular values and global values—or at least 
shared/compatible values. In fact, as the American anthropologist Conklin and Graham (1995, 
p. 698) noted, "without the connection to local peoples' struggles, foreigners' protests against 
Amazonian deforestation can be construed as just another form of self interest first-world 
meddling imperialist in third-world affairs." 
However useful and widely used, the coalition strategy between so different 
constituencies as Northern and Southern NGOs has its advantages and weaknesses. The next 
chapter will deal with the establishment of coalitions in the Amazon and its political 
implications.  
CHAPTER FOUR 
4  COALITION: A NETWORK MADE OF CONFLICT, 
DIVERSITY AND ALLIANCES  
North American NGOs have formed coalitions almost since their first incursions into 
Amazonian issues, both with local organizations and with international human rights networks 
(see Chapter 3 Thinking Globally, Acting Globally). Such strategy had forced US NGOs to 
accept and to work with different conceptions of nature and environmentalism. Coalition with 
Southern NGOs--if on one side has offered definite advantages to both partners (such as the 
long-sought legitimacy mention in the previous chapter)--has also brought to the sphere of 
NGO activity the more traditional North-South conflicts. These conflicts, as well as the 
success of the alliance, have shaped the action of the US NGOs in the Amazon, as well as the 
representation of Amazon they report to their members in America. This chapter proposes to 
analyze both the concrete and ideological frameworks in which the coalition between North 
American and Brazilian NGOs took place. 
4.1 	Coalition as a Multipath Strategic Tool  
Activists from both North and South have echoed the sentiment that "developing partnership 
between environmental groups and indigenous people is one of the most important things we 
should be engaging in. h is both moral and practical" (Breyman, 1993, p. 111). During the 
1992 United Nations Conference on Fnvironmental and Development in Rio de Janeiro 
(UNCED), the "coalition was seen by the Center South group of scientists as a strategic tool 
for the South," coalitions not only between North and South, but among the Southern 
countries and movements. "Networks and task forces of experts were necessary to counter 
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Northern scientific dominance in the negotiations. Contacts with Southern NGOs would have 
to be intensified to seek their advice, profit from their know-how, and to establish closer links 
with Northern NGOs in this way" (Kolk, 1996, p. 40). Likewise, Martin Khor, coordinator of 
the Third World Network, appeals to the cooperation between North and South movements 
to accomplish the coalition and international cooperation that their governments are so 
unlikely to try. "This is where the peoples' movements, the NGOs and individual 
environmentally-conscious scientists can play a role," claims Khor. "After all, there were the 
groups and individuals that have alerted the governments to the ecological crisis, and thus were 
responsible for the staging of UNCED. The voices of ordinary citizens around the world—the 
victims of environmental degradation, the sufferers of development gone wrong, the witnesses 
to Earth's and humanity's possible death throes—have to carry through the thick mist of 
bureaucratic wrangling to demand to the decision-makers to stop the madness of 
unsustainable and unequal growth, to cooperate in a new spirit of genuine internationalism, 
redress the world's economic imbalances, change national development systems, and thus 
make possible the transition to a fair and sustainable world" (Khor, 1992, p. 49). 
In a approach similar to Khor's, Barbara Bramble, from the National Wildlife 
Foundation, sees that the "North South dialogue may prove to be an alternative forum to the 
intergovernmental committees, to produce proposals for eventual official negotiation." Even 
more, this dialogue is sine qua non condition "for building a sustainable future." Both Khor and 
Bramble urge that, through international cooperation, the Northern NGOs' power of shaping 
public opinion may be a counter-hegemonic16 force to address the environmental from a 
16 Hegemony here is defined as "the structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that 
permeates a whole system of states and non-state entities" (Conca 1993, 104). Many agents of policy decisions 
accept hegemonic values as natural, the real order of the things. NGOs can be a counter-hegemonic force 
because they challenge such values and propose or built new ones to be accepted by public opinion. 
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Southern perspective. After all, according to Bramble, there was a basic agreement among 
most of the US NGOs "on the overall goat of these efforts—to change the current short-
sighted and consumption-driven waste of the earth's natural resources, which is pursued by 
most societies in the name of economic growth, into a type of true development that is 
environmentally sustainable and socially equitable" (Bramble & Porter, 1992, pp. 319-350). 
Strategies, however, do not go unpunished. They may have unexpected outcomes, or 
at least, outcomes that go beyond their immediate ends. To create a successful coalition, where 
both partner state their goals, South and North NGOs entered into common strategies that 
involved understandings and misunderstandings. These would change their earlier perceptions 
and their future actions in the Amazon. 
Some scholars argue that such common ground is not possible. According to the 
American philosopher Lohmann, it is a mistake to believe that "equal exchange" or 
"combination of compromise of views" are possible "between groups with radically different 
languages. Even the shortest exchange between two people with different systems of thought 
must be conducted in the terms of one of the other systems, and the person whose system is 
not being used runs the risk of being dominated." He proposes instead "ad hoc unions to fight 
interference expropriation and disruption. It means emphasizing undergrounded solidarity 
with those who are different rather than trying to incorporate them in new strategies for global 
change" (Lohmann, 1993, p. 167). 
Communication (and coalition is one form of communication), however, contrarily to 
Lohmann's observation, does not require total identification among the interlocutors, but only 
a communication intersection, a "discursive community" out of the different backgrounds of 
the cultures that touch each other. The challenge is to find out how and if meanings were 
negotiated inside this discursive community. The challenge is to discover how the process of  
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constructing a negotiated meaning took place― to End a new representation of ideas and issues that 
makes a new sense out of competing or opposed ways of seeing (Flowers, 1996, p. 47). 
4.2 	The Other Partner: The Brazilian Environmental Movement  
Like many southern NGOs, Brazilian organizations trace their roots to political and human 
rights challenge. As in other Latin American countries, much of the Brazilian NGO activity 
grew Out of the work of the Catholic Church in the 1970s and, especially, Vatican 11 
Concillium, which called for greater social justice. "In the 1980s, a broader set of interests 
including environmental and public health concerns has stimulated the formation of NGOs. 
Throughout the South, women have been ignored in the development process and, partly as a 
result, many NGOs exclusively for women have been started" (Princen & Finger, 1994, p. 8). 
Church groups and neighborhood associations formed most of the grassroots 
organization in and around the cities during the 1970s. These groups were, in the First place, a 
response to the poverty and inequality that has characterized Brazilian economic development. 
They were also related to the growth of political protest against the military government that 
gathered pace after 1974. In a first moment, they would not define themselves as 
"environmentalist," although "their demands were a direct reaction against the ecological 
degradation of Brazil's urban environment: the lack of clean water and sanitation, the 
uncontrolled industrial pollution, and the lack of housing and basic amenities." These many 
popular, grassroots movements in this transitional period from dictatorship to democracy  
(1974-1985) "tried to influence state policies without, however, being able to definitely oppose 
very powerful elite interests with a strong position in Brazilian society. Gradually a broad 
conglomeration of actives groups emerged, representing a landscape of urban and rural, 
indigenous, middle-class and popular backgrounds" (Hurrell, 1992, p. 412).  
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New specifically environmental groups have been created since the early 1970s, parallel 
and in the same context of the social movement mentioned above. Their membership was 
largely middle-class and which are based mostly in the industrialized south of the country. The 
Brazilian conservation movement has its roots in the nineteenth century and was responsible 
For the creation of national parks in the 1930s. The post-war period saw the formation of 
groups such as the Union of Protectors of the Nature (1955) and the Brazilian Foundation for 
the Conservation of the Nature (1958). Some environmental organizations were also formed 
by a nationalist impulse to "defend the Brazilian natural resources." This is the case of the 
CNDDA (National Campaign for the Defense and Development of Amazon), founded in 
1967 by military and national and/or communist scholars, former activists in the nationalist 
campaign "The Oil Is Ours" in the 1950s. The original goal of the group was to protest against 
the Hudson Institute's project of damming rivers in the Amazon and forming great lakes. 
Likewise, in 1978 the Brazilian Government decided to create National Forest in the Amazon 
to be explored by private business, including foreign corporations. Out of concern for what 
such action could mean to the Amazon, nationalist and environmental groups were created in 
several Brazilian States (J. A. Padua, online interview, January 17, 1998). Therefore the first 
signs of a political environmental consciousness appeared as part of the growing opposition to 
the military government. 
Notwithstanding their different: backgrounds, most Brazilian environmental groups at 
least partially shared the governmental position adopted before and during the 1972 
Conference on the Human Environment persisted, which places the responsibility for global 
environmental pollution and its solution to developed countries. The absolute priority For 
developing countries should be economic growth, according to the government, or economic 
and equitable development, according to the emerging social movements (Kolk, 1996, p. 77).  
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The internal debate was, at that time, on the costs or on the type of development and, 
above all, the control of natural resources by the different sectors. This dispute assumed 
explicit contours during the Constitutional process (1986-1988), when international pressure in 
environmental issues was already a factor in domestic politics. A large mobilization and the 
formation of effective lobbies by the popular sectors obtained significant conquest in the 
Constitution of 1988, compared to the previous, elite-dominated constitutions could be seen.17  
"The proposals put forward by the unions, the environmental movement, Indian organizations 
and others centered on agrarian reform, workers' and indigenous rights, and the preservation 
of the environment. In the Amazon the most important issues were the question of Indian 
rights and mineral resources in their territories, the environment and agrarian reform.... The 
results therefore need to be placed within a wider context, particularly because the salient issue 
of agrarian reform was blocked.... It is likely that the elites allowed the restriction on mining in 
indigenous areas to forestall pressure on the more delicate issues of land reform and worker's 
right. In addition, the most sensitive aspects of the mining question were circumvented 
(especially to declare mining rights in Indian areas null and void)" (Kolk, 1996, p. 101). 
It was not surprising that most US NGOs failed to see the environmentalist element in 
the Brazilian social movement. In 1996, the Brazilian NG() Maternatura, together with the 
World Wildlife Foundation, elaborated a directory of environmental organizations in Brazil. 
While defining the guidelines for the publication, the editors found out that a strict 
environmental criteria would leave Out some of the most environmentally active NGOs, such 
as EASE (Association of Organizations for Social and Educational Assistance), IBASE 
(Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analyses), or the National Council of Rubber- 
17Since its independence, Brazil has had seven constitutions (1824, 1893, 1933, 1937, 1946, 1967 and finally 1988), 
some imposed and some votes.  
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Tappers (defined as a worker union). The two former organizations define themselves as 
"development NGOs," which means that their major institutional goals are alternative 
development, social justice and protection of minorities. They claim, however, that it is 
impossible to address such questions in Brazil without considering the environmental 
dimension and the management of natural resources. Likewise, they also understand that it is 
impossible to address the environmental questions without considering the social and 
development needs. 
4.3 	Environmentalism in Northern and Southern Traditions18  
The deeply rooted differences between North American and Brazilian NGOs raised the 
question whether a real and successful coalition was possible. Could a common basis for a 
dialogue be found in these two different experiences of environmentalism? 
Since its beginning, environmentalism has been considered a new social movement, 
characteristic of rich countries whose basic needs were already met. Hobsbawm went so far to 
call environmentalism a "full belly movement." Yet there has been a mature and often heroic 
environmental movement in southern countries—which by no means can be considered "full 
belly." Northern and southern environmental movements remain quite different in focus and 
ethical basis. R. Guha, an Indian environmental scholar, intensified these differences in a rather 
dualistic, yet lucid way. Northern environmentalism, says Guha, is primarily concerned with a 
dichotomy which polarizes the rights of humans and the rights of non-humans, while southern 
environmentalist is concerned with a dichotomy which polarizes rich humans and poor 
humans. Northern environmentalism has aesthetic and ethical goals, while the southern  
18This analyses session is result of the discussion the course "Environmental Ethics," conducted by Prof. Eric 
Katz at    New jersey Institute of Technology in the Spring 1997. 
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environmentalism fights for the survival of communities and the use of natural resources.19 
Northern environmentalism wants to change values and cultures, while the southern wants to 
change the production and wealth distribution system. Finally, northern environmentalism 
considers the planet as a whole, while in the South the environment movement is based in the 
local issues (Guha, 1997). Guha developed better his thesis for an "environmentalism of the 
poor" in his book with J. Martinez-Allier, in which the authors propose a less dualistic or 
Manichean position toward environmentalism (see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 — Some Varieties of Environmentalism (Guha & Martinez-Allier, 1997, p. 140).   
MATERIALISM NON-MATERIALISM 
In affluent Reaction against the increased impact of the Cultural shift to postmaterial 
countries effluents of affluence( e.g. the environmental "quality of life" values and 
justice movement in the United States, the anti- increased appreciation of 
nuclear movement). natural amenities because of 
declining marginal utility of 
abundant, easily obtained 
material commodities 
In poor • The environmentalism of the poor (i.e., the "Biocentric" eastern religions 
countries defense of livelihood and communal access to (as distinct from western 
natural resources, threatened by the state or by "anthropocentric" religions). 
the expansion of the market). 
Essentialist eco-feminism 
Reaction against environmental degradation (poor women intrinsically 
caused by unequal exchange, poverty and closer to nature) 
population growth 
Guha stresses the differences between the two movements and the impossibility for 
the northern environmental movement to answer the questions posed by the southern 
environmental movement environmental movement. My point is quite the opposite: I want to demonstrate the basis for 
agreement and cooperation between those two movements, without obliterating their 
differences. Therefore I look for the nuances and similarities that Guha has left aside. 
19It is tempting to go even further in Guha's comparison, although this is not our current goal. As J. A. 
Drummond (personal email, August 24, 1997) noted, southern environmentalism fights not only for access to 
natural resources, but also for fair prices for their products which hold the potential to alleviate poverty. 
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First, the northern environmental movement ingeneral―and the American in 
particular—is not blind to claims for environmental justice or for local solutions. This can be 
seen not only in the European movement, but also in the American grassroots  movement and, 
more recently, even among the so-called mainstream organizations (Gottlieb, 1993; Pulido,  
1996). The picture would be correct, however, had Guha referred only to the wilderness 
preservation movement. Even so, the wilderness movement has demonstrated more 
responsiveness to social issues, without losing its focus on the preservation of nature. 
Second, the southern environmental movement is not as purely materialist as depicted 
by Guha in his brief summary. We should notice that one of the most potent criticisms against 
the Western society by the southern environmentalists is exactly about Western excessive 
materialism (Unger, 1991; Leis, 1996). Southern environmentalists give to holism their own 
meaning when they argue that the fight for the environment is also a fight for all aspects of 
life. Southern communities fight also for dignity, identity in itself and in relation to the nature, 
and access to nature. Southern communities fight against marginalization. To deny the non-
materialistic aspects of this movement is to impoverish it. In fact, as it can be seen in the figure 
above, Guha includes this non-materialist aspect in his longer analysis (Guha & Martinez-
Allier, 1997). 
These non-materialist aspects include also a non-materialist understanding of nature, 
and, in some cases, a consideration toward nature in itself. Rubber tappers, forest workers in 
extractive (gathering) reserves in the Amazon, have their own way to "evaluate nature for 
itself"—although quite far from more sophisticated schemes of "intrinsic and instrumental 
values." This is part, and not an unimportant one, of their more immediate and basic Eight for 
survival. Popular religions based on nature or the forest, such as the `Mime" or ayhuasca cult, 
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are no less important an element of the rubber tapper 'strategy of survival than the "empate" 
(the rubber tappers' tree-hugging tactic).20  
However, let us admit that Guha's picture of northern and southern movement serves 
a purpose. Let us admit that the North and South dichotomy is the embodiment of more 
traditional dichotomies in environmental ethics: anthropocentrism and non-biocentrism, social 
ecology and deep ecology, ontological views and materialist views_ Even so, such differences 
do not necessarily prevent northern and southern environmental movements from working 
together for definitions of international environmental policies. To recognize the value of the 
forest should not prevent non-anthropocentrists from recognizing the third world's 
dependence from and relation to the environment—and their right to have a voice in political 
decision regarding the environment where they live. 
There is nothing in the non-anthropocentric point of view that necessarily means that 
survival of human beings should not be taken into account. "There is no inherent 
antagonism," says the deep ecology philosopher A. Naess (1994, p. 399), "between human 
settlement and free nature, for it all depends on the kind of culture humans have." 
The American philosopher Eric Katz, although highly committed to a non-
anthropocentric environmental ethics, stresses the "outstanding debts" of the richer nations of 
the world to both nature and third world. peoples, who are now asked to keep from developing 
their natural resources for the sake of preservation of nature. The first world has previously 
20  In 1994, due to my work, I was often in touch with environmental groups in the Amazon region. One day 1 met 
a member of the Cooperativa Xapuri, the rubber tapper union founded by Chico Mendes in 1986.1 asked him 
why he thought that it was important to preserve the forest. He answered me that it was because the forest was 
the lung of his world, it was the air. "Oh, no," I said to myself, "he still believes that the Amazon is the lungs of 
the world. Everybody knows it is a climatic forest, and it consumes its much oxygen as it produces." I put on 
my tolerant-intellectual Face, that face you make when you know better than your guest, but you are polite 
enough not to let him know he just made a Faux pas. I had understood nothing. He was talking of something 
much more serious than science. "The forest," he continued, "is around us, like the air, and involves everything. 
It gives sense to everything that dwells in it. The animals die without the forest, the soil disappears, the sun is 
hotter, and we don't have work. Then the forest is the lung and the river is the blood." 
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gained the benefits of environmental destruction and economic development, and it should 
now pay its fair share of the burden that the poorer nations have to bear regarding the 
preservation of a diverse planetary environment. In fact, Katz argues that concern for the 
indigenous people in the Third World is an intrinsic part of a non-anthropocentric ethics. 
"Any implementation of environmental policy must include not only the moral consideration 
of all benefits and burdens resulting from the policy. justice extends to all members of the moral 
community, however we have broadened the notion of community. Within this broadened 
human and natural community are the indigenous people of the third world who need to gain 
access to the realm of economic development" (Katz, 1997, p. 175). 
On the other hand, forest people usually see their fates linked to the forest. Some of 
them probably would recognize themselves more easily in the biotic community described by 
Aldo Leopold (1949/1996) than any high executive of a mainstream organization in the North. 
Therefore, the preservation of natural areas, where nature can carry on freely its processes, 
means the preservation of their own culture, lifestyles and lives. Populations in the third world 
are therefore painfully aware of the effects of the "massive destruction we have imposed on 
natural systems" right now (Katz, 1997, p. 176). They are the first to suffer the lack of water, 
the loss of the forest or the loss and poisoning of the soils. On one side they bear the 
damaging effect of the industrial world; on the other side they lack the benefits of such a 
world. 
Consideration for nature and concern for environmental justice and equity permeate 
both North and South environmentalism, with wide variations according to their internal 
diversity. The challenge is less an absolute opposition of both species of environmentalist and 
more a strategic dilemma for the integration of North and South environmentalisms' goals. 
The South environmental movement is more likely to receive support from Northern  
environmentalist as long as they can drive their demands to common goals (i.e., the 
preservation of "wilderness"). 
In a reverse example, were southern environmentalists to recognize in consumerism 
and militarism the major threats to their environment, would they find the same willing 
support that northern environmentalism offer to the establishment of national parks and 
reservations in the tropical forests? In other words, would the same affiance that qualifies 
"ethical and sustainable" behavior for the Kayapós be strong enough to establish "ethical an( 
sustainable" practices for the northern partners? 
These are some of the questions that North and South partners face in the establishing 
their coalitions. The next items discuss the conflicts and the advances that are also a result of 
such questions. 
4.3.1 Conflict Areas 
The first source of conflict in the US-Brazil NGOs coalitions results from their historical 
origins. As it was seen above, the majority of US NGOs involved in the Amazon are basically 
environmental in orientation, whereas in Brazil many of the groups focus on social justice, or 
represent grass-roots movements or union. This leads to divergent priorities and may cause 
fundamental splits in the vulnerable North-South NGO alliances. Besides, most are relatively 
new with little history of personal trust (Bramble & Porter, 1992, p. 350). 
Also, because of their primary commitment to a national level, as opposed to an 
international level, these Brazilian NGOs display significant ideological and political 
differences among themselves, mostly over political strategy but sometimes also over the 
question of environment versus development. in some cases, however, such domestic gaps 
can be bridged by the intervention of a international, third party. In 1993, for instance,  
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Greenpeace succeeded in creating a coalition of over seventy Amazon NGOs that had been 
reluctant even to attend to the same meetings (J. A_ Padua, online interview, January 17, 1998). 
However, during the UNCED there were often conflicts over leadership in the such 
international coalition, in particular between environmental NGOs from the North and 
development-orientated NGOs from the South (Finger, 1994a, p. 210). 
4.3.1.1 An Unequal Relationship? Brazilian NGOs have been wary because of the 
differences in political orientation, and also because of the size and financial power of US 
NGOs. Local organizations are perfectly aware of their role as the source of legitimacy for 
their US partners, and they want to make sure that they are not simply being used in the 
bargain_ For instance, in the Greenpeace coalition with Amazon organizations against 
predatory logging, sometimes the media's excessive interest on Greenpeace caused 
problems. Some organizations considered themselves less valued or dismissed by the media 
(see Chapter 5, Case Study: The Mahogany Campaign). The coordinator of the campaign, 
Jose, Padua (online interview, January 17, 1998), offers some examples: "Sopron [a local 
partner] has an ideological mistrust on the GP, but this group has several problems of 
relationship with other Amazon groups. I recall also that the GDA [Grupo de Defesa da 
Amazonia — Group of Defense of the Amazon] in Santarem showed a serious ideological 
concern about the possibility of being used by the GP, but they have never outspoken how 
that could have happened. It is difficult to know, because the amazon culture has this 
tradition of 'cordiality' and they would not complain on your face" Q. A. Padua, online 
interview, January 17, 1998). 
Other Southern partners are not so shy. Jhamtani, coordinator of a development 
NGO in Malaysia, complains that "anybody working in the development and environmental 
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field recognizes issues such as sustainable development, social forestry, management of 
national parks, women in development and, most recently, the conservation of biological 
diversity. It was First World NGOs that put these issues on the agenda without consulting us. 
Third World NGOs, including my own, took them up because they meant money and 
support" (Jhamtani, 1992, p. 5). 
The financial dependence and the consequent setting of the agenda are highly delicate 
issues for both sides of the partnership. For the Brazilian organizations, these are delicate 
issues because they would be deviating of their primary goals of equity; for the American 
NGOs, these are delicate issues because a partnership that reproduces old colonialist schemes 
instead of challenging them loses all its legitimating purpose. The charge of eco-colonialism 
(Guha, 1989; Luke, 1997) haunts every North-South coalition as a permanent and vigilant 
watchdog. 
We are avoiding here cases where the nature of the donor/recipient roles is explicit in 
the coalition, and we have chosen instead cases where the bargain is more political and 
immaterial. But there is no doubt that the financial aspect is fundamental. On one side, local 
NGOs tend to expect from their US partner, if not cash, at least full infrastructure 
commitment and support 	which in some cases is not possible (Schwartzman, phone 
interview, October 17, 1997; Borges, online interview, October 24, 1997). For instance, J. A. 
Pádua (online interview, January 17, 1998) recalls a high overestimation and "mythicizing of 
Greenpeace's capacity of work and financial resources, which was even more problematic 
when Greenpeace International started its financial crisis [in 1993]." On the other side, 
Southern NGOs see their legitimating asset being transformed in hard cash for their partners. 
Over a dispute with a former partner, jhamtani says "This group and other First Word NGOs 
still secure financial support by having partners in the Third World" (Jhamtani, 1992, p. 5).  
83 
Even when there is a real transference of resources from North to Brazilian NGOs, 
dilemmas arise. Since the funds come from the North, does not that put Southern NGOs in a 
more or less dependent position? 
More than the transference of funds, Brazilian NGOs showed concern on the 
definition of priority issues in the coalition agenda and on the possibility of being 
misrepresented by their US partners. in this sense, a good example is the document issued in 
1989 by the Coordinating Body for the Indigenous Peoples' Organizations of the Amazon 
Basin (COIC), representing more than a million tribal people of South America. The language 
could not be more explicit. While appreciative of ecology movement efforts, COIC said: 
"It should be made clear that we never delegated ... power to the 
environmentalist community nor to any individual or organization in that 
community.... We are concerned that you have left us, the indigenous Peoples, 
out of your vision of the Amazonian biosphere. The focus of concern of the 
environmental community has typically been the preservation of the tropical 
forest and its plant and animal inhabitants. You have shown little interest in its 
human inhabitants who are also part of that biosphere. We are concerned that 
you have left us Indigenous Peoples and our organizations out of the political 
process which is determining the future of our homeland. While we appreciate 
your efforts on our behalf, we want to make it clear that we never delegated 
any power of representation to any individual or organization within that 
community" (qt. in Hawkins, 1993, 241). 
EDF and other large institutions agree that one of the major problem is to make  the 
agendas between local and international organizations compatible. "The response time,"  says 




multilateral development banks campaign showed that we have different institutional cultures. 
It is difficult to make meaningful alliances, when we have such different institutional weight 
and different potential levels of influence. For each institution we have to adapt to a certain 
context." But he defends that the same is true also among the Amazonian organizations 
themselves. "For instance, take the Conselho lndigenista Missionário de Roraima (
CIMI -Roraima), which is close to the Catholic Church. They have serious infrastructure problems. 
At the same time, they do a lot of stuff, usually in opposition to the governmental of Roraima, 
while the CONIVE (Conselho Indigenista da Venezuela), a similar small organization in 
Venezuela, has never been listened by the government: and is totally marginalized. So, CIMI 
and the CONIVE have very different strategies, and a disproportional leverage power." 
The definition of the Amazon agenda is a bitter point of dispute; even more bitter for 
Brazilian NGOs is the comparable disregard that the US NGOs show for other urgent 
Brazilian environmental issues. More than deforestation in remote tropical frontiers, the steady 
deterioration of urban areas has garnered the attention of millions of Latin Americans, 70 
percent of whom live in cities where air pollution, water quality, and solid wastes negatively 
affect their lives. Brazilian NGOs fear to see their government spending huge amounts of 
human and financial resources in an issue that is not the national priority, but a global priority, 
while the other more urgent issues for the Brazilian population go unattended. On the other 
hand, they find themselves with domestic conflicts that are far from affecting US NGOs. As 
Kolk well points out, "public mobilization [for the Amazon] in the North has been relatively 
easy because of the impressive magnitude of forest, the large number of animals and species, 
the climatic aspects, in short, the concern for nature, and of the fact that the engagement does 
not have to lead to substantial changes in production and consumption patterns in the North"  
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(folk, 1996, p. 247). In other words, public mobilization has been easy in the North because 
the forests (and the political costs) are located in the South. 
One major political cost for Brazilian NGOs is that the coalition itself threatens their 
domestic legitimacy local NGOs. It is true that international financial, moral and political 
support for their causes strengthened the Brazilian NGOs in their struggle, especially when 
direct access to decision-making 'authorities is not granted. This was especially true during the 
military dictatorship (1964-1985). But at the same time, this support also "made them 
vulnerable to accusations of paving the way for outside interference in national affairs a 
sensitive matter," as it is the sovereignty issue, particularly in Brazil. They are charged with 
following a foreign agenda (Martins, 1997) and with being pawns in the interest of foreign 
agents. In 1988, when the Kayapó  leader Payakan and Kube-I traveled to the United Sates and 
testified against the Xingú River dams (a World Bank funded project), they returned to Brazil 
and were charged with sedition under a law applied to foreigners. In even more explicit words, 
the National War College, a highly influenced military institution, stated that "the domestic 
subversives of the 1990s are ecologists linked to this international movement" (Conklin & 
Graham, 1995, p. 701). 
Greenpeace has been a common target: for this charge because it is an international 
organization with a Brazilian staff. Padua (online interview, January 17, 1998) says bitterly that 
the nationalist argument was frequently used "by corporations or members of an elite used to 
free access and exploitation of the Amazon resources. I t is very hypocritical, because in their 
relationship with the international capital their behavior was openly welcoming and 
subservient. For instance, Danilo Remor, owner of the sawmill Maginco, a loud voice against 
the internationalization of Amazon, is now an associate of the Malaysian capital [to explore the 
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Amazon]. The nationalist argument was valid only against environmental groups and the 
Indians." 
Autonomy and sovereignty are important values for the Brazilian NGOs themselves. 
By challenging national elites and government, Brazilian NGOs seek to strengthen local 
control over natural resources, not relinquish it to a global authority_ As stressed by the Indian 
activist Vandana Shiva (1993, p. 150), the NGOs' role of linking the global to the local, should 
fortified the local, and not weaken its autonomy. However, the nationalist charge can be very 
harmful, when it identifies the government with the nation, and the opponents of the 
government with the enemies of the nation. 
For historical reasons, the internationalization of Amazon is a highly sensitive issue in 
Brazil. Vague proposals of global control over the Amazon in the 1970s were equally refused 
by Brazilian government, NGOs and public alike (Kolk, 1996). The environmental suggestion 
that Brazilians cannot protect their own natural resources is similar to the developmentist 
suggestion by Lieutenant Maury (see 2.2 The Traveler) that Brazilians could not correctly 
develop the full potential of the wasted Amazon resources. Currently, none among the most 
important NGOs with activities in the Amazon would even suggest similar proposals. 
However, although most US NGOs support a "democratic reform that gives a voice to forest 
dwellers in determining their own future," some groups defend "the establishment of strong 
international efforts to prevent ecosystem destruction, even when it is supported by local 
government and populations." 1n this perspective, the fundamental goal is conservation, and 
local governments or populations may be focusing on short-term benefits rather than long-
term costs" (D. Malakoff, online interview, November 14, 1998).  
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4.3.1.2 The Environmental Noble Savage: The concept of an "environmental noble 
savage" successfully exemplifies the risk of conflict in a coalition where the Brazilian partner 
wants autonomy and control over natural resources, while the US partner wants to preserve 
the same resources. In Brazil, Indians and environmentalists discovered common cause in 
opposing ecologically destructive dams, roads, mines, and colonization schemes. US and 
European NGOs joined forces with indigenous communities in defense of native rights to 
land and resources. "The contemporary equation of indigenous resource management 
practices with Western environmentalism has promoted an image of Amazonian Indians that 
Kend Redford dubbed 'the Ecologically Noble Savage.' This is the latest expression of a 
long tradition of Euro-American thought that identifies certain non-Western 'primitives' as 
innocent and free of corruption, in contrast to the West's destructive materialism," in the 
best Rousseaunian tradition (Conklin & Graham, 1995, p.696; Darnovsky, 1995, p. 22). 
To explain this alliance between Brazilian Indians and first-world environmental 
activists—and the limitations of such alliance 	-Conklin and Graham coined the idea of 
"global ecological imaginary." The global ecological imaginary, according to the authors, "is 
based mostly on abstract notions about the convergence between native and environmentalist 
visions for the future.... It emerges not from the reality of concrete everyday experiences but in 
the circulation of collective held images." The result is a chimerical "global eco-village" which 
creates and shares notions of transcultural eco-solidarity. The effects of such an imaginary 
cannot be underestimated. It generated unprecedented international support for local Amazon 
struggles that helped some Brazilian Indians gain important land rights and more favorable 
government policies. "Since the 1980s, indigenous people have become key symbols, as well as 
key participants, in the development of an ideology and organization networks that links local  
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Amazonian conflicts to international issues and social movements (Conklin & Graham, 1995, 
p. 696). 
However, Conklin and Graham (1995, p. 696) alert us against the projection of 
environmentalist expectations on the representation of the Amazon Indians. "The stereotype 
of native people as natural conservationists forms a precarious foundation for indigenous 
rights advocacy because it misrepresents the nature of native Amazonian communities and 
their priorities." Other scholars, such as Candace Slater (1995), Buege (1996) and Brosius 
(1997), agree with the alert and fear for the effects that such misrepresentation can have on the 
fate of the Amazon Indian communities. 
Although this relationship has benefited both environmentalist and Indian interests, it 
has clear limitations. First, as seen in the previous section (4.1.1.1 An Unequal Relationship?), 
the relationship between Indians and Northern environmentalists can undermine the domestic 
political power that the Indian communities may have in Brazil, if they are identified with 
foreign interests, "pawns of foreign economic imperialists seeking to interfere in Brazilian 
national affairs and control the country's natural resources." 
The strongest limitation, however, is die backlash effect that this alliance can suffer if 
the image of "environmental noble savage" is not confirmed in every and each deed. 
Historically, indigenous advocacy was based on human rights notions about the intrinsic value 
of distinct cultures and universal rights to physical and cultural survival. If the legitimacy for 
their claims now comes not from their traditional rights, but from their allegedly 
environmental practices, what would happen to this legitimacy if and when their practices are 
not considered environmentally sound by the Northern allies anymore? 
Sustainable systems of natural resource management arc die primary goal for 
environmentalists, not for Indigenous Peoples. Instead, they "ultimately seek self- 
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determination and control over their own resources. The degree to which these two sets of 
priorities coincide is debatable.... The need to participate in the market economy is a give 
reality for the vast majority of Brazilian Indians." Native activists thus confront a quandary: 
they can forge alliances with outsiders only by framing their cause in terms that appeal to 
Northern values, but "this foreign framework does not necessarily encompass indigenous 
communities' own worldviews and priorities. Indianness and signs of Indianness for the 
Western world have a symbolic value that is not intrinsic but bestowed form the outside" 
(Conklin & Graham, 1995, p. 702). 
The alliance, therefore, has worked only as far as the environmentalist's interest in 
preservation of the forest and the Indian's tinerest in self-determination have agreed. When 
some Kayapós groups tried to reproduce non-sustainable practices of commercial logging, 
they faced heavy criticism from their former environmentalist allies. In capitalizing on 
symbolic values bestowed from the outside, native Amazonian actives may, ironically, have 
substituted one form of dependency for another. 
This dilemma is not different from the faced by Native Americans in their relationship 
with the environmental movement. As the environmental philosopher Douglas Schwartz 
writes, "we admire Indians so long as they appear to remain what we imagine and desire them 
to be: ecologically noble savages symbolizing a better way of life than we ourselves find it 
practical to live. We respect their traditions so long as they fit our preconceived notions of 
what those traditions should be. Let their ways cross purposes with ours, however, and we not 
only cease to admire them (which in some cases might be justifiable), but begin actively to 
resent them for not living up to our ideals. If a White hunter shoots an eagle we arc angry. But 
if an Indian shoots an eagle we are outraged; an Indian should know better!" (Schwartz, 1087, 
p. 298).  
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Conklin and Graham (1997, p. 709) urge for the environmentalism movement to 
"move beyond the pitfalls of relying on unrealistic assumptions about who Indians are, what 
Indians want, and what Indians need for political survival." This would increase the possibility 
of less vulnerable alliances and would help to soothe the way for the rainforest's native peoples 
and their allies to find common paths over this shifting middle ground. According to the 
authors, this process has already started: "Today, Native Amazonians have already begun to 
reshape Western environmentalism into forms suited to their own objectives and realities." 
The authors, however, do not provide any example of this turning point. 
Most environmentalists, however, see the alliance with indigenous people with a very 
positive assessment. Schwartzman (phone interview, October 17, 1997) and Borges (online 
interview, October 24, 1997) argued for the efficiency of such strategy. Borges says that "we 
have only but to compare the preservation in the national Park of Xingú to the existent 
degraded areas around it, in the borders, to sec how the demarcation of Indian territories has 
meant real protection to the forest." 
All authors agree that, until now, the alliance with environmentalists has been most 
fruitful for the Indigenous communities. "We should consider, for instance," says 
Schwartzman (phone interview, October 17, 1997), "that the Indigenous communities have 
never before been consulted by the World Bank in the projects that affected them. We 
succeeded to have the Kayapós in meetings in Washington in which they claimed the right of 
being consulted because they were local constituencies.... in 1985 there was no understanding 
of the indigenous people by the environmental NGOs. [The alliance with environmental 
organizations] has basically been great for them, the indigenous groups. The World Bank 
forced the Brazilian Government to speed the demarcation, under pressure from NGOs in 
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Washington. So, maybe the image of the Indian is romanticized, but it brings benefits. There is 
a greater understanding of these issues today." 
According to Schwartzman (phone interview, October 17, 1997), whose relation with 
the Amazon Indians predates his work with environmental organizations, "we should be also 
aware of two different issues. One is that the defense of the Indians rights is a legitimate cause 
per se. And second, it is also a good 'window' to know alternatives of the use of the forest." 
4.3.2 Advances and Gains 
Despite several areas of conflict, North American and Brazilian. NGOs have looked. for more 
and stronger links. The coalition strategy offers advantages that they couldn't have otherwise, 
and that means that both partners have had. to learn to work together in order to assure their 
gains. Besides legitimacy, discussed in the previous chapter, there are several others gains and 
advantages of the coalition strategy. 
One of these advantages is the transference of funds, seen in the previous item as a 
possible source of conflict. Many groups, such as the National Council of Rubber Tappers, 
have received significant funding from abroad. They could not have kept their work without 
that. The funding of projects by Northern NGOs has turned the Amazon in a interesting 
laboratory for projects of sustainable development, though all the warnings of dominance and 
eco-colonialism should apply (R. Borges, online interview, October 24, 1997). Transference of 
funds has also been crucial in legal battles by local constituencies, such as the demarcation of 
the territory of the Parana Indians, who received legal and financial support from the Brazilian 
Institute Socioambiental and 
Another important point is the exchange of information. Chico Mendes, founder of 
the National Council of Rubber Tappers, stresses the support received from the scientist  
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throughout the world in their struggle. "In this fight," said Mendes, "our only defense is the 
pressure put on the authorities by Brazilian society and the international scientific community". 
The rubber tappers' union relies on a small network of academics and the Institute of Amazon 
Studies, which Mendes called a "strategic center of the movement". "The possibilities for 
information exchange are multiple, although it has not been throughout explored. "Scientists 
can be supportive allies in the struggles of Southern movements, and northern 
environmentalists can reinforce these coalitions by bringing together grassroots wisdom and 
scientific insight.... Third World ecologists can also help themselves by helping their Northern 
neighbors (and vice versa) as the successful visits to Washington of Chico Mendes and 
Yanomarni Indians attest. These visits helped U.S. organizations more effectively work the 
halls of power on behalf of Amazonian ecosystems and peoples" (Breyman, 1993, p. 143). 
Some solutions of sustainability are now born in the South, and Northern NGOs arc 
looking to the South for ideas, as well as to establish their own international credibility. This is 
the source of success for the Rainforest Network Action's fundraising efforts, according to 
Borges (online interview, October 24, 1 997): foundations are interested in creative solutions 
from South NGOs, that can be reproduced elsewhere. "Thus although among governments 
the trend in financial and technology flows has been from the North to the South, the 
technology of sustainable development is increasingly flowing form South to North." 
Examples of this new technological flow are the concept of extrativist reserves (see footnote 
14) and the Grameen Bank, a non-profit, small-loan, self-help development bank in 
Bangladesh that lends to landless poor and, especially, women. It has been so successful (with, 
for example, 98 per cent repayment rates), that the South Shore hank of Chicago in the United 
States is emulating it" (Princen & Finger, 1994, p. 8).  
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The representation of Brazilian NGOs in the domestic decision making process has 
also benefited from the transnational linkages, "whether those linkages are made with 
international NGOs and outside environmental groups or thorough pressures from 
international lending institution, bilateral assistance agencies, UN bodies, and other.... The 
growing attention being paid by outside organizations is encouraging developing-country 
governments to include national NGOs within governmental decision-making" (Hawkings, 
1993, p. 240). For instance, in 1993 international pressure forced the Brazilian environmental 
agency to take concrete steps for a sustainable tropical timber policy. The agency invited ten 
local NGOs that were studying or working with the subject. Such invitation would be 
unthinkable just some years before. 
Not only local NGOs but also local communities, even when non-organized, have 
been recognized. Part of the preservation policy defended by the US NGOs in the campaign 
against multilateral development banks (see chapter 11) was the "position that preservation is 
important and that, if forest resources are used, local populations should reap the benefits and 
determine the speed at which this takes place. The increased concern for the fate of the forest 
inhabitants, whether indigenous peoples or not, was also a significant characteristic of 
environmental attention related to rainforest in the 1980" (Kolk, 1996, p. 34). The Amazon 
hosts a multitude of different human groups, indigenous and non-indigenous. just recently the 
international US NGOs has included communities other than Indian and rubber-tappers in 
their projects and campaigns. Ribeirinhos (fluvial communities), descendants of runaway slaves 
and small peasants, are now considered legitimate constituencies in projects funded by the 
World Bank or national government, if they can prove they will be affected. 
Politically, Brazilian NGOs have counted on their international linkages as a form of 
protection against violence and authoritarianism. This is perhaps the oldest benefit from such  
94 
linkages, previous even to the involvement of the environmental international NGOs. "The 
work of groups such as Survival International, OXFAM, and Amnesty International has been 
critical in publicizing the scale of violence and thereby offering an albeit fragile degree of 
support and protection" (Hurrell, 1992, p. 414). The difference is that now environmental 
activists, or "ecodissident," are protected. Violence in the countryside is still a terrible feature 
of the Brazilian society. Chico Mendes, Paulo Vinhas and Amazon Indians are just the most 
famous victims. 
The density and range of these transnational linkages has thus been a very important 
characteristic of the politicization of the Amazon question in Brazil. "The political impact of 
social mobilization in the Amazon was largely the result of these transnationalities and their 
contribution to the international campaign against Brazilian governmental policies, rather than 
the result of direct pressure on the government in Brasilia" (Hurrell, 1992, p. 414). 
It is in international forums that the coalition offers the best advantages. Bramble and 
Porter (1992, p. 380) defined what they saw as the role of the US NGOs in the UNCED, after 
10 years of experience in North-South coalitions. "The NGOs in the North can build the 
political will to take action on certain issues, through education, specific campaigns, and the 
media. The information and proposals the Northern NGOs bring to their members can be 
shaped by Southern NGOs through the process of dialogue and working together over time. 
In the run-UP to UNCED over the period 1990-2 there were over a dozen major NGO 
conferences where controversial development and environment questions could be hammered 
out." The "process of dialogue and working together" found Brazilian NGOs looking for 
greater autonomy and less dependence on Northern supporters. In the multilateral 
development bank campaign, for example, Brazilian or other Southern NGOs have been 
taking "more of the responsibility for setting NGO strategy. In so doing, they have taken up  
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some of the tougher issues of international debt and trade, and even the question of whether 
the banks should be abolished" (Princen & Finger, 1994, p. 9). The Pilot Program for the 
Brazilian Amazon is another example of cooperation between international organizations and 
NGOs, and between governments and NGOs, on which the Brazilian government only 
agreed after strong pressure was applied (Kolk, 1996, p. 253). 
However, besides the traditional forums such as the UN agencies and the Multilateral 
Development Banks, there are a number of international forums that potentially deal with 
Amazon issues. just to quote some, there are the Forest Stewardship Council, that discuss 
sustainable guidelines for forest products; the Convention on International Trade of 
Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora―CITES; the Intergovernmental Panel on Forest; the 
International Tropical Timber Organization; and the environmental chapter of the WTO 
(World Trade Organization). Each of these Forums has its own meetings, agendas, and 
schedules, demanding a commitment of human and financial resources that cannot be 
matched by many Brazilian NGOs. IBASE and FASE, two of the largest Brazilian 
Development NGOs, tend to split and cooperate to cover most of them, with only reasonable 
success. Therefore, there is a huge imbalance in the representation of North and South NGOs. 
Some US NGOs, however, have financed the participation of their Brazilian partners in these 
meetings. The National Council of Rubber Tappers went to the Forest Stewardship Council's 
first meeting in Toronto thanks to the support of the National Wildlife Foundation. Even 
when the actual representative cannot take part in the meeting, coalitions have brought 
Brazilian struggles to international meetings, as it happened in the case of the attempts of 
listing of the Amazon timber Mahogany in the Appendix II of CITES (see Chapter 5, Case 
Study: The Mahogany Campaign).  
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Besides international forums, international markets can be highly affected by successful 
international coalitions. According to Pádua (online interview,  January 17, 1998), "international 
organizations have more capacity of work when there is an international market and when the 
consumption is mainly in other countries. The mahogany case opened good possibilities in this 
field, showing us the possibility of playing with the market in other countries to affect the 
action of the domestic actors." In the case of mahogany, about 80% of the Brazilian 
production go to the international marker, mainly England and United States. As it will be seen. 
in Chapter 5, the mahogany campaign established a link between Northern consumption 
patterns and the actual destruction of the Amazon, or at least the broadening of the 
deforestation frontiers. 
4.4 Conclusions  
Most authors agree that one of the most important effects of the Amazon coalition (and other 
North-South coalitions) was to broaden the understanding of environmentalism beyond the 
classic western concept. As Damovsky (1995, p. 22) nicely put it, in the 1990s "the rubric of 
environmentalism has firmly linked trees, along with the rest of non-human nature, to social 
change and social justice. Speaking of trees conjures crimes of all manner: the clearcutting of 
California last ancient forests to payoff the junk bonds debts accumulated by lumber 
companies; the murder of radical unionist Chico Mendes by Brazilian ranchers aiming to 
destroy a growing rainforest alliance among rubber tappers, indigenous people, and North 
American environmentalists; the acid rain, unchecked by its corporate producers of 
government regulators, that kills woodlands and sterilizes lakes; the bulldozing of Palestinian 
orchards by the Israeli army as punishment for the intifada."  
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Some authors that are also actors in this process, such as the EDF coordinator 
Stephen Schwartzman (phone interview, October 17, 1997), considered that the Amazon 
alliance "was a landmark for the environmental movement in the US," not only for on 
Amazon issues. "Traditional conservationist movements now pay attention to the relationship 
between social and environmental problems, and make deeper criticisms to development 
models. For instance, in 1985 organizations such as the Sierra Club had no contact with 
grassroots movements. Nowadays this exchange is a common place." 
The coalition is not a strategy free of conflicts. Criticizing the unequal international 
situation, a common request by Brazilians to their US NGOs partners, has been more difficult 
for the Northern NGOs, "because if they object to existing patterns of production and 
consumption they could come into conflict with their adherents and undermine their Own 
bases of support." In contrast to the inure integrated (social and environmental) perspectives 
of many Southern organizations, Northern NGOs have therefore either focused on global 
inequality and debt problems (development organizations) or on environmental problems, 
often those of the South (environmental organization). "However, it critique of Northern life--
styles is gradually being incorporated into this environmental analysis, and cooperation 
between these two types of NGOs started recently' (Kolk, 1096, p. 56). 
This evolution in the process of understanding and accepting differences is probably 
the more effective change that the coaltions can brought about. 
A last note, however, should be said about the limits in the effectiveness of the 
coalition as a strategic tool. Schwartzman (phone interview, October 17, 1997) alerts us that 
the different expectations from the partners in the coalitions may led to frustrating outcomes. 
"We work in partnership with Southern institutions; we give attention and publicize problems 
in the South. The problem is that sometimes campaigns give different kinds of benefits to the  
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partners. For instance, in the multilateral hank campaign, we worked with local organizations 
to halt the Narmada Dam project, funded by the World Bank. Well, we succeeded to have the 
World Bank withdrawing its support, But the Indian government decided to maintain the 
project with its own funds." Therefore, a huge victory for US NGOs did not correspond to an 
equivalent victory in their partners in India. 
Schwartzman also alerts us that a next step now should come from the local grassroots 
and NGOs. "They have to create greater connection and to strength their national influence; 
they have to work with their government more directly. They cannot remain small and isolated 
movements with no resources to reach their government." International coalitions, with all 
their tensions and advantages, cannot be by all means the panacea for the international 
environmental crisis—not even for the Amazon issue. They can, however, offer multiple 
perspectives for a crises that is both environmental and political, and to actors that more and 
more think and act globally.  
CHAPTER FIVE 
5 CASE STUDY THE MAHOGANY CAMPAIGN  
In 1992, Greenpeace officially launched an international campaign against the predatory 
logging of Mahogany. The campaign involved a more than 80 Brazilian non-governmental 
organizations in a formal campaign. One of its major attributes was to link the deforestation of 
the Amazon to the international community. The major consumer markets of Mahogany are 
United States and United Kingdom, where Northern NGOs exercise great influence. The 
campaign counted with the organized support of a number of Northern NGOs, in Europe 
and in the United States. For its characteristics and the wide range of Northern and Southern 
organizations involved, I believe that the Mahogany Campaign is an interesting study case for 
this thesis. 
This chapter focus on Greenpeace with more attention than other partners in the 
Coalition because its role as articulator of the Brazilian coalition and its double status of 
International organization with a Brazilian staff (see item 3.2.5 Greenpeace). From 1991 to 
1096, Greenpeace held a Latin American Forest Campaign and a Brazilian Forest Campaign, 
both with Brazilian officers. Jose Augusto Pádua, the coordinator for Latin America, was a 
well-known academic and environmental activist, since 1975. Anna Fanzeres, the campaigner 
for Brazil, was a forester with an MS from Yale. Both had strong connections with the 
Amazon and local organizations.21 The mahogany campaign was a major, although not 
exclusive, issue in their jobs. The campaign was subordinated to both the Greenpeace Latin 
America and the International Forest Campaign, initially located in the United States. In 1993,  
21 From 1993 and 1995, 1 worked in G Greenpeace 	as assistant to the Latin American Forest Campaign. 
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US Forest Campaigner, Pamela Wellner, was hired, in a selection process that counted with the 
participation of the Latin American Forest coordinator, Pádua. A former Rainforest Action 
Network officer, Warier was supposed to organize the mahogany campaign in the US, the 
major consumer market. Due to the international financial crisis in Greenpeace, the US Forest 
Campaign was dismissed. Only in the Final months of 1997, US Greenpeace initiated a hiring 
process for a new US Forest Campaigner. 
5.1 Deforestation and Strategies  
The Brazilian Legal Amazon is an approximately 5 million square kilometer area that covers 
the Brazilian Amazon Forest (4 million square kilometers) and transitional bionics (see section 
1.2 The Amazon Rainforest: Characteristics). It includes nine Brazilian states, although 
integrated policies for this region are defined by the Federal  Government. In 1994, only 11,8% 
of the Legal Amazon were deforested. Compared to other Brazilian rainforests, such as the 
Atlantic Coastal Forest (only 7% left), the Amazon rainforest is almost: intact. The major 
problem is that most of deforestation has taken place in the last 30 years, due to careless 
development policies encouraged by the Brazilian military government (1964-1985) (Albert, 
1992). In 1966, after 450 years of European colonization, only 2% of the forest were cleared. 
In the next twelve years, to 1978, only 1% more of the Brazilian Legal Amazon was deforested 
(a total deforestation of 3% ). By 1994, 16 years later, an additional 6% had been cleared. 
Within two more years, another 1% would be deforested (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 — Deforested Areas According to Satellite Data (IBAMA 1998)  
Date Total Deforestation in 
SqKm 
% Relative to Brazilian Legal 
Amazon (5,000,000) 
Jan 1978 152,200 3.0 
Aug. 1994 469,978 9.4 
Aug 1996 517,069 10.3 
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Recent data released by the Brazilian environmental agency, IBAMA, reveals that the 
decade of 1990's has imposed a heavy toll upon the forest. The Table 5.2 shows the gross 
deforested area in the sample years:  
Table 5.2  Average Gross of Deforestation (SqKm) (IBAMA 1998)  





This accelerate deforestation rate was visible by the beginning of the 1980s, and it has 
been confirmed by recent satellite date. Local NGOs have protested and showed concern 
regarding the deforestation pattern since the 1970s (see 4.2 The Other Partner: The Brazilian 
Environmental Movement), but only after the end of the military dictatorship, the protests 
were more vocal. Although farming and cattle are the principal direct causes of deforestation 
in the Amazon, since 1980s local. studies have pointed to logging as the first cause for the 
advance of the deforestation frontier. The share of the Amazon in the total Brazilian timber 
production has been rising, form only 1.3% in 1979 to 72.1% in 1989 (Kolk, 1996, p. 73). 
Logging is a key issue in the Amazon deforestation not for the number of cut trees, 
but because it open roads in the closed forest. These roads are used by farmer and settlers to 
advance further in the forest, burning new forest areas and converting them to agricultural use 
Therefore, logging concurs for deforestation, through logger roads, by turning healthy  forests, 
relatively untouched, into vulnerable forests, forests that are subject to burning and illegal 
settlement.  
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Since the second half of the 80s Brazilian environmental groups have been 
campaigning for the promotion of strong controls against illegal and predatory logging in the 
Amazon, considering these controls as an essential step to save the Amazon forest 
Since Mahogany is by far the most profitable Amazonian hardwood—with an 
extraction cost of roughly $42.00 for cubic meter, and prices up to $600.00 in the international 
market—Brazilian NGOs, such as lEA (Institute of Amazon Studies) and NDI (Nucleus for 
Indian Rights), focus their efforts on the control of mahogany logging. 
5.2 	Mahogany The New Campaign Symbol 
In 1991, when Greenpeace started its research in Amazon looking for the right approach, 
looking for the right approach to counter the deforestation rates, Mahogany looked like the 
perfect symbol for the new campaign (see Figure 5-1 — Truck with Single Mahogany Log ). 
Figure 5-1— Truck with Single Mahogany Log 
(RAN, 1996, photo Marco Santini) 
Mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla) is a highly praised tropical hardwood. It may reach 30 
meter high and is widely distributed at low densities in a natural range of over 80.000 Km2 (see 
Figure 5-2 — Mahogany Occurrence Range). Because of its size and distribution, mahogany 
logging requires excessive road access, with up to 400 km between forest and mill (Friend of 
the Earth [FoE], 1993). In 1994, 3000 km of mahogany logging roads were built in the State of 
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Para (see Figure 5-3 — Mahogany Logging Roads ). New agricultural frontiers were being 
established in the Amazon: colonists and ranchers have made use of the roads cut through 
previously inaccessible regions and have cleared the forests the loggers had previously opened 
(Monbiot, 1991; Fearnside, 1992). 
The mahogany belt coincides also with the highest density of Indian reservations in the 
Brazilian Amazon (Figure 5-2 — Mahogany Occurrence Range). Illegal loggers invade Indian 
reservations as well as environmental reservations to collect the timber, with serious impact on 
communities. Conflicts between loggers and Indians are common, and devastating for Indians 
(FoE, 1993).  
Figure 5-2 — Mahogany Occurrence Range (Greenpeace, 1994). 
From an ecological point of view, Mahogany logging is also critical. Mahogany has 
little natural regeneration, and loggers tend to remove all the trees in one area leaving no seed 
supplies for regeneration. Sweitenia macrophylla King, or big-leaf mahogany, was added to the 
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official list of Brazilian species threatened with extinction in 1992. Studies in three logging 
areas in the Brazilian state of Pará, showed that an average of 26 trees (greater than 10 
centimeters in diameter at breast height) per hectare were damaged for every tree extracted 
whilst loss of forest canopy averaged 38 per cent over the three sites. Road building, the 
movement of heavy machinery and the dragging of logs through the forest cause irreparable 
damage to other trees. 
Figure 5-3 -- Mahogany Logging Roads (Greenpeace, 1994)  
Mahogany is the most valuable timber extracted from Amazon—in some areas, it was 
called "green gold." About 80% go to the international markets, mainly to US and United 
Kingdom markets, respectively. Both countries have strong activity of environmental 
NGOs—together with Netherlands and Germany, they form the basis of Greenpeace's 
membership support The mahogany campaign, thus, offered the opportunity to link the 
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devastation of the Amazon forest—and the suffering of the forest peoples—to unsustainable 
consumption patterns in the North. 
In campaigns designated to capture public attention, a symbol is definitively useful. 
Mahogany was seen as a symbol for the damage created by the logging industry in the tropical 
forests. 
5.2.1 The coalition Manifesto  
In 1992, Greenpeace succeeded in joining more than 70 groups (a number that would increase 
to 80 in the following year) into a coalition against predatory logging of mahogany. The 
coalition released a manifesto in October 1992, denouncing the negative impacts of mahogany 
logging. Most of these local NGOs had private conflict among them, and the intervention of 
Greenpeace, as an outside agent, was fundament to allow these conflicts to be  overlooked. 
However, although also targeting to the timber industries as the major actor for the 
expansion of the deforestation frontier, some NGOs were inure concerned with timber in 
general than with mahogany. Their manifesto was against: predatory logging, not predatory 
logging of mahogany—in fact, the final title of the manifesto was The Manifesto of the "Coalition 
against Predatory Logging in the Amazon" (the text of the manifest is found in APPENDIX II). 
They resisted to single out mahogany as the only species to concentrate forces on and 
considered a campaign commitment that other trees, more essential for their way of life (such 
as the Brazilnut tree) were to be included in the campaign. 
The Manifesto's first draft was written by Jose Padua, and later corrected and 
approved by all coalition members. The text very much expresses the radical feelings of the 
local NGOs and at the same time shows the influence of international NGOs This was the 
basis for actions in Europe and US supporting the mahogany campaign.  
106 
The Manifesto combines a nationalist appeal with considerations on the negative 
impacts of predatory logging in humanistic, environmental and economic point: of view. The 
first paragraphs link the mahogany logging to "periodic cycles of predatory exploitation of 
natural resources took place aimed at meeting foreign needs and markets," along five five centuries 
of Brazilian history. "-The consequence of these cycles," the document continues, "has been 
always the same: environmental destruction and social impoverishment." Fighting against the 
predatory logging, the text suggests, is an attempt to break this new cycle, in the best interests 
of the country. The document also denounces at length the destructive effects on Indian 
communities and in extractives reserves; the "genetic erosion" suffered by the species (when 
the best specimens are harvested before they can disseminate their best characteristics); the 
commercial extinction of mahogany in several areas; and the huge Fiscal evasion existent in the 
logging business. 
5.2.2 The International Campaign  
The International campaign had two major fronts: to create a consumer campaign (to 
influence mahogany consumers) and to create controls for the mahogany international trade 
(see section 4.3.2 Advances and Gains). 
5.2.2.1 Consumer Campaign: The campaign was launched in October 1992 with 
Greenpeace's direct action in the Amazon - the invasion of the Magma) sawmill in the state 
of Pará, the biggest mahogany exporter company. By the same period the Coalition's 
Manifesto was released, with a considerable impact in Brazilian public opinion. Soon after, 
the international campaign started with total strength. In 1993, Friends of the Earth created 
their mahogany campaign, called "Mahogany is Murder." It stressed the negative effects of  
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mahogany logging in the local communities. Rainforest Action Network (RAN) fed its 150 
associated groups—Rainforest Action Groups (RAGs)—with information and coordinated a 
number of demonstrations against mahogany logging in all the United States. 
The concept was to affect the consumer market of mahogany. A decrease in the 
mahogany consumption would force producers to alter their logging practices. At the same 
time, Northern NGOs would lobby their own governments take measures against the 
importation of mahogany, and a consumption decreasing would be an important 
demonstration of influence. Likewise, it would help Brazilian NGOs in their bargaining with 
the government For better regulation against predatory logging. 
A wider goal, expressed by some campaigners, was to create more awareness among 
consumers on the effects of their consumption patterns. Northern NGOs came from 
successful campaigns in altering consumer habits in the eighties, by which fur was not consider 
a natural symbol of class and refined taste. 
The international coalition used a number of varied tactics for the mahogany 
campaign. Most of them were tactic already proved successful in other campaigns. For 
instance, press releases and Folders were sent in direct mail to Northern NGOs' members, who 
were asked to write letters to their congressmen. Big mahogany consumers were also targeted. 
After being singled by several RAN's demonstrations and letter campaigns, in March of 1996 
the US publishing company Barnes and Noble agreed to refrain from using mahogany or any 
other "uncertified rainforest wood" (Rainforest Action Network, 1996). 
Another common practice was the "mahogany ethical shoplifting." According to 
denunciations From Brazilian NGOs, most of the mahogany sold in the international market is  
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harvested illegally in Indian reservations or natural reserves.22 Northern NGOs thus direct 
theirs member to enter Furniture stores, sequester any mahogany object and take it to the 
closest police station. he object was considered material stolen from Brazilian Indian 
communities, and the Furniture store had to answer for buying allegedly stolen material.  
These tactics were very successful into calling the attention of the media, especially 
during the 1993-1995. In 1993, five of the largest British do-it-yourself stores (Great Mills, 
Texas, BandQ, Sainsbury's Homebase and Do-It-All) agreed to stop selling Brazilian 
mahogany. In the same year, the biggest 23 exporting sawmills signed a declaration that they 
would not do logging inside Indian lands anymore. Another agreement was signed between 
these sawmills and the UK National Hardwood Association, committing to trade only in 
legally obtained mahogany (FoE, 1998). 
The agreement gave to the campaign another possibility of action. It became soon 
clearer that the declaration didn't prevent loggers from invading Indian reservations.  They just 
contracted other small loggers to do so, and then buy the timber. Brazilian 	NGOs such as 
NDI (Nucleus of Indigenous Rights) and CIMI (Indian and  Mis ionary Cou cil) kept an 
accurate log on the illegal loggers and to whom they  would sell the timber. Then, these NGOs 
sent the information to the Northern  NGOs wh  would track the final buyer. The pressure 
was concentrated on the  importer, with high broadcasting. Greenpeace and Friends cif the 
Earth claims that  such tactics had a heavy impart on the consumer market: in the UK the 
imports  dropped by 68% since 1002. It was the first consumer market in 1992, position now 
22 This information is very difficult to prove or disprove. There is not an inventory of  the Amazon mahogany 
stands.    The affirmation results from projections that estimate that the mahogany outside the Indian reservations 
is commercially extinct: (i.e., it does not exist in enough density to he successfully harvested without invading the 
reservations). 
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held by the United States. More important than that, this tactic created a flow of information 
between North and Brazilian NGOs that was latter used in other campaigns. 
Greenpeace also carried on some direct actions in Brazil, but for publication abroad. 
For dismay of its Brazilian partners, Greenpeace found out that direct actions imply some 
unsuspected difficulties. "The first of all is the presence of the media. The concept of direct 
action is based on the Quaker tradition of "bear witness" to wrongdoing. Greenpeace was 
created in 1972 with this goal: to make the world bear witness to a nuclear rest in the North 
Pacific, through the media. The media is also the main guarantee of safety for activists, 
sometimes. The secrecy of the direct actions and their need for the presence of the media 
creates a strategic dilemma, which is Sharpened in the Amazon region. In the First direct action, 
in 1992, Greenpeace had to bring the reporters to the activists in a two-clay travel to the action 
location. With no public transportation to the heart of the forest, that meant the rent of a 
plane from Rio de Janeiro to Marabá more than 5,000-km north and the rent of a bus—
which broke in the way to the sawmill. Expensive and/or slow locomotion is common place 
in the Amazon, but it tines not help direct actions. 'the characteristic of the forest itself also 
hindrance hie use of otherwise successful Tactics. The canopy hides deposits logging 
that is hard to discover and even harder ti document with dramatic photographs. In aerial 
pictures, the forest seems placid and intact―until it is burned for agriculture. Sometimes the 
only visible sign of the massive intervention of logging in the Amazon ecosystem is 
the transport of the heavy logs by trucks or the huge shipments of sawn mahogany in the Belém 
and Santarém harbors.  
5.2.2.2 International Forums — CITES:  From the different international environmental 
forums, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
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(CITES) has been the most relevant for the mahogany campaign. The Convention was 
negotiated in 1973, as a result of the United Nation Conference on Human Development, in 
Stockholm, 1972. It became effective in 1975 and now has 128 member countries. CITES is 
a binding international treaty regulating trade in wildlife and plants to help protect species 
threatened with extinction. 
CITES has an unusual degree NGO participation to provisions. The convention 
explicitly permits NGOs to participate as non-voting observers at the biennial meetings and 
they also receive, as registered observers, all documentation pertaining to the upcoming 
meetings. NGOs attend plenary sessions and most committee meetings. And, as it turns Out, 
NGOs, both conservation and trade-oriented groups, contribute considerable time and 
financial resources to CITES for enforcement and implementation. They have developed 
publicity materials for. CITES, printed export: permits for Bolivia and Paraguay, done 
population studies on a number of species, and conducted training seminars for officials form 
the management authorities of less-developed countries. Many conduct their own 
investigations of illegal trading and, if necessary, fund funding delegates of poorer 
organizations to participate in the meetings (Princen, 1994, p. 142). 
Species under CITES's protection are listed in three Appendices. Appendix I lists 
species threatened with extinction - they are thus banned from international trade, except for 
scientific conservation. Appendix 
II 
 lists species on the verge of becoming so if exploitation 
arid trade are not regulated - trade is permitted inso flit as it does not threaten their continued 
survival. Appendix III (added in 1995) is for species that member countries are regulating by 
themselves and for which they ask for collaboration from the other members. Species may be 
proposed for listing even if they do not occur in the proponent country, although the proposal 
should be accept by two thirds of member countries. In some way, CITES is a multilateral  
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agreement where one country may pro-pose environmental regulation to other countries 
without offending the concept of sovereignty (United Nations, 1993). 
According to Pádua (1997), "since 1991 the tropical forests defense movement has 
been campaigning for the listing of mahogany at the Appendix II of Cites. Although this listing 
is not the final solution— and cannot substitute internal policies in the Amazon countries and 
consumer responsibility in the importing countries —there is a consensus among specialists that 
it would help a lot in the promotion of strong controls against the industry." The listing in 
CITES' Appendix II would have forced the Brazilian government to establish durable policies 
to control the logging industry and these controls would be complemented by measures taken 
by the importing countries. Moreover, under the role of an international agreement, these 
controls should be kept in the future, independent from temporary measures promoted by 
particular officers or cabinets. According to the CITES' Appendix II, the producer countries 
must provide a certificate that the timber exported does not come from illegal sources. 
Therefore, the listing would also force the government: to fight against the non-registered 
activities and extend its controls beyond the official lowing industry. it would also help the 
NGOs on the importing countries to make pressure over their governments to only accept: 
mahogany coming from true sustainable 
The big-leaf mahogany has been proposed for listing successively in the CITES 
Conference of Parties in 1091 Kyoto, Japan; 1994 Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and 1997 Harare, 
Zimbabwe. The proposal has been withdrawn or defeated in all occasions,  although for a small 
margin. 
However, the simple fact that mahogany was proposed for the Appendix II of CITES 
had big consequences in the mahogany campaign and in the CITES itself, as we see below. 
Although CITES prides itself on basing the inclusion of a species in one of its Appendices on 
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pure scientific criteria, the Convention has been more and more politicized. In the past, 
CITES has not listed in its Appendix II timber species that could have a strong impact on the 
trade. Susan Lieberman of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service points out that the 
elephant question overwhelmed everything else at the 1989 CITES meeting. Ronald Orenstein 
(1997), international officer of the International Coalition, said that the timber lobby 
monopolized the debate in Fort Lauderdale in 1993. In 1997, it was even worse: countries that 
wanted the end of the ivory ban (for instance, Zimbabwe) allied themselves to the countries 
who wanted to avoid the listing of mahogany (for instance, Brazil) and to the countries who 
wanted to reject the connection between CITES and the International Whaling Commission 
(for instance, Japan; the connection was accepted) joined effort in what some 
environmentalists called "an unholy alliance." It is obvious that if CITES gains in importance 
by regulating commercially significant species, it also is more vulnerable to commercial 
interests and maneuvers. 
NGOs are not above political maneuvers themselves. if listed, Mahogany would be the 
first timber species with high value and a relevant place at the international market on CITES' 
Appendix 11. 'Nis measure could open a precedent for the future listing of other species like 
the Khayas genera (Africa) and Ramin (Southeast Asia). Therefore, the use of Cites as a 
conservation tool could open new strategic possibilities for the defense of the tropical forests, 
Intl the NGOs―as well as the government and the timber industry― are aware of that. 
Independent of the final results at the CURS Conference of die Parties, the presence 
of the mahogany campaign at CITES resulted in two interest consequences for the coalition: 
first, a vigorous flow of scientific information; second, Brazilian domestic regulations such as 
the Mahogany Moratorium Decree, in 1996 (see item 5.1). 
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5.2.2.3 The Flow of Science Information: The 1994 CITES meeting in Fort Lauderdale 
counted with a singular amount of scientific material on mahogany produced by NGOs. In 
fact, the material produced then is still the basis for the campaign, except by the new 
information gathered by the Friends of the Earth. In 1994, "Faith Campbell from Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) was a key person to move the work, collecting and 
sharing information" with NGOs in the US and Brazil (Padua, 1997, par. 15). The NRDC 
proposal included information on mahogany produced by US think tanks and it was widely 
spread among the Brazilian NGOs. 
The flow of information was also from the South to the North. in 1993, after strong 
lobby by more than 137 US groups led by the Rainforest Action Network, the United States 
Government decided to propose the inclusion of mahogany in the Appendix II, which, being 
the US the major consumer market, had strong effect in the Conference.23 The US proposal 
used a great deal of information produced by NGOs, from North and South. For instance, 
regarding the area of distribution of the species, the Brazilian government insisted in the figure 
of 1,500,000 sq. km, provided by some conservative studies; the US proposal calculates the 
same area, for use of sustainable logging purposes, in 800,000 Sq.Km. Anna Fanzeres, the 
Brazilian Forest Campaigner, calculated the 800,000 Sq. Km. figure for Greenpeace. The 
argument, supported by Brazilian NGOs, was is that although mahogany may exist  along 
1,500,000 Sq.Km., this whole figure should subtract the protected areas where the species' density is not enough to be explored. By doing so, we obtain the 800,000 Sq.Km figure.  
2 3In the previous meeting the proposal had been done by Netherlands, which is not a significant mahogany 
importer. 
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This flow of information has somehow decreased for the 1997 CITES meeting. 
Greenpeace, for instance, reduced its mahogany campaign and its tropical forests work after 
1995, and in 1997 it did not have a forest campaigner working in Brazil. Friends of the Earth 
entered more actively on the issue, and released an important report just before the 1997 
CITES meeting, called Forest Management at Loggerheads (Pádua, 1997, par. 35). 
5.2.3 Mahogany Moratorium Decree  
On July 26, 1996, the Brazilian President Cardoso determined a number of measures (Brazil 
1996 and Brazil 1996a) -- named "the Amazon Package" or "the Mahogany Moratorium" -- in 
order to control the rampant deforestation rates in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. These 
measures have immediate law status, although Brazilian Congress should approve them later. 
The "Mahogany Moratorium" came about as the country's National Institute of Space 
Research (NPR) announced that: deforestation had reached 14,896 SqKm/year in 1994, up 
from 11,130 in 1991. Official estimates indicate that de forestation increased 33% between 
1991 and 1994 (IBAMA, 1996a). Further studies by the INPE would confirm the trend: the 
deforestation in 1995 was two times bigger than in 1994. 
The mahogany moratorium was a result of the mahogany campaign as a whole. It was 
also an attempt to prove that the listing of mahogany in the Appendix 11 of caps was 
unnecessary, because Brazil had already taken the necessary measures to assure sustainable 
logging. 
By the "Mahogany Moratorium," the Brazilian government decided to declare, in July 
1996, a 2 years moratorium on the concession of new permits for mahogany logging. It also 
defined stricter rules for conversion of land use and started an auditing process on the logging 
management plans officially registered in the Amazon. The first results of this process were 
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released in January 1997. From the 3,700 existing management plans the federal environment 
agency―IBAMA―was able to make an initial investigation on 845. From this initial universe 
of management plans 190 were canceled, 353 were temporally suspended (waiting for more 
detailed investigation) and 302 were confirmed. The projection is that by the end of this 
process around 70% of the existing management plans will be suspended or canceled. 
The decree was greeted by the local and international NGOs as a positive result of the 
mahogany campaign―"we must remember," says Pádua (1997), " that the Brazilian 
government did nothing about the problem until the campaign started to get a good public 
profile." However, the decree still falls short from a final and true solution for the logging 
problem. "The first results of the auditing process shows that the vast majority of the official 
logging practices in the Amazon is happening against the law. The essential point, however, is 
that we are talking here only of the officially registered logging activities. If these ones are already 
very bad we can imagine the situation with the big number of illegal logging activities 
happening in the Amazon. The auditing is ignoring the last ones. If fact, according to the local 
informants, what is happening is that the registered companies did quit the Indian reserves 
after 1993, but they were substitute by non registered groups that keep doing the same job. 
And everybody knows that the timber logged by these non-registered groups is sold to the big 
companies. When the denounces are released the registered companies blame the behavior of 
the non registered ones (the so called 'timber diggers'), but extra-officially they support it." 
The Mahogany Moratorium was also an admission by the Brazilian Government that 
the mahogany campaign—so often called an "imported agenda" or a "unduly interference in 
national affairs"—had on the contrary pointed out in the right direction regarding the 
devastation of the Amazon. The moratorium in fact answers to some of the oldest request by 
Brazilian NGOs. On the other hand, it was the major rational used by the Brazilian  
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Government against the listing of mahogany in the Appendix II of CITES. Last but not least, 
the Moratorium was a Brazilian Government's answer to the massive introduction of 
Malaysian sawmills in the Amazon logging industry. 
5.3 	Campaign Assessment  
Any assessment of the Mahogany Campaign as whole would be limited. As a study case, 
however, the Mahogany Campaign includes all the important elements existent in a coalition 
between North and South NGOs. First:, we must recognize the impossibility of transfer 
without major adaptations campaign strategies that are successful in Northern Countries. The 
complexity of issues in the Amazon, and the characteristics of the Amazon itself, challenge the 
traditional activist profile of a single environmental interest and little regard for the social 
conditions. 
It is not possible to assess if the campaign had an effective impact on the deforestation 
rates. The deforestation has accelerated in the last years, but this is due to a complex 
combinations of factors—that could include from the Brazilian economic situation to the 
introduction of Malaysian sawmills in the Amazon. However, the major victory of the 
campaign was to put mahogany logging in particular, and all unsustainable logging in general, 
in every debate on trade and timber across the planet―Intergovernmental  Panel of Forests, 
International Trade Timber Organization, Forest Stewardship Council, and others. 
This chapter has focused more on the relationship between North and South NGOs. 
However, a full account of the mahogany campaign should study the acceptation—or 
rejection—by other local players. Workers, for instance, are very mulch split on the issue 
Sawmill owners and sawmill workers are the most likely to suffer directly from the "Mahogany 
Moratorium." The industry is also responsible for about 15,000 direct and indirect jobs. The 
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effective closure of the illegal or irregular logging may cause an employment crisis. Farmers 
and landless peasants are also likely to be affected. The mahogany logging roads have provided 
in the last 20 years a safety valve for land conflicts in the boundaries of the Amazon Forest. 
Landless peasants are pushed into the jungle so they burn the forest and set the first crops. 
Usually, later this land is informally bought by the farmers, and peasants move again even 
more deeply into the forest (Fearnside, 1992). Closing this safety valve will probably bring 
about conflicts hitherto delayed. 
Worker unions, however, have welcome the campaign. In fact, among the signatories 
of the Manifesto against Predatory Logging, there are at least 17 worker unions. They represent, for 
instance, rubber tapers, forest workers who live from non-wood products. The non-wood 
forest productive reserves have been heavily threatened by illegal logging in  the last seven 
years. According to the Council of Rubber Tapers, mahogany logging jeopardizes any attempt 
at sustainable economic activities, such as Brazilnuts and rubber harvesting, in the Amazon 
Forest (Coalizão, 1992). 
The Campaign also showed some fears by local NGOs of being used by international 
NGOs, or that the victories of the campaign would be capitalized by the hitter. At least in one 
occasion, these fears were not Lint-minded. in 1996, just after the signature of the Mahogany 
Moratorium, Greenpeace issued two press releases that "typically claim most: of the credit for 
Greenpeace." According to the releases, the director of the Brazilian Environmental Agency 
had recognized the Moratorium as a "Greenpeace victory"― and this is how Greenpeace 
called the Moratorium, with no or little reference to the Coalition. The reaction was almost 
immediate. Glen Barry (1996), a rainforest activist, protested in the electronic list 
rainforest.general that: "noting Greenpeace's contributions, we know that: the call for a 
moratorium on mahogany has been a major rallying point for the rainforest movement; and  
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the dozens of groups working on this issue in Brazil and internationally, we all deserve our 
due." The coalition itself, however, did not exist- anymore. The protests against Greenpeace's 
arrogance do not make any reference to it. In the same electronic list, Truda Pallazo (1996), a 
Brazilian activist of International Wildlife Coalition, is more acid regarding Greenpeace, 
although he attributes the moratorium more to some Brazilian government officials than to 
Brazilian NGOs: "It would be very unfortunate," says Palazzo, to have foreign NGOs parting 
their respective backs without openly recognizing the courageous and rather lonely efforts of 
concerned Brazilian officials like Mr. Beninca de Salles [an IBAMA officer]." This remark is 
even more ironic when we note that the International Wildlife Coalition is a signatory of the 
Coalition Against Predatory Logging of Mahogany since 1993. 
Another issue that the Coalition brought up was the relationship between Brazilian 
NGOs and the Government. Since 1993 some NGOs had been called to take part in meetings 
with the Brazilian environmental agency regarding the mahogany logging. Most of the NGOs 
called to take part in these meeting had links with international NGOs. Although these 
meetings have became are more common with the consolidation of the Brazilian democracy, 
the NGOs were not yet able to establish strong links of pressure in their own government, as 
it was seen during the CITES meetings. For instance, the Forum of Brazilian NGOs and 
Social Movements for Environment and Development, during its general meeting in Brasilia, 
supported the listing of mahogany it) the Appendix II and asked the coordination to take the 
necessary measures for this campaign. Two Brazilian Congress representatives (Senator Marina 
Silva form Acre State, a former Chico Mendes partner, and MP Gilney Vianna from Mato 
Grosso state) also lobbied in favor of the listing. They did not succeed, however, into 
transforming the issue into a common effort by Brazilian NGOs in the months before the 
CITES meeting.  
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The campaign also had to deal with the nationalism that permeates any discussion on 
the Amazon Rainforest. Returning from the Cites Conference of Parties in Harare, Gilberto 
Martins, president of the Brazilian environmental agency, complains that the Brazilian NGOs 
deal with an imported agenda, with no regard for the true Brazilian priorities. In this view, 
mahogany would be only the last "oriented fashion [symbol of an international environmental 
movement] that has already had symbols such as the lion-monkey, the elephant and now the 
mahogany." Martins touched a sensitive key, because the local NGOs themselves feel 
uncomfortable with allies that change their support according to the latest interest of their 
donor members. The Brazilian answer to this comment in a national magazine was to 
remember that the government had always tried to gain more legitimacy by looking for the 
advice of the NGOs, now aecused of non-patriotic. Besides, Martins himself had stressed the 
importance of controlling mahogany in the previous year, during the signature of the 
mahogany moratorium, and had been a strong supporter for the mahogany listing in 1994, 
when he was the president of the World Wildlife Foundation — Brazil. 'Mere was not, in any of 
these answers, any mention to the multiyear campaign against predatory mahogany logging led 
by Brazilian NGOs even before the coalition with international NGO's. 
This answer seems to point out that although the coalition has the potential to bring 
advantages to both North and South partners, Southern partners are less used to politically 
capitalize the existence of this coalition in their own benefit. 
The context of the mahogany campaign has changed in the last two years, and this new 
context should define the next steps. First, the downsizing of Greenpeace left an empty space 
in the articulation of the campaign that has been fulfilled by the Friends of the Earth. The 
strategies, however, have been similar. Until 1993 Friends of the Earth was more involved with 
the Multilateral Development Bank Campaign (see item 3.2, The Amazon Forest Enters the  
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US NGOs' Agenda). Currently it has a local staff and a Brazilian office, and strong links with 
local NGOs. It has released scientific studies and articulated new coalitions. Friends of the 
Earth has, however, re-started from the scratch, without recurring to the former Coalition 
Against Predatory Logging. It lacks, until this moment, the expressive support of Indian Rights 
organizations and worker Unions that were present in the Former Coalition. 
Second, the new presence of Malaysian sawmills in the Amazon (and the new and 
appalling deforestation rates data) should revitalize the campaign. Moreover, now with the 
nationalist argument should count in favor of the NGOs. If, in the past, there was a national 
logger and a foreign consumer, now there is a foreign logger disputing or joining with the 
national businessman. It will be interesting to see how the international and local 
environmental movement will act in this new correlation of forces. There are already some 
signs of revitalization of the campaign: The Globo, one of the biggest Brazilian Newspaper, and 
the VEJA, the biggest Brazilian magazine, have both prepared special series on the 
deforestation of the Amazon, in December 1997 and March 1998. In both cases, the Malaysian 
sawmills are pointed out as the new "bad guys" in a long story.  
CHAPTER SIX 
6 CONCLUSION 
This study focused on the action of US NGOs24 in the Brazilian Amazon and the 
representation (see 1.1 Methodology) of the Amazon created as a result of such action. Some 
of the conclusions in the previous chapters will be summarized below. 
The Amazon has been presented in the American mentalité  since the 18th century, 
through the first reports by visiting naturalists. From the first, science has been an important 
element in the understanding of the Amazon in America. Other representations added new 
elements along the years—the question of resource control, untamed wilderness, the place of 
the wonderful and the bizarre. These overlapping and sometimes contradictory representations 
had in common the fact that they projected upon the Amazon their. Own ideas on what the 
region was or should be. The American mentalité greatly disregarded the plans or conceptions 
that the Amazonian and its inhabitants may have had about themselves. The representation 
created by US NGOs over the last three two decades through their activity in Amazon may be 
different: from these previous representations, because of the particular characteristics of the 
non-governmental organizations, because of the concrete history of their activity in the 
Amazon, and because of their strategic choices, such as the coalition with local NGOs. 
The coalition between US and Brazilian NGOs was possible hut: not conflict-free. 
international environmental politics is also deeply entwined in a North-South conflict, and the 
coalition could not but bear effects of this conflict. They came from different, although not 
This study has focused most on US NGOs or NGOs with strong influence on the American mentalité. 
However, we have used the concept of "Northern" and "US" NGOs almost as interchangeable, although we 
have pointed out the larger influence of public opinion on US NGOs. 
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incompatible, environmentalist traditions, and had different historical and political 
backgrounds. The use of simplified images of the Amazon—as in the case of a myth of 
"ecologically noble savage"—can repeat the pattern of projection and misrepresentation found 
in the earlier narratives of the Amazon. On the other hand, due to these misrepresentations, 
US and Brazilian NGOs may find themselves at odds regarding their goals and strategies. 
Should the emphasis be in the control of the resources or the conservation of the resources? 
The coalition is not a panacea for all Amazon problems, even for the single problem of 
deforestation. As American envirorimentalist John Muir (1911,157) said, "when we try to pick 
out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe." It is not different 
with the Amazon. A whole range of complex issues is linked to the deforestation of region, 
and they imply a likewise complex range of solutions, from the strengthening of the 
communication between Brazilian NGOs and Government, to resolution of land conflict in 
the border of the Amazon. Coalitions between US and Brazilian NGOs, however, have been 
an important multipath strategic cord to address some urgent questions for the Amazon. 
Non-govenmental organizations press governments to change titles. They may also 
act indirectly, by targeting people and their actions toward Nature. in this case, NGOs' 
activities take place in the so called so-called ''global civil society," by the international relations scholar 
P. Wapner (1997). "Civil society is that arena of social engagement which exists above the 
individual yet below the state. it is a complex  economics, social, and cultural 
practices based in friendship, family, the market, aid ridnotary affiliation." NGOs act in this 
realm— in fact, they are sometimes called "civil society organizations"—and it has been a 
traditional concept for analysis of domestic societies. Recently, it has been applied to a global 
level. "The interpenetration of markets, the intermeshing of symbolic meaning systems, and 
the proliferation of transnational collective endeavors signal the formation of a thin, but  
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nevertheless present, public sphere where private individuals and groups interact for common 
purposes.... When transnational activists direct their efforts beyond the state, they are 
politicizing global civil society" (Wapner, 1997, p. 233). 
The arrival of US NGOs in the Amazon, in the 1980s, brought this global civil society 
to an already complex national civil society. The result has been an interweaving of economic, 
political, and social cooperation and conflict manifest at a number of different levels: in 
"pitting local groups against the apparatus of the state and those who control it (agencies, 
developers, political elites); in cooperation between local movements and environmental 
organizations from outside the region; in conflicts among competing élites of political 
jurisdiction (local, national, and multilateral); and in pressures for intergovernmental 
cooperation (or perhaps more accurately, regulated competition and conflict)" (Conca 
Lipschutz, 1993, p. 3). 
Influencing representations of the environment―and in this case, of the Amazon---is 
not just a by-product of NGO action. It may often be their major purpose, and, due to their 
special dependence of public opinion, sometimes a matter of NGOs may confirm 
and reinforce values already existent in the current representations. Or they may challenge 
hegemonic values, values and understandings that are relatively stable and unquestioned and 
appear to most actors as the natural order, NGOs have, therefore, the potential to be 
"counter-hegemonic" players, by challenging consumption patterns  questioning the 
decision making process of multilateral agencies. 
For Brazilian NGOs, this counter-hegemonic potential was a tempting promise to 
have their values brought to global levels through alliances with US NGOs. To bring into 
effect this counter-hegemonic, however, US NGOs had to overcome their "democratic  
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deficit" (see item 3.3.2). They had to legitimate their "diplomatic niche," a niche that is defined 
by the NGOs' ability to forge links local questions to global issues, and vice-versa. 
In the Brazilian Amazon, this "linking local to global" implied into building coalitions  
with local organizations. Coalition was a favored strategy because it provided  the necessary 
legitimacy for US NGOs' counter-hegemonic potential, and because it would increase the 
efficiency of NGOs' declared goal, for instance, lighting primarily the deforestation in the 
Amazon. 
The coalition strategy thus could serve both partners. The legitimacy of the action of 
American environmental NGOs in the Amazon would be stronger if such action is also the 
product of local concerns. Local NGOs could be empowered in their local efforts through the 
support of American NGOs. 
Roberto Smeraldi (online interview, 1998 March 16), the Friends of the Earth's 
Amazon Program coordinator, suggested that Mere is much to gain by both partners in the 
coalition if they broaden their understanding of the Amazon, an understand that would 
encompass the Amazon as a region, with different socio-economic issues and with different 
environmental dimension. Environmentalists have always insisted that a forest is much more 
than timber resources and trees: it has singular ecological and thermodynamic process. Maybe 
it is time for US NGOs to understand fully that: the Amazon is also more than a forest: it: has 
singular social, environmental, cultural anti political processes. 
6.1 	Findings  
Representations of the Amazon are, by definition, mental constructions. These constructs are 
defined and shaped by the cultural point of view (or mentalité) of the different actors. It is 
equally important to note that the same representations can also shape this mentalité. Being  
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subjective does not prevent the representations from creating and sponsoring public policies. 
That is why it is so relevant to track and understand their process of birth and gestation. 
In addition, one of the most important points in the comparison between Northern 
and Southern environmentalists is the place of the environment in ordinary life. For most 
Southern communities in the Amazon, environmental concern means the response to essential 
and basic needs, and control of the natural resources needed for everyday life. In this case, 
environmentalism is not an "extra" concern, or a "full belly" concern. It is survival. 
Of course, this approach does not necessarily imply the preservation of the 
environment in traditional Northern environmentalist terms; it only shows the significance of 
environmental resources for the communities ries in the forest. 
Finally, this study shows that North and South coalitions are essential for defining and 
advocating responsible and effective policies for the Amazon region. However, these 
coalitions do have an element of inequality that could drive them to undesired developments 
(manipulation, imperialism and dominance by one of the partners). "Therefore, the coalitions 
should be under continuous scrutiny by the partners involved anti their supporters. 
6.2 	Future Research  
This study explored some questions for future research opportunities. For instance, this thesis 
pointed out the particularity of the Brazilian social context: in which the local NGOs were 
created. In this context, social and environmental movements have the same roots, and 
environmental struggles cannot he dissociated from social demands. Therefore, NGOs in 
Brazil that focus on social development share the same limelight with women's organizations, 
Indian right's groups and environmental groups (see item 4.2 The Other Partner: The Brazilian 
Environmental Movement). In contrast, US environmental NGOs devoted their attention 
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primarily to environmental issues. However, this cultural and political contrast between US 
and Brazilian NGOs is similar to other dichotomies, such as between US mainstream 
environmental and grassroots organizations, as well as between the poor Brazilian North and 
the rich Brazilian South. Some studies on different environmentalist traditions have been 
carried on by the American scholars Gottlieb (1992) and Pulido (1096), and by Guha and 
Martinez-Allier (1997). However, most of these studies have stressed the differences between 
such traditions. Future studies could cover the experiences of collaboration between these 
traditions and the limits of these collaborations. 
The case of the Amazon may offer guidelines for the development of environmental 
international actions out of a multicultural basis. These may include North and South 
environmentalism, subaltern social movements (Pulido, 1996) and mainstream organizations, 
and biocentric and anthropocentric environmental traditions. It may also help to shape NGO 
policies toward other global environmental problems, such as biodiversity and the 
conservation of globalcommons, problems that also involve a complex web of sometimes 
conflicting and sometimes legitimate interests.  
The question of NGOs' legitimacy in global environmental politics deserves a more 
comprehensive study than what was presented here. International relations scholars, such as 
Wapner (1997), Conka and Lipschutz (1993a) and other have explored the theme. It is not 
clear in their studies, however, whether environmental global NGOs have a different: platform 
of legitimacy than other transnational NGOs (such as gender or development NGOs due to th ir l nk with science, a fundamental legitimating agent for environment issues. 
The methods used in this research proved to be rich and robust for the verification of 
our hypothesis. Future research would especially benefit from further use of structured 
interviews for multicultural sources. 
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This research has focused more on the US side of the Amazon coalitions. Future 
research could explore better the Brazilian side of these coalitions, and the effect that this 
experience had on the Brazilian NGOs' action and policies. 
6.3 	Significance  
The current globalization of the world makes more and more frequent the meeting of agents 
with different cultural backgrounds in international environmental forums. Moreover, the 
transboundary characteristics of environmental issues themselves points to the increasing 
interaction of such agents, troubled by common questions. 
The experience of coalitions in the Amazon rainforest, presented by this thesis, offers 
a possible guideline to understand and optimize such interactions, by taking into account 
ecological pre-conditions and social/cultural imperatives.  
APPENDIX I 
INTERVIEW WITH OFFICERS OF US NGOS  
The following questions were send by email on September 15, 1998 to the 
interviewees. The answers were collected between October 1997 and .March 1998. The 
interview is composed in three parts: a brief identification of the officer; general information 
on the organization and a longer questionnaire on their action and thoughts about the 
Brazilian Amazon. The interview ends with an overall assessment of the organization's action 
in the Amazon. 
Except for Schwartzman and Borges, whose interviews. were conducted by phone, all 
the other officers answered the questions by email. The list of interviewees and dates when the 
interviews were conducted is in OTHER REFERENCES. 
The structured interviews were used mainly in Chapters 3, Thinking Globally, Acting Globally, a d 4, Coalition: A Network M d  of Conflict, Diversity and Alliances. 
Officer 
1. Complete name 
2. Job description at die Organization 
3. 	Brief background (Academic Graduation, previous experience in Amazon, how you would 
like to be described). 
4.   How were you hired by this organization? 
Organization  
1. Name and foundation year. 
2. Where does it have its headquarters? 
3. Flow is die representation in the US? How is the representation in Brazil or other Amazon 
Countries? 
4. How is the NGOs' activities funded? (contribution of members, projects, Governmental 
funding, or other) 





1. How and when did your organization decided to establish a camping on the Amazon 
rainforest? Could you explain a bit of the decision making process? 
2. Which factors were more relevant for the starting of an Amazon campaign in your 
organization (please give a value to each one of the factors below and/or suggest others)? 
In other words, why is the Amazon relevant for your organization? 
• Biodiversity 
• Forest for itself 
• Forest people's situation 
• Forest Sustainability experiences 
• Future uses for medicine 
• Greenhouse effect 
3. And which factors were more relevant to you? 
4. What are the major issues of the campaign? 
• Animal trade 
• Consumption patterns 
• Deforestation rates 
• Indians rights 
• Mahogany 
• Others (please specify) 
• Sustainability 
5. What is the relationship of your organization with local NGOs? And with local 
governments?  
6. How does your organization act inside USA? 
• Direct action 
6 Public awareness campaign 
• Lobby 
✓ Others (please exemplify) 
7. Have you notice any change of perspective on the way your organization deals with 
Amazon issues, since you have entered the organization? 
to 	Loss or gain of importance of the Amazon as an issue. 
✓ Loss or gain of importance of any of the factors mentioned before 
8.  Have you noticed any kind of difficulty of relationship with the local NGOs? Why? Can 
you   exemplify? 
9. Some consider the concern of non-local NGOs on the Amazon issue an undue intrusion 
of foreigners in the local countries' sovereignty. Have you faced this argument before? 
Being a Brazilian officer in a transnational NG 0, how do you deal with it? 
flow do you see the Amazon campaign in a con I ext. of conflict between North and South? 
How do you see the action or your organization in this context? How do you see your 
action in this context?  
APPENDIX II 
MANIFESTO TO THE POPULATION 
PREDATORY LOGGING THREATENS AMAZONIA.  
1. This year marks the 500th anniversary of Europeans coming to the Americas. This is the 
right time for a deep and critical evaluation of the course followed by the societies that 
devolved from European contact with the peoples and nature of this region. Regarding the 
relationship of Brazilian society with the environment, the evaluation of these centuries can be 
defined as a real tragedy. During this period cycles of predatory exploitation of natural 
resources took place aimed at meeting foreign needs and markets. The consequences of these 
cycles have been always the same: environmental destruction and social impoverishment. 
2. In Brazil the exploitation of Pau Brasil, a red timber and dye, was the first mark of this cruel 
process. Its consequences are well-known: the disorderly occupation of the territory, the 
cultural disintegration of indigenous populations, the destruction of forest ecosystems, the 
extinction of species and the dilapidation of natural resources. This took place for die benefit 
of a selfish elite and their international partners. (Pau Brasil became commercially extinct in the 
first century of colonization). 
3. Today, five centuries later, we can realize how much this pattern of exploitation, referred to 
as development, is still present. The Amazon region provides many examples of this pattern of 
development and is still submitted to an irrational process of devastation. and disorderly 
occupation. Already 415,000 square kilometers of the Brazilian Amazon have been deforested, 
about equivalent in size to Germany. The fruits of this devastation are more than questionable: 
the destruction of tens of indigenous cultures, huge unproductive farms generating very few 
jobs, illegal and highly polluting gold mining projects, colonists with abysmal living conditions 
and the advance of prostitution and drug dealing. 
Instead of recognizing these mistakes and taking up ecologically viable projects in the areas 
already deforested (such as agrarian reform, ecological agriculture and forest restoration) the 
agricultural frontier continues to push into primary forest areas reproducing the same mistakes 
of the past. As affirmed by rim signatories to this Manifesto, colonists prefer to settle in the 
vast areas already cleared from the forest anti do not wish to be pushed into the jungle where 
living conditions are much harder, lt makes no sense to destroy more virgin forest when the 
result of the deforestation promoted so far are totally absurd in terms of ecological and 
economic aspects. 
4. It is ironic that one of the major economic forces that continues this destructive and 
disordered penetration of the Amazon forest: is very similar to the extinguished 
Pau Brasil in the beginning of the colonization of Brazil. Today, the logging industry, and 
especially Mahogany logging, seriously threatens the future of much of the Amazon forest. 
5. Mahogany is the most valuable Brazilian timber sold on the international market:. The 
species is found over a huge area of die southern Amazon covering much of the states of Para, 
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Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Rondonia and Acre. The big sawmill owners who pay for the search 
and extraction of this "green gold" do not consider how their industry leads to the degradation 
and eventual complete destruction of primary forest areas. Mahogany is a rare tree and its 
exploitation requires loggers to move into more and more remote forest areas each year. More 
than 3,000 kilometers of major roads and tens of thousands of kilometers of secondary roads 
have been illegally pushed in the southern Amazon in the last ten years to extract Mahogany. 
After cutting out all marketable Mahogany in a given area the logging  companies move on, 
leaving their access roads for colonists, gold miners and displaced poor who consolidate the 
destruction of the forest. The exploitation of timber in general and the cutting of Mahogany in 
particular are the driving force leading to forest destruction in the southern Amazon today. 
6. Most of the Mahogany extracted in Brazil is taken from the territories of indigenous 
peoples. There are numerous reports of Mahogany trees being cut down and removed from 
indigenous lands despite resistance of Indian communities against this usurpation of their 
territory. At the same time, strong pressure and the allurement of Indian leaders - sometimes 
with the assistance of Funai employees - has led some indigenous communities to sign 
contracts allowing the extraction of Mahogany on their lands. These agreements, however, 
have not been approved by the relevant government authorities and are legally invalid. Such 
timber deals have often led to the political fragmentation and cultural degradation of Indian 
groups. These communities learn by example that ecological destruction through over-
exploitation of the forest is the only alternative that can allow them access to outside assistance 
and consumer goods. 
In the last ten years the number of indigenous communities that have become victims of the 
Mahogany boom has more than doubled. The problem is bound to get worse as almost all the 
remaining stands of Mahogany are located inside indigenous territories. The lack of 
enforcement from Funai and IBA MA, the federal environment: agency, has encouraged the 
exploitation of Mahogany from indigenous land from logging companies. Over the last 
two years in the state of Para, the bulk of all Mahogany produced comes from trees illegally 
extracted from indigenous lands. 
7. The ecological impacts of the Mahogany industry are equally serious. Areas of protected 
forest such as the Biological Reserve of Guaporé in Rondonia and the Extractive Reserve 
Chico Mendes in Acre have been systematically invaded by Mahogany loggers. National Parks 
throughout the region have also been violated. Due to intense exploitation, the Amazonian 
Mahogany species, Sweitenia macrophylla King was added to the official list of Brazilian 
species threatened with extinction in 1992.. There is some debate regarding how close the 
species is to extinction but the fact remains that if left unchecked, the current pattern of 
exploitation of Mahogany will drive the species to extinction in the Amazon in a few short 
years. 
Wherever the Mahogany exploitation frontier has passed, the species has become practically 
extinct. In the 1960s, Mahogany was extracted in the Araguaia region of Para. After the 
commercial extinction of the species in this region, the loggers moved forward along the 
highway PA 150. During the 1980s this same predatory pattern moved into the occidental part 
of Amazonia towards the Xingu River. Today the Mahogany loggers have already crossed the 
Xingu and keep advancing.  
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In addition to the role that logging roads play in opening up primary forest to other destructive 
influences, Mahogany logging itself causes considerable ecological damage. Studies show that 
for each cut tree around 28 other trees are killed and some 1,450 square meters of forest are 
damaged.. The few attempts at growing the species in plantations in the Amazon are still in 
their early stages and only occupy a small area when compared with the amount of forest 
damaged by the industry each year. To date, none of the plantations have demonstrated the 
ability to overcome attacks of the moth (Hypsipella grandella) common in commercial 
Mahogany plantations. Such plantations are often used to justify the continuation of the 
Mahogany industry in natural forests rather than a real search for concrete alternatives to 
forest destruction. 
8. Despite all the problems mentioned above there are people and companies still defending 
the exploitation of Mahogany as a source of economic development for the Brazilian Amazon. 
Even this argument must be contested. The Mahogany industry is made up of an extensive 
chain of informal actors and middlemen who are controlled by a small elite group of sawmills 
and exporters. The industry generates relatively Few jobs and the bulk of the profits are made 
in the importing countries or in the southeast of Brazil. The Mahogany sawmills belong to 
business groups which moved to Amazonia after exhausting the timber resources in the 
Atlantic Coast Rainforests and the Araucaria forests in the South of Brazil. 
In addition to the impunity with which Mahogany loggers still operate in nature reserves and 
on indigenous lands, there are strong indications that the industry includes a substantial 
number of companies engaging in tax Fraud through concealing information regarding the 
source and the correct volume of extracted logs. 
9. Given the seriousness of the economic, ecological and social impact of the industry and the 
clear evidence that Mahogany extraction is perpetuating and intensifying the chaotic model of 
occupation in Amazonia to the detriment of Brazilian society, the following groups, many of 
which deal directly with this problem, have formulated the following demands: 
10. A) That the Brazilian government through its competent institutions must face up to this 
problem by prohibiting all cutting and trade of Mahogany in the Amazon region until it has 
evaluated the extent of damage caused by the industry to date, and defined through a wide 
debate among all interested parties!  legal measures necessary to halt this chaotic process. 
This measure is necessary to achieve the following objectives: a) Mahogany losers do not 
build illegal and inadequate roads into primary forest areas, and that: existing logging roads are 
used appropriately or closed; b) all exploitation of Mahogany trees in areas designated for 
ecological preservation is halted; e) all exploitation of Mahogany in indigenous areas and 
extractive reserves is halted and at the same lime the government concretely supports the 
efforts of the forest peoples and communities to find economic and non-predatory alternatives 
For their survival and development; d) the dynamic of predatory logging leading to the 
extinction of species in areas reached by Mahogany exploitation is stopped. 
B) That the solution of the problems caused by the Mahogany industry must be seen as the 
First step in the implementation of policies and programs to end all forms of predatory logging 
in Amazonia. This policy on Mahogany should serve as a guide to transform all logging 
activities throughout the region; including restricting the areas where logging is allowed,  
133 
defining rigidly the technical conditions acceptable for logging operations, halting the violation 
of protected areas and indigenous territories, and enforcing prohibitions on the cutting of 
species forbidden by law such as the Brazil-nut tree. 
NGOs signing the Manifesto of the "Coalition against Predatory Logging in the Amazon" 
(November 12): 
Ação Ecológica Vale do Guapore: ECOPORE (Rondonia) 
Associação de Proteção Ambiental e Recuperação de Areas Indigenas: APARAI (Rondonia) 
Associação Profissional dos Engenheiros Florestais do Rio de Janeiro: APEFERJ (Rio de 
Janeiro) 
AWARU: Organização de Apoio ao Povo Nambikwara (Rondonia) 
Casa da Cultura de Marabá (Para) 
Centro Agroambiental do Tocantins: CAT (Para) 
Centro Ecumênico de Documentação e In Informação: CEDI (Sao Paulo) 
Centro de Educação, Pesquisa e Assessoria Popular. CRPASP (Para) 
Centro de Trabalho Indigenista: CT1 (Sao Paulo) 
Conselho Nacional dos Seringueiros (Acre e Para) 
Centro Mari de Educação lndigena: CM El (Sao Paulo) 
Centro de Defesa dos Direitos Humanos (Amazonas) 
Centro Ecumênico de Estudos Biblicos: CEBI (Amazonas) 
Centro dos Trabalhadores da Amazônia: CTI (Acre) 
Centro de Defesa dos Direitos Humanos e Educação Popular: CDDHEP (Acre) 
Comitê Chico Mendes (Acre) 
Comissão pela Criação do Parque Yanomami: CCPY (Sao Paulo) 
Comissão Pro-Indio do Acre (Acre) 
Comissão Pro-Índio de Sao Paulo: CPI/SP (Sao Paulo) 
Comissão Pastoral da Terra do Acre: CPT/AC (Acre) 
Comissão Pastoral da Terra de Rondônia: CPT/RO (Rondonia) 
Comissão Pastoral da Terra do Amazonas: CPT/AM (Amazonas) 
Comissão Pastoral da Terra do Pará e A Amapá: CPT/PA (Pará) 
Conselho Indigenista Missionário Nacional: CIMI/Nac (Brasilia) 
Conselho Tndigenista Missionário do Norte is CI MI/Norte I (Pará) 
Conselho Indigenista Missionário dry Norte II: CIMI/Norte II (Amazonas) 
Conselho Indigenista Missionário: Regional 	Rondônia 
Conselho de Missão entre us Indic da lgrejn tie Confissão Luterana do Brasil (Rio Grande do 
Sul) 
Coordenação das Organizaçôes Indígenas da Amazônia Brasileira: COIAB (Amazonas) 
Central Única dos Trabalhadores tin Sudeste do Pará (Pará) 
Delegacia dos Urbanitários de Marabá (Pará) 
Ecoforça (São Paulo) 
Forum das Organizações Não-Governamentais q ue Atuam em Rondônia (Rondonia) 
Fundação de Apoio a Vida nos Trópicos 
ECOTROPICA (Mato Grosso) 
Fundação Serra das Andorinhas (Para) 
Fundação Mata Virgem (Brasilia) 
Fundaço SOS Amazonia (Acre) 
Greenpeace Brasil, Campanha Lie Florestas (Rio de Janeiro) 
Grupo de Trabalho Missionário Evangélico: 	GTME (Mato Grosso) 
Instituro de Antropologia e Meio Ambiente: IAMA (Sao Paulo) 
Instituto de Estudos Amazônicos: IEA (Brasilia)  tituto de Soci
ó-Econômicos: INESC (Brasilia) 
stituto de Pesquisa em Defesa da Identidale mazônica: INDIA (Rondonia) 
Movimento Nacional de Aristas pela Natureza (Brasilia) ovimento de Educação de Base (Pará) vimento de Apoio a Resistência Waimir-Atroari: MAREWA (Amazonas) Núcleo de Direitos Indíg n s: NDI (BrasilOperaçã Anchiet  OPAN (M to Grosso) Pastoral Indigenist  de Manau  (Amazonas) storal I digenista do Al  S limões (Amazona ) ro eçã  Amb tal Caco lense: PAC  (Rondonia) rogra  de Estu o s bre Terras Indígenas no Br l: PETI Rio de J neiroSindic to de Peq en  Agricultores e Assalariados Rurais de Rio Branco: SINPASA (Acre)  indic to dos Professores Particul re  d  ará (Pará) a T abalhadores Rurais de Brejo Grande (Pará) Si i t  s r   u Branco (Pará) nd c o do l r s r is Eldorado (Pará) i i at  s Traba hado e u a  de Itupi nga (Pará) S l r s R r is  Marabá (Pará) indic to dos r  i   Novo Rep timento (Pará) a T abalhadores ura s de Parauap b s (Pará) Si i t  s r  r is  São João (Pará) nd c o do l r s R Tuc rui (Pará) i i at  s Trabalhadores em Educação Pública de Marabá (Pará) Sociedade Paraense de Defesa dos Direit s H m nos: SDDH União das N çõ s In ígenas do Acre: UNI/AC (Acre) 
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